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Post-crisis trade and investment opportunitiesiii
The Asia-Pacific region has made a vigorous comeback from the global economic crisis and is currently
leading world economic growth. However, not all countries have benefited equally from this rebound.
Furthermore, as the second decade of the twenty-first century proceeds, the region faces various challenges,
such as high food and fuel prices, continued malaise in most of the developed economies, and a higher
incidence of natural disasters that affect trade and investment. At the same time, there are also plenty
of opportunities. With its focus on the theme “Post-crisis trade and investment opportunities”, this year’s
Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Report identifies the challenges and opportunities for trade and investment
in the region. The report concludes that, with the right policies and strengthened regional cooperation, the
region would be able to continue its strong trade- and investment-led growth.
According to the report, export and import values in the region have already returned to pre-crisis levels, while
investment inflows are recovering, albeit at a slower rate, particularly in Central and South Asia. The recovery
from the crisis has, to a large extent, been driven by intraregional trade, including trade among developing
countries of the region, with China at the centre. In fact, as shown in the report, trade within the region is
growing more rapidly than the region’s trade with the rest of the world, potentially contributing to a deeper
level of regional integration. Therefore, opportunities for export expansion will depend largely on the growth of
intraregional demand and the ability of various developing countries of the region to restructure and diversify
their exports to meet that demand. This would also allow those countries to improve the purchasing power of
their exports to meet the higher prices of imported food and fuel. Foreign direct investment could play an
important role in this regard.
The report shows that the services are an important emerging sector and that various developing Asia-Pacific
economies are leading the recovery in exports of commercial services, with the group as an average
recording a growth rate of more than 20 per cent in 2010. However, in contrast to merchandise trade, the
region has run a deficit with the rest of the world in services trade, although the situation is gradually
improving. The report notes that there is scope to expand intraregional trade in some services.
Another important growth area is that of climate-smart goods and services. Some Asia-Pacific countries are
already world leaders in the production and export of these goods and services, which help mitigate
greenhouse gas emissions. According to the report, the estimated untapped export potential of climate-smart
goods in Asia and the Pacific was $30 billion to $35 billion in 2008. Similarly, it was estimated that
investments worth about $600 billion per year over and above current investment levels were required in
order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to desired levels. As the region will have to come to terms with the
expected effects of climate change, there is a collective imperative to increase regional trade and investment
in these goods, which would benefit companies in different parts of the supply chain, and, hence all countries,
no matter what their stage of development.
In making the case for increased trade and investment, the report notes that the region continues to face
challenges associated with protectionism. While the incidence of at-the-border protectionist measures has
remained limited despite the crisis, it has been found that behind-the-border measures have been used
comprehensively throughout the crisis and continue to be a prevalent trade policy tool during the current
economic recovery. With the continued stalling of the Doha multilateral trade negotiations, regional trade
agreements remain a critical approach to preventing and reducing protectionism. In this context, the report
notes the continued expansion of regional trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific region. Despite the fact that
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the trend is for these agreements to be more comprehensive in coverage and depth, actual utilization of trade
preferences and their effects on trade creation remain relatively limited. The report recommends giving
a fresh look at the negotiation of the rules under these agreements in order to make them perform their
enabling role so that businesses can trade more efficiently, more quickly and more smoothly.
The report emphasizes that Governments need to step up efforts to improve the environment for business
and investment. This requires regulatory reform and concerted efforts at the national and regional levels to
reduce non-tariff barriers and associated trade costs and to improve trade infrastructure and logistics. These
issues are particularly important for small and medium-sized enterprises, as they normally make up the
majority of all enterprises in any given economy but continue to face severe constraints. Such constraints
undermine their potential to provide employment and generate growth, and affect their ability to integrate
effectively into regional and global value chains.
I strongly support the recommendations of the report and call on all Governments of the region to give them
due consideration.
Noeleen Heyzer
Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations and
     Executive Secretary of ESCAPv
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Export recovery has led Asia and the Pacific out of the
global financial crisis, allowing the region to emerge as
an important stabilizing force and an engine of global
economic growth. However, it is challenging for Asian
economies to maintain the growth momentum, given
that the traditional developed economies of the Group
of Three (G3: the European Union, Japan and the
United States) will all face economic slowdown in the
medium-to-long term. The developing economies of
Asia and the Pacific, normally the champions of
export-led growth, may see their export growth almost
halved, to 9% in 2011 from 17.3% in 2010.
The region's trade remains dependent on external
factors. It is unlikely that the region can completely
decouple itself from the rest of the world, because
many of the economies of the region have been deeply
integrated into global production chains. It is expected,
however, that Asian and the Pacific economies will
have to rely less on G3 consumers for final demand,
and more on domestic and regional demand. Recent
trends and opportunities signal that several factors are
at work in support of Asia and the Pacific becoming
more resilient to external shocks and maintaining the
growth trajectory. These include:
● The expected robust growth and massive
urbanization in the region, especially in China
and India. This signals continuing growth of
intraregional final demand and a partial offsetting
of weak long-term demand from the G3;
● Increasing global awareness of climate change
that opens up new business opportunities for
innovative producers to develop and export new
goods and services, especially in the areas of
water, energy, and resource efficiency promotion.
Several Asian economies, such as China, Japan
and the Republic of Korea have already taken the
lead in the development and utilization of climate-
smart goods and technologies (CSGTs). Others
could follow this lead to integrate with regional
climate-smart value chains. However, a
supporting policy environment and sizeable
investments are necessary preconditions to
becoming market leaders in this area;
● A great potential for Asia-Pacific developing
economies to expand trade and investment in
services. Developing Asia-Pacific economies
have an abundance of low and semi-skilled
labour that is a major input to tourism,
construction and transport services. Some of
these economies are also investing in creating
the high-skilled human capital necessary
fo the development of knowledge-intensive
services. Irrespective of the services sector,
proper regulatory reforms, including liberalization
of trade and investment in services, are keys to
the expansion of trade in services, as well as an
enhanced contribution of services to national
economic efficiency;
● The rapidly rising labour costs in fast-growing
developing economies such as China and India
could be an incentive for manufacturers in those
economies to move up the industrial value chain;
● Import more from low-income Asian and Pacific
economies. The transformation of China's
industrial structure, in particular, would further
deepen the integration of China's production
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network with other economies in the region and
spur intraregional trade. A recent increase in
South-South foreign direct investment (FDI)
received by lower-income Asian economies
appears to support the emergence of this
catching-up process.
(f) Mutually reinforcing multilateral and regional
cooperation.
1. CAPTURING OPPORTUNITIES FROM
THE  INCREASING ECONOMIC
STRENGTH OF ASIA AND
THE PACIFIC
Trade cannot materialize if there is no demand for
goods and services. While intraregional final demand
can only partially offset the weak demand from Europe
and North America, there is much more scope for
further growth of the region's consumption. Low-
income developing economies in the region (referred
to as "developing Asia") are still in the early stages of
development. The expected massive urbanization in
the region, especially in China and India, signals plenty
of opportunities for production and export of not only
raw materials and intermediate inputs, but also
consumer and capital goods by the rest of the region.
Such a transformation will require major adjustments
of both demand and supply.
On the demand side, just 12 economies in the region
account for more than 90% of the total regional
demand for imports. Thus, the projections for their
import growth, together with existing and potential
trade complementarities, are an important determinant
of the export prospects of the region (as well as the
rest of the world). Based on matching between current
import demand of major Asian importers and export
patterns of economies in the region, Asian economies
need to strengthen their position as viable and
valuable trading partners of China and other important
regional economies with potentially large import
demand. Meanwhile, Asian importers will need to
increase not only domestic consumption, but also the
intraregional import content of domestic consumption.
2. MOVING FORWARD WITH CLIMATE-
SMART GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES
Climate-smart goods and technologies1 are receiving
much attention as a potential source of growth, as the
expansion of trade in environmental goods and
services on a global scale will create many
1  CSGTs are defined in chapter 5, annex table V.1. See also
chapter 5, section D.
This report postulates necessary reforms needed to
capture those opportunities, with the ultimate goal of
achieving inclusive and sustainable growth. This will
require major changes and policy actions, including:
(a) Adjustments in production and export structure in
order to capture opportunities from the increasing
strength of Asia and the Pacific;
(b) Moving forward with the global expansion of trade
and investment in climate-smart goods and
technologies;
(c) Regulatory reform and investment to improve
efficient supply of services, including the
elimination of bottlenecks in the infrastructure
services sector;
(d) Improving the physical and institutional
infrastructure necessary for facilitating
intraregional trade;
(e) Greater integration of small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) into the regional and global
value chains;
South-South foreign direct investment increasing
in Asia and the Pacific
Developing economies of Asia and the Pacific are
gaining importance as sources of FDI in the region,
complementing FDI from those developed economies
that have been traditional sources. For example, low-
income ASEAN members (i.e. Cambodia, the Lao
People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Viet
Nam), have experienced increasing intra-ASEAN FDI
inflows compared with the more industrialized and
higher income ASEAN member countries such as the
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. This is an
indication of increased South-South FDI within
ASEAN. In South Asia, Indian enterprises have
become the main investors in smaller-sized
neighbouring markets, such as Nepal and Sri Lanka.
(More details in part 1, chapter 4.)
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international business opportunities. This report
reveals that apart from China, Japan and the Republic
of Korea, which have already positioned themselves
as global exporters of CSGTs; various economies in
Asia and the Pacific (including low-income economies)
also have untapped opportunities to become CSGT
exporters. Regional climate-smart value chains could
provide new opportunities for many less developed
economies in the region to become parts and
components suppliers to the leading CSGT exporters.
At the same time, the capacity of domestic SMEs in
the area of CSGTs should be enhanced so that they
can evolve into suppliers of low-carbon products and
become effectively integrated with low-carbon value
chains.
Based on an analysis of trade-related emission
intensity indices and export gaps for selected
economies of the region, the report finds that the
successful development of sustainable (also known as
"green") trade depends on policies that influence
technology choice and consumer behaviour rather
than policies that only adjust relative border prices
(i.e., trade policies). Investment in renewable energy
technologies could help develop the capacity of
businesses to expand trade in CSGTs. However,
investment decisions are also driven by many other
factors, including trade policies (tariffs, non-tariff
barriers such as standards etc.), and policies that
affect labour mobility.
3. REGULATORY REFORM TO IMPROVE
EFFICIENCY OF TRADE AND
INVESTMENT IN SERVICES
Opportunities for the expansion of trade and
investment in services remain under-exploited,
especially within the region. This report emphasizes
the fact that proper regulatory reforms, including
liberalization of trade and investment in services, are a
key to the expansion of trade in services as well as the
enhancement of contribution of services to national
economic efficiencies.
In addition, more effective international and regional
cooperation will greatly facilitate liberalization and
regulation of cross-border trade in various services. A
particular focus of reforms should be bottlenecks in
infrastructural services: communications, transport,
energy and water, financial services and other related
services, as they (a) form the backbone of industrial
development, (b) play a crucial role in support of trade
facilitation, (c) help to enhance competitiveness
of business entities, especially local SMEs, and
(d) contribute irreplaceable inputs to improving national
economic efficiency.
4. TRADE FACILITATION
Effective trade facilitation is essential for greater and
deeper integration of Asian economies into regional
and global value chains, where cost efficiency is
highly sensitive to trade costs because parts and
components have to be traded across borders several
times at different stages of production. Despite the fact
that active participation by Asian economies in the
regional and global value chains have spurred trade
between Asian economies, data from the ESCAP
Trade Costs Database indicate trade costs between
neighbouring economies in the region tend to be more
expensive than trade between economies located
much further apart.
Thus, greater facilitation of intraregional trade is
needed in order to improve cost efficiency and to
strengthen Asia's position as the global production
base. This report identifies specific policies and actions
specifically required for that purpose. Trade costs of
many economies of the region have decreased largely
due to tariff cuts; however, much remains to be done to
address non-tariff barriers. Non-tariff trade costs of
many Asia-Pacific developing economies – particularly
with regard to trade with developed economies – are
found to have changed little, and have sometimes
even increased. In fact, while ESCAP estimates reveal
that many countries of the region have made
significant progress in reducing costs over the past
decade, they also show that in many cases nearly half
the cost reduction may be attributed to tariff cuts.
Given that non-tariff trade costs account for at least
90% of overall trade costs, economies should
therefore increase their efforts to remove non-tariff
barriers, including those arising from unnecessarily
cumbersome procedures and regulations or
inadequate logistics services, if they are to make
further progress.
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5. GREATER INTEGRATION OF SMES
INTO GLOBAL TRADE
While SMEs in Asia-Pacific economies play a crucial
role in creating employment, in general they appear to
make a relatively lower contribution to exports. SMEs'
contribution to exports of Asia-Pacific economies lies
between 14% for Malaysia and 69% for China.
However, SMEs could actually play a larger role in the
export economy than is suggested by these statistics
because many SMEs are exporting indirectly through
wholesalers and as producers of intermediate inputs.
Export contribution of SMEs could be enhanced further
by supportive measures aimed at improving their
performance and helping them gain access to
international markets, especially through regional and
global value chains.
SMEs in Asia and the Pacific typically lack the
environment to improve their capacity, including (a) a
proper policy and regulatory framework, (b) supporting
infrastructure, and (c) access to finance, market
information, technology incubation and business
Non-tariff intra- and extraregional trade costs in Asia and the Pacific, 2007
Reporter
Source: ESCAP Trade Cost Database.
Notes: Trade costs between reporters and their partners are shown as a percentage and may be interpreted as tariff equivalents.
ASEAN-4: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. European Union-5: France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United
Kingdom. SAARC-4: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
development services. Therefore, they will be the
largest beneficiary from a policy to promote efficiency
and universal availability of infrastructure services and
trade facilitation. In this context, FDI could play an
important role, both directly and indirectly. FDI could
be a crucial source of capital, management skills,
technological transfer and infrastructure services. In
addition, FDI could indirectly accelerate capacity of
domestic SMEs through its backward and forward
linkages with the domestic economy. Increasing the
awareness of SMEs regarding how to access
preferences under existing regional trade agreements





With the inability to complete the WTO Doha
Development Round, bilateral and regional trade
arrangements have proliferated rapidly in Asia and
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xxEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
prominent contribution to the global regionalism trend,
with at least 50% of all agreements being put into force
annually associated with economies from this region.
Despite the rapidly growing number of RTAs, their
impact on trade does not appear to be always very
large. Apart from the lagging utilization of negotiated
preferences, exports covered by the agreements are
also relatively low. It is found that only 38% of Asia-
Pacific exports are to economies with which RTAs
are in force. This report emphasizes the fact that
complexity of the rules of origin may be one of the
main reasons for this outcome. The high cost of
compliance makes RTAs less attractive for traders,
and thus the actual margin of preference that could
have a downwards effect on the prices of traded goods
– and thus generate additional demand – is not used.
Although RTAs are not cost-free to implement and may
have some other weaknesses, many are already in
place, and more will be signed as long as the Doha
Round negotiations do not close successfully. This
report therefore suggests ways of reconciling this
reality with Asia's regional and global interests.
Possible solutions for making existing RTAs a major
asset that enables the region to trade faster, more
cheaply and more extensively are linked to making
RTAs less restrictive and more multilaterally-friendly.
The first step is to try to consolidate the large number
of RTAs in the region, especially with regard to rules
of origin (RoO). If all agreements follow the same
template for RoO, the time saving between using them
or the ordinary MFN-based rules would be sharply
increased. Revised RoO would also allow less
restrictive cumulation rules (e.g. diagonal or full
cumulation), duty drawback, outsourcing and higher de
minimis levels, and more trader-friendly methods of
proving origin, such as self-certification. It is still
unclear who will introduce this initiative for
consolidation, given that the current configuration
of trading blocs in Asia and the Pacific reveals
a complete lack of links among them. Since there is no
appetite for creation of a new institution in the region
(e.g. an Asian Agreement on Trade and Investment),
a regional body such as ESCAP can play a role in
helping economies that suffer from difficulties in
utilizing the negotiated tariff preferences to collectively
push forward an initiative to simplify RoO in the
agreements between themselves.
The next viable option is thinning the margin of
preference by deepening MFN liberalization in the
sectors in which the Asia-Pacific economies are most
interested. Removal of the margin of preference
between the MFN rates and (current) preferential rates
by reducing the MFN rates to zero would make RTAs
irrelevant for market access. In addition, pursuing a
negotiation of WTO-plus elements in new RTAs is also
desirable in making regional agreements among Asian
and Pacific economies a building block in multilateral
liberalization.
xxiASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
Proportion of export directed to partners in regional trade agreements
(an average for 2007-2009)
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Trade in the Asian and Pacific region has recovered
strongly since the first quarter of 2010. While world
trade is still struggling towards a full recovery, monthly
trade values for Asia and the Pacific have already
returned to the pre-crisis level. Merchandise trade in
the region grew by more than 30% in 2010, compared
CHAPTER 1
MERCHANDISE TRADE CONTINUES TO REBOUND
Figure 1. World and Asia-Pacific trade recovery,2  2008-2010
with 21% growth in world merchandise trade. Although
export and import growth rates slowed in the second
half of 2010, they were still more than 20% in the last
quarter of 2010 (figure 1).
“While world trade is still struggling towards a
full recovery...trade in Asia and the Pacific has
already returned to the pre-crisis level”
2 "Asia-Pacific" in the WTO short-term statistics comprises: Australia; Bangladesh; China; Fiji; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia;
Japan; Republic of Korea; Macao, China; Malaysia; Maldives; Mongolia; New Zealand; Pakistan; Philippines; Samoa; Singapore; Sri
Lanka; Taiwan Province of China; Thailand; and Viet Nam. In ESCAP, the geographical classification "Asia-Pacific" also covers:
Armenia; Azerbaijan; Bhutan; Brunei Darussalam; Cambodia; French Polynesia; Georgia; Islamic Republic of Iran; Kazakhstan;
Kiribati; Kyrgyzstan; Lao People's Democratic Republic; Myanmar; Nepal; Papua New Guinea; New Caledonia; Russian Federation;
Tajikistan; and Uzbekistan. These economies have a small trade volume and, hence, their omission from figure 1 does not
significantly affect the trend analysis.
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Trade has recovered throughout the region. There has
been very little variation in the pace of rebound for
most economies (figure 2). However, uncertainties in
world economic recovery have created concerns
regarding the sustainability of Asia-Pacific growth.
While the recovery of major world economies (the
European Union, Japan and the United States) is
continuing at a slower pace, growth of Asia-Pacific
exports and imports has actually declined since the
last quarter of 2010. This decline is partly a reflection
of trade growth "normalization", since in early 2010 the
changes were measured relative to the negative
growth in 2009 (see annex figure I.1). Trade growth
also eased because of a general slowing of the global
economic recovery.
Recent export data on traditional export sectors
confirm these recovery patterns (see annex figure I.2).
Export growth rates of key export sectors had already
reached pre-crisis levels, but started to taper off at the
end of 2010 and early 2011. The export slowdown has
become more obvious in the case of China than in
other exporting countries. The Asia-Pacific Trade and
Investment Report 2010 argued that export growth of
Asian countries was driven by the inventory cycle of
China (ESCAP, 2010; ESCAP, 2011a; IMF, 2011a).
Thus, if China's export growth slowdown continues,
export recovery in other Asian and Pacific economies
in 2011 is also expected to stagnate.
“In 2010, China and India suffered a worse
deterioration in their terms-of-trade than the rest
of developing Asia”
Although the export volume of the Asian and Pacific
region grew more rapidly than the import volume, the
great volatility in primary commodity prices in 2010 has
seriously affected the export purchasing power of the
region's developing economies. Most developing
economies in the region depend heavily on importation
of energy, food and/or industrial raw materials. They
have experienced large fluctuations in their terms-of-
trade in the recent past, and the direction of change in
their terms-of-trade followed an almost completely
opposite cycle to the terms-of-trade of the dominant
exporters of energy and raw materials from Asia and
the Pacific (see annex figure I.3).
In 2010, China and India, in particular, suffered a
worse deterioration in their terms-of-trade than the rest
Figure 2. Export and import growth of selected Asian countries, 2008-2010
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3  This conclusion is derived from a comparison of trends in
terms-of-trade for all Asian developing economies with those
for all Asian developing economies excluding China and India,
with the first group experiencing worse terms-of-trade from
1993 to 2010. The terms-of-trade of developing Asia declined
by 10.7%, while that of developing Asia excluding China and
India dropped by only 4.2%.
of developing Asia.3 That, however, does not mean
other Asian developing countries can be complacent
about the impact of terms-of-trade changes on their
economies. On the contrary, they are actually
becoming increasingly concerned about the volatility of
terms-of-trade, as it could damage their long-term
growth when their foreign exchange reserves also
come under stress. Most commentators argue that
there is a high risk that volatility will remain high, given
the uncertainties in the global economic recovery and
the high degree of speculative investments in
commodity markets. Therefore, countries with less
than adequate foreign exchange reserves, will face
difficulty in coping with macroeconomic instability, and
will become increasingly vulnerable to external shocks.
“Asia and the Pacific may see their export
growth almost halved to just 9% in 2011”
Amid this global volatility of primary commodity prices
and adverse impacts of disasters, the region's
developing economies are still expected to register
strong export and import growth in 2011 (table 1).
Exports and imports by China, which account for
almost 30% of the region's export and import values,
will grow at close to or more than 10% per annum in
real terms in 2011, and slightly slower in 2012. India's
exports and imports are forecast to grow even faster,
by around 11%. Major trading economies in South-
East Asia are also expected to continue a strong
growth in their exports and imports, despite relatively
large variations between different member economies
ranging from just over 5% to around 10% respectively
(see table 1 and part III tables for more country
details). However, the developing countries of Asia and
the Pacific, representing about 90% of the regional
exports, may see their export growth almost halved
from 17.3% in 2010 to just over 9% in 2011.
Table 1. Prospects for export growth in selected economies in Asia and the Pacific
(Percentage)
Source: ESCAP estimates based on Oxford Economic Forecast (data up to May 2011), and Asia-Pacific weighted average growth
calculated by using export/import data from WTO International Trade Statistics.
a  Estimates.
b Growth of Asia and the Pacific is the export-weighted average growth rates of those observed countries. The estimates use 2010
as the base year.
c Growth of developing Asia and the Pacific is export-weighted average growth rates of those observed countries excluding Japan
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Given the impact of the recent natural disaster
in Japan, its export and import growth may
not be as dynamic as forecast. The limited amount
of research on the economic consequences of this
natural disaster suggests, however, that the trade
impact should be relatively small, especially in the
medium-to-long term (WTO, 2011a; ESCAP, 2011a).
However, some of the newly industrialized economies
(NIEs) closely linked with the Japanese economy
through production networks may also experience a
small slowdown in their economic and trading activities
in 2011. Since Japan and NIEs account for a
significant share of Asian trade (Japan accounts for
about 14% of Asia's exports and imports, while NIEs,
excluding Taiwan Province of China, account for about
22%), their slowdown needs to be monitored despite
the current prevailing opinion that the impact on the
growth of exports and imports of the rest of Asia and
the Pacific will be minimal. Notwithstanding this,
the economic fundamentals of NIEs support
expectations of resumption of robust growth in 2012
and subsequent years.
B. SUBREGIONAL AND SECTORAL
PATTERNS OF TRADE
During the decade following the 1997 Asian financial
crisis, the Asia-Pacific region, and in particular China,
gained significantly in world merchandise trade. The
region steadily increased its shares in world exports
and world imports from 29% to 36% and from 25% to
34%, respectively, during 2000-2010. The East/North-
East Asia and South-East Asia subregions accounted
for more than two thirds of the region's exports and
imports and drove its recovery in 2010.
“Asia-Pacific, and in particular China, gained
significant importance in world
merchandise trade”
However, the relative shares in total exports and
imports among the various subregions within the Asian
and Pacific region have not changed significantly
since 1998 (figure 3). The long-term changes in the
geographical composition of Asia-Pacific trade are very
similar to the changes in the subregions' shares in
world trade, thus indicating that the changes are being
driven by economies’ global relative competitiveness.
Although the shares of the various subregions in total
Asia-Pacific exports and imports have not changed
much, the pattern has become more dynamic among
individual economies (figure 4). The most striking
feature of Asia-Pacific trade dynamics is the rising role
of China, which has more than doubled its share of
Figure 3. Geographical breakdown of Asia-Pacific exports and imports,
by subregion, 1998-2010
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Asia-Pacific exports from 13.4% to 28.6%. The rising
importance of China has come at the expense of
advanced East Asian and major ASEAN economies.
Japan's share almost halved from 25.7% to 13.9%.
The joint share of the five major ASEAN economies
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand) fell from 23.3% to 19%. While NIEs such as
the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, China, also lost
market shares, several economies in transition
managed to capture marginally larger shares. As
figure 4 shows, the changes in import shares were
similar to those in exports.
“The rising importance of China in Asia-Pacific
exports and imports has come at the expense of
advanced East Asian and major ASEAN
economies”
It should also be noted that some Asian economies
with very dynamic trade growth caused dramatic
changes in the geographic composition of trade, such
as the repositioning of China, Japan, the Republic of
Korea and Hong Kong, China. In South-East Asia, Viet
Nam has surpassed the Philippines in exports, and
both the Philippines and Thailand in imports.
Figure 4. Changes of market shares for selected economies
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An analysis by sector reveals that the global trade
share of the fuel and mining sector has increased very
rapidly over the past decade at the expense of the
manufacturing sector (table 2). From 2000 to 2009, the
share of fuel and mining in world exports and imports
increased from 14% to 19%; during the same period,
the share of manufactures contracted from about 77%
to 71%, while agriculture maintained its share at
about 10%
“Rapidly rising oil prices have significantly
raised the share of fuel and mining
in Asia-Pacific exports and imports,
but not in real terms”
Source: ESCAP calculation, based on WTO International
Trade Statistics online (downloaded on 7 April 2011).
Table 2. Sectoral compositions of world and Asia-
Pacific trade, 2000 and 2009
(Percentage)
Agricultural products
Fuel and mining products
Manufactured products
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Source: WTO (2010a).
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This trend was followed by the Asia-Pacific region, with
the share of manufactures in its total exports dropping
from 81% to 76.5% during the same period, while the
share of fuel and mining in total exports increased from
12% to 17%. The export share of agriculture remained
quite stable at about 6%. Similar changes took place
on the import side. Rapidly rising oil prices have
significantly raised the share of fuel and mining in Asia-
Pacific exports and imports, but not in real terms.
In terms of export volume, world manufacturing
exports grew faster than exports by other sectors at an
average annual rate of 3.5% from 2000 to 2009, with
agricultural exports increasing by 3%, and fuel and
mining exports growing by only 2% (table 3).
Asia-Pacific continues to gain market shares in world
trade, especially in manufacturing exports. The region
increased its share in world merchandise exports from
30% to 35% during 2000-2009 (table 4). It was
Source: ESCAP calculation based on WTO International
Trade Statistics (downloaded on 7 April 2011).
Table 4. Share of Asia-Pacific in world exports and
imports, by sector, 2000 and 2009
(Percentage)
Agricultural products























  Exports           Imports
relatively more successful in capturing a larger portion
of the world manufacturing market (up from 31% to
37%), than of the fuel and mining sector (up from 26%
to 31%) in the observed period. The region's share in
world agricultural exports remained quite stable at
around 21-22% during this period.
“Asia-Pacific continues to gain market shares
in the world, especially in manufacturing
exports”
In a similar way, the share of the region in world
imports increased from 25% to 31% in the period
2000-2009. Dynamic economic activities in the region
caused the its fuel and mining consumption to grow
very rapidly. The region accounted for almost 39% of
world fuel and mining imports in 2009, an increase
of 7.5 percentage points from 2000. The region's share
of world manufactured imports also grew fast to reach
29.5%, but its share of world agricultural imports
remained at just below 30%.CHAPTER 1 – MERCHANDISE TRADE CONTINUES TO REBOUND
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C. TRENDS IN INTRAREGIONAL TRADE
AND CENTRALITY OF CHINA
Intraregional trade has also grown, with China as the
main destination for exports, and currently accounting
for more than 50% of total regional trade; trade within
the region is growing faster than the region's trade with
the rest of the world. While Asia-Pacific's exports to the
rest of the world roughly doubled between 2000 and
2009, intraregional exports rose almost 2.5 times. As a
result, the share of intraregional exports in total Asia-
Pacific exports increased from about 49% in 2000 to
about 52% in 2009. The changes were less obvious on
the import side. The share of intraregional import in
total regional imports increased marginally from 53.5%
to 54% during the same period.
“Intraregional trade has also grown, with China
as the main destination for exports”
The growing share of intraregional trade has resulted
largely from increased exports to developing Asian
economies. In general, the share of exports to
developing Asia increased to one quarter of the total
regional exports in 2009. China accounted for more
than 12% of regional exports in 2009 (and almost 50%
of regional exports to developing Asia), a significant
increase since 2000. In contrast, the roles of NIEs and
Japan as major export destinations have declined
(table 5).
4 See, for example: Athukorala, 2005, 2008, 2009 and 2010;
Athukorala and Yamashita, 2008; Gereffi and others, 2005;
Kimura, 2006; Ng and Yeats, 2001 and 2003; Park and Shin,
2009; and Yusuf and others, 2007.
Source: ESCAP calculation, based on International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics online (downloaded on 7 April 2011).
A large number of empirical studies on Asian trade
integration have pointed out that the East and North-
East Asian subregion is relatively more integrated than
other subregions.4 This is mainly the result of the rapid
growth of production networks that operate mostly in
East Asia, while the role of an increasing number
of regional trade agreements (RTAs) has not yet
been recognized as an important driver of economic
integration.
The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) is generally
considered to be the most advanced regional trade
agreement (RTA) in Asia and the Pacific. However, the
growth of intra-ASEAN exports was much slower than
exports to China in terms of share of total ASEAN
exports. While the share of China in ASEAN exports




























































































































Table 5. Intraregional shares of Asian exports in 2009 and changes from 2000a
(Percentage)
a Percentage share of total exports by origin. Changes in percentage points from 2000 are shown in parentheses.
b Advanced Asia includes Australia, Japan, New Zealand and NIEs (Hong Kong, China; Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Taiwan
Province of China).ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
10
(to 10.4% in 2009), the share of intra-ASEAN exports
only increased slightly from 23% to 25.4% despite
substantial tariff reductions by ASEAN members on
intra-ASEAN trade during that period.5 The share of
India in ASEAN exports also doubled but it still remains
relatively low at 3.4% in 2009. In contrast, the shares
of ASEAN exports to advanced East Asian economies
dropped considerably to one third of its exports.
“Increases in intraregional trade are market
driven rather than RTA driven”
Other subregions also have RTAs corresponding
to their geographic groupings, such as the Com-
monwealth of Independent States Free Trade
Agreement (CISFTA) for North and Central Asia, the
Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) for
the Pacific and the South Asian Free Trade Agreement
(SAFTA) for South Asia. The extent of their intra-
regional trade is rather small6 (and not increasing
despite the existence of the operational RTAs). This
could be explained by the fact that production
networks – the main driver of intraregional production
and trade integration – have only recently started to
become more widely established in some of those
subregions (e.g. South Asia).7 On the other hand,
initiatives for trade liberalization through formal trade
agreements as well as trade facilitation in those
subregions have not been particularly effective in
reducing costs of intraregional cross-border trade
(ESCAP, 2010).
These observations appear to indicate that increases
in intraregional trade are market driven rather than
RTA driven. This conclusion is also supported by the
ESCAP (2010) calculation that, on average, only about
40% of the total trade by Asia-Pacific economies is
conducted under RTAs. While trade among the
countries that have signed RTAs has not necessarily
grown fast, there is still evidence of tighter overall
intraregional production as well as trade cooperation
and linkages. The driving factors of this phenomenon
are trade and investment linkages with China.
The rising importance of China as an export
destination in the region is the result of the "Factory
Asia" phenomenon, already discussed by ESCAP
(2009a). China has dramatically strengthened both its
position as a hub for imports of intermediate products
from the region, and as a source of exports of final
products from the region to the rest of the world. The
data shown in table 5 indicate that the share of China
in exports of individual economies increased faster, on
average, in the case of advanced Asian exporting
economies (i.e. Australia, Japan, New Zealand and
NIEs) than in the case of Asia-Pacific as a whole.
China is currently also a major trading partner of most
of the world's biggest economies. Figure 5 shows that
during 2000-2009, the share of China in trade with the
three advanced regions (i.e. European Union, Japan
and the United States) increased more rapidly than
the shares of other emerging economies and ASEAN-6
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand and Viet Nam).
Figure 5. Shares of developing economies in trade,
by major economy, 2000 and 2009
Source: ESCAP calculation, based on IMF Direction of Trade
Statistics online (downloaded on 7 April 2011).
5 It is not only tariffs that have been reduced in intra-ASEAN
trade, but also many behind-the-border barriers; see part II,
chapter 6 of this report.
6 The shares ranged between 4% and 10% in 2009. For more
details on each RTA monitored by the Asia-Pacific Trade
and Investment Agreements Database (APTIAD), see
www.unescap.org/tid/aptiad.
7 See also ARTNeT, Fighting Irrelevance: The Role of
Regional Trade Agreements in International Production
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“China continues to play an important role as
an engine of world and regional economic
growth and trade”
China has not only increased its relative share in world
trade but also its rank as a top trading partner of major
economies (table 6). A decade ago, China was the fifth
largest trading partner of the United States, fourteenth
largest trading partner of the European Union, third
largest trading partner of Japan, and eighth largest
trading partner of oil-exporting countries in the Middle
East and North Africa. China is currently the second
largest trading partner of the United States, eighth
largest trading partner of the European Union, and the
largest trading partner of Japan, the Middle East and
North Africa.
Several studies have documented China's role as a
regional export platform8 and as a hub for Asia-Pacific
production networks. Most of these studies indicate
the role of China in enhancing a greater vertical
specialization, allowing countries in the region to
exploit differences in comparative advantages to build
production networks targeting extra-regional markets.
This is reflected in China's increasing imports from
Asia-Pacific to exports to the rest of the world, known
as the "Asia factory" phenomenon.
Table 6. Ranks of Asian and other selected exporters in major trade destinations, 2000 and 2009















                                                                                                                                                                           North Africa











































8  See, for example: Athukorala, 2005, 2008, 2009 and 2010;
Athukorala and Yamashita, 2008; Ng and Yeats, 2001 and
2003; and Yusuf and others, 2007.
“To become a sustainable locomotive
for the region, China would need
to raise not only domestic consumption,
but also the intraregional import
content of its domestic consumption”
More recently, exports from Asian economies to China
increased faster than China's exports to Europe and
the United States (ESCAP, 2010 and 2011a). This fact
indicates that part of the region's exports to China
have started to cater to that country's final domestic
demand. According to the Economic and Social Survey
of Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP, 2011a), China's growth
is expected to remain robust at 10.8% in 2011 and
9.5% in 2012 despite the challenges it faces in shifting
the growth engine from external to domestic demand.
To what extent will the growth of China drive demand
and growth in the rest of the region? It is expected that
China will only partially offset the weakness in final
demand from advanced countries. Although China has
become the largest export market for an increasing
number of economies in the region, an important part
of Chinese imports is used as intermediate inputs for
final goods exported to the rest of the world. Figure 6
shows that there is a close correlation between China's
imports from Asia-6 and China's exports to the United
States with an apparent time lag. This observation
reveals an indirect exposure of China's Asian trading
partners in the longer term to China's slowdown in
exports to advanced economies.
However, in the short term, China's export growth is
expected to remain robust. Taking the growth of Asia-6
   United States                European Union                Japan
ExportersASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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exports to China as a three-month leading indicator for
China's exports to the United States, calculations by
ESCAP (2010) predicted that China's exports to the
United States would show moderate growth during the
first half of 2011.
It is quite challenging for China to sustain its role as
the region's trade locomotive. Studies have indicated
that the import content of consumption in China is
Figure 6. China as the region’s trade locomotive
Source: ESCAP calculation, based on the CEIC database, updated April 2011.
Note: Asia-6 includes Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
quite low compared with that of advanced countries
(Akyüz, 2010). This implies that growing domestic
consumption in China will not necessarily result in
higher growth in the rest of the region, unlike growing
exports from China. Thus, to become a sustainable
trade locomotive for the region, China will need to
raise not only domestic consumption, but also the
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Figure I.2. Monthly changes in sectoral exports of selected Asian economies
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Source: ESCAP calculations, based on CEIC data online (downloaded April 2011).
China Hong Kong, China Indonesia Republic of Korea Malaysia Taiwan Province of China
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Source: IMF (2011a).
Notes: “Developing Asia” in the IMF World Economic Outlook comprises countries included in the ASEAN-5 group  (Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam) as well as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China,
Fiji, India, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon
Islands, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
Other “Asia-Pacific” in the ESCAP geographical classification is covered by the Commonwealth of Independent States group in the
IMF statistics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan),
Central and Eastern Europe (Turkey), Middle East and North Africa (Islamic Republic of Iran) and NIEs (Hong Kong, China;
Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Taiwan Province of China).
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A. COMMERCIAL SERVICES TRADE
SLOWLY RECOVERING
Commercial services exports are slowly returning to
their pre-crisis level, with global exports climbing by
8.3% from $3.4 trillion in 2009 to $3.7 trillion in 2010.
Asia,9 and the Pacific, in particular developing Asia, is
again leading the recovery, with a growth rate of more
than 20% in 2010. This strong rise came after a slump
in commercial services exports by almost 12% in 2009.
The Asian lead in services export recovery was shared
by other developing regions and economies in
transition while developed countries, including Japan
with only 9% growth, lagged behind (figure 7).
Economies in Asia that contributed to vibrant services
export growth in 2010 were China (32%), Hong Kong,
China (25%), Singapore (20%) and Australia (17%).
Preliminary estimates by WTO (based on the first half
CHAPTER 2
SERVICES TRADE INSTRUMENTAL FOR TRADE RECOVERY
9 The WTO "Asia" category includes: Australia; Bangladesh;
Bhutan; Brunei Darussalam; Cambodia; China; Fiji; India;
Indonesia; Islamic Republic of Iran; Japan; Kiribati; Lao
People's Democratic Republic; Malaysia; Maldives; Myanmar;
Nepal; New Zealand; Pakistan; Papua New Guinea;
Philippines; Republic of Korea; Samoa, Singapore; Solomon
Islands; Sri Lanka; Thailand; Tonga; Vanuatu; Viet Nam;
French Polynesia; Hong Kong, China; Macao, China; New
Caledonia; and Taiwan Province of China. The ESCAP
geographical classification of "Asia-Pacific" also includes
countries from North and Central Asia (most of which are part
of the CIS group in WTO statistics, i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Russian
Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, plus three non-ESCAP
members – Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine); however, they are
featured separately in figure 7. Turkey is classified as Europe
in the WTO regional classification, so that country has not been
included in the figures for Asia in this section.
of 2010) indicate that exports from India, the
Philippines and the Republic of Korea increased for
each country by a robust 18% (WTO, 2011b).10
10  More details on services trade flows are provided in the
tables in part III.
Figure 7. Exports of commercial services,
by region, 2007-2010
Source: ESCAP calculation, based on WTO International
Trade Statistics online (downloaded 7 April 2011).
“Developing Asia is leading the recovery in
exports of commercial services,
with a growth rate
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B. CHARACTERISTICS OF ASIA-
PACIFIC SERVICES TRADE
Statistical data on services trade are much less
developed than those on merchandise trade, thus
preventing a similar depth of descriptive analysis.13
Nevertheless, some time-series statistics exist,
allowing tracking of the sectoral and geographical
13 Better collection and dissemination of services trade
statistics is highly desirable. The revised edition of the Manual
of Statistics on International Trade in Services (2010) was
prepared for that purpose by the United Nations Statistics
Division (available from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradeserv/
TFSITS/msits2010.htm).see also ARTNeT Services Trade
Platfrom (http://www.artnetontrade.org).
14 Much of the services trade actually takes place through
Mode 3 (commercial presence abroad), which involves foreign
direct investment. There are, however, almost no data on
Mode 3 transactions for developing countries. Similarly data
on Mode 4 (temporary movement of services providers) are
not readily available. Therefore, the focus in this section is on
so-called commercial services trade (i.e. Modes 1 and 2, as
defined under the WTO General Agreement on Trade in
Services).
11 For more details, see WTO, 2010a.
12 This is a slower growth rate than that recorded for
merchandise exports, which jumped by 22% globally and 31%
for Asia (see also WTO, 2010b).
Because many commercial services are linked to
goods trading the unprecedented collapse of
merchandise trade during 2008/2009 triggered a fall in
demand for such services. This was particularly the
case with transportation services (figure 8), which
recorded the sharpest drop in 2009, both in Asia and
globally. While services trade in general showed more
resilience than goods trade during the crisis, countries
with a large export share of transport and other
services directly related to the goods trade, were hit
harder. Therefore, diversification is equally important in
the service sector and needs to be pursued for an
economy as a whole. Available statistics on the
changes in services trade by sector indicate that travel
and other commercial services, which include
categories such as business services and personal,
cultural and recreational services, also witnessed a
relatively big fall. The least affected services were
"royalties and licence fees" (a component of other
commercial services), and computer and information
technology services.11 In 2010, on average, global and
Asian services exports managed to grow by 8% and
21%, respectively.12
Figure 8. Developments in global and Asian commercial services trade, by services sector
Source: ESCAP calculation, based on data from WTO International Trade Statistics online (downloaded on 7 April 2011).
Note: For the list of countries covered under "Asia" see footnote 9.
composition of commercial services trade between
Asia-Pacific economies and the world.14 In contrast to
merchandise trade, the region has run a deficit albeit
small with the world in services trade (figure 9).The
global economic crisis worsened the situation by
causing a slightly larger fall in exports than in imports




one fifth of merchandise exports”
The Asia-Pacific region has earned its status as the
most successful region in export-led growth. The
region has used its comparative advantage in
manufacturing production to get integrated into the
world economy by building the "Factory Asia"
associated linkages with other economies in and
outside the region, as explained in chapter 1.
Increasingly, this has required developing the services
sectors, and some economies in the region have
improved their capacities to supply and trade in
Figure 9.  Asia-Pacifica total exports, imports and trade balance
in commercial services, 1998-2009
Source: Calculated by ESCAP, based on data from WTO International Trade Statistics online (downloaded on 7 April 2011).
a Asia-Pacific is defined as Asia, Commonwealth of Independent States economies and Turkey, following the WTO classification.
See footnote 8.
various commercial services. However, the ratio of
commercial services exports to merchandise exports in
the Asia-Pacific region remains about five percentage
points lower than at the global level; it neared the 20%
mark only in 2009 when merchandise exports fell
much faster than exports of commercial services
(table 7). In 2010, this ratio fell both at the world and
the regional level due to the fact that manufacturing
exports recovered much faster than services exports.15
15 There is also a possibility that data on services exports in
2010 are not captured fully in these statistics. See tables in
part III for coverage of individual economies.
Table 7. Ratio of services to merchandise exports, Asia and the Pacific and world
(Percentage)
Source: ESCAP calculation, based on data from WTO International Trade Statistics online (downloaded on
7 April 2011).
1999 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Asia and the Pacific 17.57 17.06 16.99 18.01 18.04 19.96 18.41
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Source: ESCAP calculation, based on WTO International
Trade Statistics online (2010) (downloaded on 7 April 2011).
* Calculation of change in export shares is based on the
difference in 2009 over 1999 for Fiji and Vanuatu.
16 It may, however, also be a reflection of the incomplete
statistics for this subregion.
17 The rankings are based on world trade excluding intra-
European Union-27 services exports.
Figure 10. Subregional share of commercial services
 trade in total Asia-Pacific trade in services
Source: ESCAP calculation, based on data downloaded from
WTO International Trade Statistics online (downloaded on
7 April 2011).
“While services are playing an increasing role in
Asia-Pacific trade, their importance differs
widely among individual subregions”
While services are playing an increasing role in Asia-
Pacific trade, their importance differs widely among
individual subregions due to the heterogeneity of the
region. Figure 10 compares the importance of each
subregion in regional services trade during 1999-2010.
East and North-East Asia remained the largest
contributor to the region's services trade (just under
51% in 2010). South-East Asia ranked second,
providing around one fifth of the regions' trade in
services. The largest increase is registered in the
regional share of South and South-West Asia (more
than 30%, mostly due to India), but it still remains only
the third largest contributor to regional services trade
at 15%. Similarly, North and Central Asia's services
trade share increased by more than 60%, (mainly
because of the importance of transportation services in
landlocked economies), allowing this subregion to
pass the Pacific in fourth position in 2010. The fact that
the regional share of Pacific economies' commercial
services dropped is particularly worrying, as it may
reflect a loss in competitiveness in the supply of
tourism and related services, which are important
drivers of economic growth and employment.16
Similarly, at the individual economy level there are
winners and losers in terms of captured share of total
Asia-Pacific and world exports of services. Between
1999 and 2010, the share of India doubled, while
China almost doubled its share of regional exports of
commercial services, to reach 11% and 17% share,
respectively. Japan's share, on the other hand fell by
one third of its 1999 share, and it lost its top ranking to
China (see figure 11 and tables in part III for more
details). The increase in the services exports by China
and India also resulted in a several-fold increase of
their share in world services exports during the period
under review; estimates for 2010 show that China and
India captured 6.1% and 3.9%, respectively, of world
services exports. Those two countries were ranked as
the third and sixth leading exporters in 2010.17
Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Thailand
currently all contribute smaller shares to regional
services exports than in 1999. The position of some
small Pacific island economies, such as Fiji and
Vanuatu, also worsened.
Figure 11. Changes in shares of regional services
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“The share of computer and information
services in total Asia-Pacific services
exports has increased over time,
while the share of other business services
has hardly changed”
Between 2000 and 2008, there were no dramatic shifts
in sectoral services trade by the region (figure 12).  On
the winning side, only computer and information
technology (IT) services, and construction services
increased their share, while financial services and
travel were clear losers. Small increases in the
shares of other business services and insurance
sectors are also noted, while other sectors (e.g.
transportation) have undergone virtually no change
in the rankings based on aggregated statistics.
However, looking at the export and import patterns
separately (see chapter 2 annex, figures II.1 and II.2),
there are some important additional findings:
(a)  The share of imports of transportation services
has actually increased by 7.5%, but because
there was a mild decline on the export side, the
average trade share did not change much;
(b) The travel services' share of imports declined
by 25%, driving the total trade share of travel
services down;
(c) Construction services increased on both the
export and the import side;
(d) The share of computer and IT services registered
the highest increase on export side of all service
sectors – almost an eight fold increase to capture
7.8% share in 2008. The share on the import side
remained at less than 2%;18
(e) Three sectors that posted relatively less dynamic
growth (i.e. transportation, travel and other
business services) cover two thirds of both
exports and imports of commercial services.
Figure 12. Changes in sectoral composition of services trade for Asia-Pacific economies,
between 2008 and 2000
Source: United Nations Service Trade Database (accessed in May 2011).
18 See also WTO, 2011b, for comments on the success of Asia
in increasing its share of world exports of computer and
information services, from 15% in 2000 to 27% in 2009. India is
the second leading exporter of computer and information
services.ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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Figure 13. Recent changes in international
tourist arrivals
Source: UNWTO World Tourism Barometer online
(downloaded in April 2011).
Note: *Asia and the Pacific comprises the following
economies: Australia; Bhutan; Cambodia; China; Cook
Islands; Guam; Fiji; French Polynesia; Hong Kong, China;
India; Indonesia; Japan; Kiribati; Macao, China; Maldives;
Malaysia; Marshall Islands; Myanmar; Nepal; New Caledonia;
New Zealand; Niue; Northern Mariana Islands; Pakistan;
Palau; Papua New Guinea; Republic of Korea; Samoa;
Singapore; Solomon Islands; Sri Lanka; Taiwan Province of
China; Thailand; Tonga; Vanuatu; and Viet Nam.
19  GATS includes sector 9, known as "Tourism and travel
related services", which is broken down into four subsectors:
hotels and restaurants (including catering), travel agencies and
tour operators services, tourist guides services, and other.
Overall, the sectoral changes in services trade in Asia
indicate a beginning of a move away from trade in
traditional labour-intensive services towards trade in
services that require higher levels of skilled labour,
innovation and creativity. These latter types of services
are beneficial to increasing the overall flexibility and
productivity of a national economy. They also tend to
be less volatile, unlike traditional services activities
(such as transportation, construction and travel), which
proved to be much more vulnerable to the economic
crisis. However, these traditional services sectors are
still the major employers and are linked to the rest of
the economy through strong multiplier linkages. In
the next section, a more detailed focus is on two of
these traditional services – tourism and construction –
as well as computer and information services, which
show the most dynamic growth on the export side.
C. FOCUS ON SELECTED SERVICE
SECTORS
1. International tourism remains one of
the largest services sector
International tourism is one of the 12 sectors covered
by the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) and is also often covered in RTAs.19 However,
it does not feature as a self-standing service activity in
trade statistics, but is reflected in travel services. In
national accounts it does not often appear as a well-
defined category, even though it is an important source
of income and employment for many developing and
least developed countries, especially in Asia and the
Pacific. While the global economic crisis, pandemic
threats, and factors related to disasters and
international security in 2009, reduced demand for
international tourism services overall, the Asian and
Pacific region was not affected as badly as some other
regions. However, 2010 brought a welcome change in
business and leisure travel trends, in both the global
and regional economies.
“In 2010, Asia's tourism sector experienced
a very dynamic rebound with  international
tourist arrivals up by 12.6%, compared with
6.7% for the world as a whole”
The recovery of world tourism started in the third
quarter of 2009, and has since continued unabated.
According to the United Nations World Tourism
Organization (UNWTO), in 2010 the number of
international tourists increased by 6.7%. In that year,
Asia's tourism sector experienced a very dynamic
rebound with international tourist arrivals up by
12.6%, compared with 6.7% for the world as a whole
(figure13). Asia and the Pacific region captured almost
22% of the total global international tourist arrivals,
with more than half of that linked to visits to North-East
Asia, while Oceania's share fell to just 5% of the
region, and is now equal to the share of South Asia.
The most dynamic growth in international tourist
arrivals was recorded in China, while Australia, Macao,
China as well as some small islands (such as the
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While there are no detailed and long-term data series
on the geographical breakdown of travel services, this
category appears to be contributing towards an
expansion of intraregional trade in Asia. According to
WTO (2011b), more than 60% of China's travel
receipts were sourced from Asian economies, in
particular Hong Kong, China, as well as Japan, the
Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China. More
than two thirds of the Republic of Korea's travel
exports were destined for other Asian economies, with
more than 30% of those exports going to Japan. In the
case of Hong Kong, China, the share of Asia is even
higher (more than 84%), with China being the largest
recipient of exports of travel services. Asian economies
accounted for around 77% of Japan's travel exports
and 60% of Australia's travel receipts in 2008. In
reporting Asian economies, travel exports to the
European Union-27 represented between 6% and 9%
of the total, while the share of the United States
ranged between 5% and 12% (see tables in part III).
Asia and the Pacific shared the fastest recovery in
international tourism with the Middle East in 2010, but
the prospects for 2011 do not look that bright. In
February 2011, UNWTO forecast reduced growth for
all regions, with Asia and the Pacific still expected to
perform well (table 8). However, given that the forecast
was made prior to the spreading social and political
protests in many Middle East countries, and before the
earthquake and tsunami disaster struck Japan, the
figures might need to be adjusted downward.
Region 2010 Forecast for 2011
World 6.7 4-5
Europe 3.2 2-4
Asia and the Pacific 12.6 7-9
Americas 7.7 4-6
Africa 6.4 4-7
Middle East 13.9 7-10
Source: United Nations World Tourism Organization,
Barometer February 2011, available from www.unwto.org/
facts/eng/pdf/barometer/UNWTO_HQ_Fitur11_JK_2pp.pdf.
2. Construction  services  adversely
affected
GATS lists construction services as construction and
related engineering services within sector 3, with five
subsectors (general construction work for buildings,
general construction work for civil engineering,
installation and assembly work, building completion
and finishing work, and other). As in the case of other
services, there is no perfect one-to-one corre-
spondence between the GATS classification
and statistics on trade in construction services. In
trade statistics, construction services (based
on the Extended Balance of Payments Services
classification), are associated with two subcategories:
construction abroad and construction in the home
economy (i.e. the economy preparing the statistics).
Services related to engineering and architectural
design are part of business services. In the WTO
International Trade Statistics, however, commercial
services trade includes only three subcategories:
transportation, travel and other commercial services.
Other commercial services include several groups,
including construction services.
“By the end of 2009, world exports of
construction services had declined by 13%, and
construction was the most affected services
sector after transport and finance”
The contraction in construction services in 2009 was
expected, in view of the firm link between this sector
and general economic conditions. However, given that
most construction services are based on long-term
contracts, contractors have better opportunities to
mitigate the effects of a downturn in the short term.
This expectation is confirmed by the data presented by
WTO (2011b). While trade in other services sectors
started to contract immediately in the last quarter of
2008, world construction services exports continued to
grow by 11%. The effects of the crisis started to show
only gradually in early 2009. However, by the end of
that year, world exports of construction services had
declined by 13% and construction was the most
affected services sector after transport and finance
(WTO, 2011b). The same happened in Asia and the
Pacific (table 9), where construction services trade
declined drastically in 2009 after a period of dynamic
growth.
Table 8. Tourist arrivals – rates of growth for
2010 and 2011 (forecast)
(Percentage)ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
26












































Figure 14. Exports of construction in selected
leading economies, first half, 2009-first half, 2010
Source: WTO (2011b).
  20All the statistics in this subsection are taken from WTO,
2011b, and the section leans heavily on section E in that study.
WTO (2011b) also reports that the drop in construction
services trade was the largest in the CIS region, and
somewhat less in other subregions of Asia and the
Pacific. The CIS result is driven by the change in the
Russian Federation's construction exports, which
dropped by 30% in 2009. Other regions performed
better and recorded smaller declines. Exports, both by
European and Asian countries, decreased by some
11%. In particular, European Union-27 exports fell by
11%, while those of China and Japan declined by 8%
and 10%, respectively.
Available short-term data on leading exporters suggest
that a recovery started in some economies but is
lagging in others. In the first half of 2010, China's
construction services exports grew by 69% compared
with the same period in 2009 (figure 14). By contrast,
European Union-27 construction services exports
continued their downward trend. Financial turmoil in
Table 9. Export and import of construction services by Asia and the Pacific
(Billions of United States dollars)
Source: United Nations Services Trade database, available from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/servicetrade/default.aspx (downloaded
on 11 April 2011).
Note: Values in 2009 were affected by the fact that only 17 countries in the region have reported data to the United Nations
Statistics Division as compared with, for example, 28 countries reporting in 2008.
the United Arab Emirates, the first partner country for
Japanese contractors, resulted in a drop in Japan's
construction services exports by 32% in the second
half of 2009, and by 44% in the first six months of
2010. Finally, the Russian Federation's exports of
construction services were down by 20% in the first
half of 2010.
3. Computer and information services
registered fastest export growth20
Exports of computer and information services recorded
the highest global and regional growth during 2000-
2008 at 19% and 27%, respectively, while CIS
recorded export growth of 50% on annual average.
Developed markets did not perform very well; for
example, Europe (which accounts for more than half of
the world's exports) recorded a 20% increase while
North America lagged behind (8%).
“ India’s exports of computer and information
services account for some 70% of Asia’s
exports”
During that period, Asian economies increased their
share in world exports of computer and information
services from 15% to 26%. India, a leading country in
IT services outsourcing, climbed to rank as the second
largest major exporter of computer and information
services. According to WTO estimates, in 2008, India's
exports were worth $36 billion, accounting for some
70% of Asia's exports of computer and information
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were destined for the North American markets. While
the portion of exports destined for Asia was, by
comparison, much lower (6.5%), it showed an upward
trend, particularly in the case of East Asia.
Other economies in Asia, such as Singapore, the
Philippines and Malaysia, also emerged as computer
services suppliers. China, however, showed the
fastest growth and its software industry expanded
significantly. By the end of 2008, there were more than
16,000 software and related services providers in
China, employing 8.5 million people. China's computer
and information services exports have increased by
43% on annual average since 2000. In 2008, the
United States was China's first export destination,
followed by ASEAN countries. Exports to those two
markets accounted for more than 53% of China's total
exports. In other subregions, the Russian Federation
has seen exports of its computer services rise annually
by more than 52% on average since 2000.
“The most impressive growth was recorded by
China, where the software industry expanded
significantly”
As noted before, the computer services industry fared
relatively well during the recent global economic crisis
(globally export fell by 6% only in 2009). This was
mostly due to constant demand for cost-efficient
technologies required for the further development of
software in sectors such as manufacturing, finance,
insurance and healthcare. A continued need to
address rising IT security concerns globally, also
contributed to the strength of demand for these
services.
Subregions, however, did not perform equally strong.
In 2009, Asian exports of computer and information
services decreased only slightly, by 2%, while India's
exports were estimated to have declined by 5%. Other
emerging exporters in the region, such as China and
Singapore, saw modest growth. In the case of the
Philippines and Malaysia, exports of computer services
grew by 11% and 41%, respectively, despite the crisis.
The CIS countries faced the sharpest fall, with the
Russian Federation's exports dropping by 21% in
2009.
Preliminary data for the first half of 2010 show that
exports by all leading exporting economies recovered,
with growth acceleration occurring in emerging
computer and information services. For example,
China's exports increased by 43% while the Russian
Federation’s exports appeared to have recovered
following their drop in 2009.
D. INTRAREGIONAL TRADE IN
COMMERCIAL SERVICES STILL
LIMITED
Data on bilateral trade in services among Asian
economies are very limited. Those that are available
have been collected in a matrix to show the level of
intraregional trade (table 10). Disaggregated data exist
for six economies (see also tables in part III): Australia,
Japan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation,
Singapore and Hong Kong, China.  Unfortunately,
however, because these data do not include the same
partners for all reporting economies, the matrix is not
symmetric. What is immediately evident on both the
import and export sides is that most Asia-Pacific
services trade is conducted with economies outside
the region (e.g. the European Union and the United
States). The Russian Federation conducts about 95%
of its services trade with countries outside the Asia-
Pacific region; other economies are trailing behind,
with Hong Kong, China, being the least dependent on
non-regional markets.
“Most of the Asia-Pacific services trade is
conducted with economies outside the region
but there is potential for increased intraregional
trade in at least some services sectors”
Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore are
among the more important destinations in the region
for services exports. Australia's largest regional
partners on the import side are Japan, Singapore and
Hong Kong, China, and on the export side, China,
India and Japan. It is not surprising that the largest
regional partner of Hong Kong, China, is China,
followed by Japan and Australia. Japan, on the other
hand, disperses its regional trade relatively evenly
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 21 More precisely, of the 56 RTAs involving OECD countries in
2010, 80% contained GATS-minus features. These include:
(a) Japan's bilateral trade agreements with Brunei Darussalam,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand; and
(b) Singapore's bilateral trade agreements with Australia, India,
EFTA, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and the United States.
See Miroudot and others, 2010.
Singapore holding slightly larger shares but still not
more than 8%. Available data for the Republic of Korea
services trade show that China and Japan account for
similar shares, between 12% and 16%. As noted
above, the Russian Federation trades only about 5%
of its services with Asia-Pacific partners. China, Japan
and Hong Kong, China, are among the larger regional
trading partners of Singapore.
The region's relatively low level of bilateral flows of
services trade, and the high growth rate of total
services trade, signal a potential for increased
intraregional trade in some services sectors. It is
interesting to note that India does not feature very high
on the list of partners in intraregional services trade.
However, in a recent development, India has begun
outsourcing some of its own outsourcing services
(in particular, call centres) to the Philippines (see
box 5.2 in part II, chapter 5).
One reason for the limited level of intraregional trade in
services may be that, despite the large number of
RTAs signed among the economies in the region
(many of which include services), liberalization of trade
in services still appears to be lagging behind; many of
these agreements are classed as GATS minus
agreements.21 Unilateral regulatory reforms and
binding commitments under RTAs to remove "behind-
the-border" barriers are necessary in order to achieve
growth in intraregional trade in services at similar rates









































Figure II.1. Sectoral composition of services exports, Asia and the Pacific
Source:  ESCAP calculation, based on data downloaded from UN Service Trade database (accessed in December 2010).






























Figure II.2. Sectoral composition of services imports, Asia and the PacificCHAPTER 2 – SERVICES TRADE INSTRUMENTAL FOR TRADE RECOVERY
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A. MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM
TESTED
At the start of the global economic crisis in 2008/2009,
there was a real fear that the sharp collapse in exports
and production in many countries would lead to a
repeat of the damaging trade wars in the 1930s.
Fortunately, such a trade war, using tariffs as the
principal protectionist tool, did not happen, although
protectionism using other tools has increased (ESCAP,
2010). Contemporary or crisis-era protectionism is
dominated by behind-the-border measures such as
bailouts, state aids and export subsidies rather than
tariffs. More recently, WTO Director-General Pascal
Lamy acknowledged that while protectionism
had become "the dog that hasn't barked" during
the crisis, the risk of rising protectionism has not
been eliminated. In fact, the continued rise in
unemployment, deepening debt and incidence of other
financial problems and shocks to national economies
have all kept protectionism as a clear danger (Elliott,
2011). The most recent monitoring report by WTO,
OECD and UNCTAD raises a cause for concern about
new a number of restrictions being imposed in early
2011 (WTO, 2011c).
The reason why the multilateral trading system was
able to guard the overall level of low(er) tariffs
achieved over eight multilateral negotiation rounds was
that members were committed to not raising the
national level of tariff protection above "bound" levels
agreed on during the negotiations. Globally, leaders
have forged an intellectual and political consensus on
"tariff wars" being lose-lose scenarios for all involved
and this helped them to control the tariff increases
during the pressure. Furthermore, low (zero) tariffs
CHAPTER 3
POST-CRISIS PROTECTIONISM IN THE REGION22
have become a very important factor in the operation
of regional and global networks especially in Asia and
thus there was less lobbying for such protection
among the participants in such networks.
“The continued rise in unemployment,
deepening debt and incidence of other financial
problems and shocks to national economies
have all kept protectionism as a clear and
present danger”
The eight rounds of tariff negotiations succeeded in
significantly reducing the average level of bound most-
favoured nation (MFN) rates, but the extent of imports
covered by bound tariffs remains a big problem, at
least in Asia and the Pacific. For example, while the
unweighted average of bound tariffs for selected Asia-
Pacific economies is 28.1% (figure 15), bindings cover
on average 87.8% of imports. These averages hide the
fact that the range of bound tariffs varies significantly,
from less than 5% to more than 169%; similarly, while
a number of countries bind 100% of imported products,
there are other economies covering only half or even
just 15% of imports (see also annex tables to this
chapter). The lower the binding coverage, the more
flexibility a country has in introducing higher levels of
applied import tariffs on products that do not have tariff
bindings.
22 Based on Wermelinger, "Features of post-crisis
protectionism in Asia and the Pacific" ARTNeT Working Paper
Series, No. 97, Bangkok: ESCAP, 2011.  Available from
http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/pub/wp9711.pdf.ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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 MFN Applied Bound
Historically, applied import tariffs in most Asia-Pacific
economies on average have never been very high, as
those economies were dynamic traders that needed to
import in order to be able to export. In the peak crisis
year of 2009, the average applied MFN rate in the
economies shown in figure 15 was 8.1%, with only
Maldives23 being associated with an average MFN
applied rates of just over 20% while most other
economies had average rates of less than 10%.
Notwithstanding the low applied MFN rate, most
economies still have "policy space" left, which equals
more than triple the level of tariff protection at current
levels. In other words, the "dog could start barking
anytime" and it is just the strong restraint of the
"owners" that is preventing this from happening.
The ESCAP (2009a and 2010) Asia-Pacific Trade and
Investment Report reviewed the evolution of the use of
discriminatory trade measures since the onset of the
economic crisis in November 2008. While initially
almost all countries, including the developed members
of the G20 group, tried to impose new or higher trade
barriers, with the recovery in 2010 fewer instances of
such measures have been recorded. Furthermore, it
appears that international trade in services has been
more resilient to protectionist actions than good trade.
Molinuevo (2010) finds that most of the protectionism
in services was in the basket of stimulus measures
and investment measures. His analysis suggests that
a number of economic, legal and institutional factors
complement each other to create strong incentives
against a general surge of protectionism in the area of
services.
Understanding the type and duration of implementation
of the measures introduced is extremely helpful in
understanding the design of trade policy and its
effectiveness, which the remainder of this section
attempts to do.
23 In 2009, Maldives was still classified as a least developed
country.
Figure 15. Remaining policy space for tariff intervention in selected Asia-Pacific economies
(Simple average tariff rate in percentage)
Source: WTO, Tariff profiles 2010, available from http://stat.wto.org/TariffProfile/WSDBTariffPFHome.aspx?Language=E.CHAPTER 3 – POST-CRISIS PROTECTIONISM IN THE REGION
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B. TRENDS IN USE OF BORDER
MEASURES
The total number of discriminatory measures being
implemented globally since November 2008, as listed
in the Global Trade Alert database, is 823.24 There is,
however, some good news regarding protectionism
dynamics; figure 16 plots the number of harmful
measures implemented per quarter by economies in
the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere. Contemporary
protectionism was a real concern from 2008 up to the
first quarter of 2010; almost 70% of all recorded
discriminatory interventions were introduced during
that period. The economic and trade recovery brought
a significant decline in protectionism. Only 46 harmful
measures were implemented in the first quarter of
2011, which is just one third of the number of such
measures implemented in the peak crisis quarter of
2009. This trend in reducing protectionism is even
more important, as some trade experts and global
leaders have been concerned that the 2010 debt crisis,
spread through a number of developed economies,
could trigger another wave of protectionist actions
around the globe.
“The Asia-Pacific region contributed to around
40% of all harmful measures since 2008”
Data presented here do not provide evidence to
support such concerns (at least up to early 2011). It
should be noted, however, that many government
interventions become apparent only several months
(in some cases, up to one year) after their actual
implementation. Therefore, the (now reported) decline
over time could also reflect reporting challenges rather
than improved government behaviour (see Evenett
and Wermelinger, 2010, for additional explanations).
Moreover, a large number of discriminatory measures
have yet to be removed, while more than 250
additional measures have been announced and may
be implemented in the months ahead.
The Asia-Pacific region contributed to around 40%
of all harmful measures in the observed period
(figure 16). According to four indicators of harm done
by a country's discriminatory policies,25 the data
further reveal that Asia-Pacific economies are well
represented among the top 10 countries instigating
discriminatory policies.26 According to ESCAP (2010),
India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan and the Russian
Federation still appear on this list under at least two
indicators while newcomers to the top 10 list and
reported directly under three indicators are China and
Viet Nam. It is also important to note that much of the
harm done to the commercial interests of Asia-Pacific
economies has been inflicted by other economies in
the region (Evenett and Wermelinger, 2010).
“Measures that harm commercial
interests still outnumber measures
with beneficial effects”
Rather than merely looking at the discrimination aspect
of government interventions, it is also important to
investigate the interaction of discriminatory and
liberalizing measures over time (figure 17). Globally,
measures that harm commercial interests of trading
partners still outnumber measures with beneficial
effects by almost three to one. This ratio reached its
peak (5.0) in the first quarter of 2009 and has been
declining ever since. During the most recent period,
the ratio of discriminatory to liberalizing measures is
almost balanced at 1.5. A similar trend is observed for
measures implemented by Asia-Pacific economies.
The improvement in these ratios with economic
recovery becomes more apparent in figure 18, which
shows that higher GDP growth rates in Asia-Pacific
economies are associated with smaller ratios of
discriminatory to liberalizing measures.
25 These indicators are (1) number of (almost certainly)
discriminatory measures imposed, (2) number of tariff lines
(product categories) affected by (almost certainly)
discriminatory measures, (3) number of sectors affected by
(almost certainly) discriminatory measures, and (4) number of
trading partners affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory
measures.
26 See table III.1 in the annex to this chapter.
24 Throughout this chapter, data for government interventions
are derived from the Global Trade Alert website (http://
www.globaltradealert.org), downloaded in April 2011.ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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Figure 16. Decline in discrimination and ratios of discriminatory to liberalizing measures
Source: Global Trade Alert database, April 2011.
Figure 17. Higher GDP growth in Asia-Pacific economies is associated with lower ratios of discriminatory to
liberalizing measures
Source: Global Trade Alert database, April 2011 and IMF World Economic Outlook database, April 2011.
Notes: Each Asia-Pacific economy that has a positive number of measures in the Global Trade Alert database, and for which GDP
growth figures are available in the World Economic Outlook, is reported twice (2009 and 2010).
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Asia-Pacific commercial interests have recently been
targeted less often by harmful measures over time
(figure 18). A comparison of figures 16 and 18 shows
that the decline in protectionism targeting the region is
similar to trends in protectionism at the global level. In
particular, some two thirds of globally implemented
harmful measures target economies in the Asia-Pacific
region each quarter. Figure 18 also shows that the
quarterly ratios of discriminatory to liberalizing
measures targeting the region show a parallel trend
with such ratios implemented globally. However, in
each quarter, the Asia-Pacific region has experienced
relatively greater benefit from liberalization than
the world on average; the line for the ratios of
measures targeting the region runs below the line
for the ratios of measures implemented globally.
Figure 18. Asia-Pacific economies have recently been targeted less often
 by harmful measures
Source: Global Trade Alert database, April 2011.
A closer look at the data shows that discriminatory
measures hurt trading partners selectively and run
counter to the spirit and commitments adopted under
the multilateral trading system. China remains as the
most frequent target of contemporary protectionism
and has been the recipient of 402 measures affecting
its commercial interests abroad since November 2008
(ESCAP, 2010).27 Despite the worldwide decline in
implemented measures during the past 12 months
compared with the crisis year of 2009, China was
targeted 40% more often in 2010 than in the previous
year. All of the other top 10 target jurisdictions are
industrialized economies, including Japan and the
Republic of Korea. Emerging economies from Asia and
the Pacific on the list of top 20 target jurisdictions
include India, Malaysia, Thailand and Turkey.
The treatment of least developed countries around the
globe as well as in the region is particularly frustrating;
their commercial interests were targeted by 124
harmful measures, despite repeated declarations by
the international community to assist those countries in
their efforts to integrate into the global economy
(Evenett, 2010; and Mikic, 2009). Finally, it should be
noted that the number of discriminatory measures
imposed on a target correlate strongly with the pre-
crisis export figures of the target country; thus, the size
of exports is a good indicator of how often a country is
affected by protectionist measures.28
 27  See table III.2 in the annex to this chapter.
 28 The correlation coefficient of the number of discriminatory
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STILL  A  PREVALENT  TRADE
POLICY  TOOL
As discussed above, Asian and Pacific economies
largely restrained themselves from increasing the
levels of MFN applied tariffs in 2009. Nonetheless,
they made extensive use of less transparent
protectionist measures – so-called "murky" measures
– during the global economic crisis.29 This section
explains how the types of protectionism changed,
quarter-by-quarter. Figure 19 examines the quarterly
shares of different groups of measure types.
Protectionist measures implemented globally are
detailed in panel (a) while protectionist measures
implemented by Asia-Pacific countries and
protectionist measures that target at least one Asia-
Pacific country are detailed in panels (b) and (c).
“Behind-the-border measures were
comprehensively used throughout the crisis and
continued to be a prevalent (trade) policy tool
during the economic recovery in 2010”
Panel (a) shows that behind-the-border measures,
which tend to be less tightly regulated by WTO rules,
were comprehensively used throughout the crisis and
continued to be a prevalent (trade) policy tool during
the economic recovery in 2010. The share of these
types of measures in total protectionist measures
reached a peak of almost 80% at the beginning of the
crisis, declined to just above 50% during the first half
of 2009, and balanced at around 40% until the third
quarter of 2010. This is a particularly worrisome trend,
to the extent that more than 60% of all bailout and
government aid measures implemented during the
analysed quarters were provided to non-financial
sectors that hardly posed a "systemic threat" during
the crisis.
One explanation for the relatively large share of non-
transparent measures, even during the recovery in
2010, may be that new disturbances – such as the
currency and debt crises – have hit world economies,
thus prompting the use of precautionary measures
such as government aid to protect domestic markets.30
Harmful government interventions during the two most
recent quarters appear to have been more transparent;
the share of behind-the-border measures declined to
less than 20%, while the share of at-the-border non-
tariff measures including quotas, import bans,
technical barriers to trade and non-tariff barriers
(not otherwise specified) increased accordingly. Tariff-
related measures (mostly trade defence measures)
made up some 35% throughout most of the period
under review.
Panel (b) shows that the picture of protectionism
induced by the Asia-Pacific region looks similar. It is
interesting that more recently (first quarter of 2011) the
region's share of "murky" measures was still above
50%, indicating that the Asian and Pacific region
implements relatively less transparent trade policies
than the rest of the world.
Finally, a comparison of how the Asian and Pacific
region is targeted by harmful government measures
is shown in panel (c), with the global distribution
of such measures illustrated in panel (a), indicating
that, on average, the region suffers by at least 10
percentage points less from "murky" forms of
protectionism than the rest of the world (see bar to
the right in each panel).
 29  Recent empirical findings suggest that "tight" tariff bindings
on non-agricultural goods have been associated with higher
levels of murkier forms of protectionism during the crisis. It is,
therefore, of little comfort that WTO members did not violate
their tariff bindings if protectionist pressures are displaced
rather than curtailed (see Evenett and others, 2010).
30 It should, however, be noted that the number of government
interventions did not increase when new threats emerged from
the currency and debt crisis in 2010).CHAPTER 3 – POST-CRISIS PROTECTIONISM IN THE REGION
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Figure 19. Changes in protectionism, quarter-by-quarter
Source: Global Trade Alert, April 2011.
Notes: Tariff-related measures include tariff and trade defence measures. Non-tariff measures at-the-border include quotas, import
bans, technical barriers to trade (TBT), non-tariff barriers (not otherwise specified). Non-tariff measures behind-the-border include
consumption subsidies, local content requirements, public procurement, bailout/state aid measures, export subsidies, trade finance
support, support to state-owned trading enterprises and state-controlled companies. Others include investment, migration,
intellectual property protection and other service sector measures.
Panel (a)  Protectionism implemented globally
Panel (b)  Protectionism implemented by the Asian and Pacific region
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D. MANUFACTURING  SECTOR
TARGETED MOST FREQUENTLY
A sectoral analysis of protectionist measures reveals
that the manufacturing sector, and in particular
machinery and equipment, is targeted most frequently
(figure 20). Globally, more than 40% of all protectionist
measures target the machinery and equipment
industry. Regionally, this number is almost 50%.
Unsurprisingly, this industry is – with 55% of all
measures – targeted relatively more in (emerging)
economies of the Asian and Pacific region than
globally. Many countries supported their manufacturing
sectors during the crisis and thus reduced demand
from their suppliers – most likely in East Asia.
The analysis also shows that protectionism in
agriculture and related industries does exist and that
some 20% of all measures, both globally and
regionally, are implemented to protect this sector at
home or target the sector in other countries (figure 20).
With regard to measures in the financial sector, it
should be noted that bailouts of banks and other
financial institutions have been used relatively less by
countries of the region, while these countries have also
been less affected by such measures than the rest
of the world. Finally, an analysis of targeted sector
groups over time reveals that the patterns are
relatively constant, except that financial sector support
measures were used predominantly at the beginning of
the crisis.31
Figure 20. Which sector groups are targeted most often?
Source: Global Trade Alert, April 2011.
Notes: Sectors are classified according to United Nations Statistics Division CPCprov. This classification is used by the Global
Trade Alert.
  31 See chapter 3 annex, figure III.1.
E. "GREEN" CLAUSES MOST
FREQUENTLY USED IN ASIA AND
THE PACIFIC
The Asian and Pacific region has experienced an
enormous economic expansion during the past
decade, which was largely driven by an export-led
growth strategy. This development has led to a sharp
increase in (fossil fuel-intensive) production and cargo
transportation, resulting in a significant surge in
greenhouse gas emissions that are likely to accelerate
climate change and its potentially devastating impacts.
There are at least two key factors why governments in
the region are (and should be) concerned about
climate issues. Firstly, countries in the region are
expected to be hit hardest by these changes, inter alia,
due to their limited environmental carrying capacity
and large coastal populations. Secondly, international
attention to environmental and climate issues has
recently intensified and pressure has increased on
businesses to use more energy-efficient technologies
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presents an important challenge for governments and
exporters in the Asia-Pacific region. Wermelinger and
Barnes (2010) critically discussed to what extent
climate policies could contribute to a low-carbon and
trade-enhancing development path, without introducing
new discrimination against trading partners.
This chapter shows that many governments
implemented measures to help and rescue domestic
industries during the global economic crisis. This
section examines to what extent these measures
constitute "murky" protectionism, i.e. implemented
under the pretext of pursuing "green growth" strategies
in the region and elsewhere, and whether these
measures are likely to be beneficial for both trade and
the environment. In part II, chapter 5  explores in more
detail the trade and investment opportunities in
climate-smart goods and services.
Figure 21 shows that "green" clauses were used most
frequently by the Asia-Pacific economies in their
measures, both by introducing new discrimination
against commercial interests of their trading partners,
and by liberalizing trade or introducing beneficial
effects for their partner countries.
A closer look at these measures reveals at least four
patterns. Firstly, "green" clauses were introduced
by many economies and, in combination with
discriminatory measures (implemented and pending
measures), were most prominently used in the
Republic of Korea (four measures), China (three
measures), Japan (two measures) and the Russian
Federation (two measures).
“The Asian and Pacific region used "green"
clauses in their measures most often”
Secondly, discriminatory measures under the "green"
clause category were most frequently introduced
through "murky" forms of trade discrimination,
particularly bailouts. In contrast, "green" liberalization
measures were most frequently enacted in the form of
tariff cuts or tariff exemptions.
Thirdly, in two thirds of the discriminatory measures,
"green" clauses are combined with several other
(harmful) policies that have no climate or
environmental purpose. This finding supports the
argument that it is more acceptable to use
discriminatory measures and to protect domestic
producers from foreign producers (particularly during
economic downturns and as part of the negotiations on
climate change), if some environmental or climate
objective is mentioned in the regulation (Aggarwal and
Evenett, 2010). Interestingly, the "green" aspect is the
main purpose of implementing most liberalizing
measures, and thereby clearly shows that climate-
friendly and trade-enhancing policies can, in fact, be
merged.
Finally, 46 trading partners, 6 sectors and 42 product
lines are, on average, affected by distortionary "green"
clause measures. This illustrates the likely economic
and political importance of these measures.
Source: Global Trade Alert, April 2011.
Note: Keywords used to find Global Trade Alert measures
with a "green" clause are: green, environment; energy;
climate; emission; wind; and solar. The "green" clause of
each identified measure is carefully studied. Two groups are
distinguished: group (a) that includes measures for which the
"green" clause is the main purpose of implementation; and
group (b) that includes measures for which the "green" clause
is of secondary importance.
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Annex
Table III.1. Asia-Pacific countries among the biggest offenders
Source: Global Trade Alert database, April 2011.
Table III.2. Commercial interests of countries still under attack in the post-crisis period
Source: Global Trade Alert database, April 2011.
1 EU-27 (198) Viet Nam (927) Algeria (62) EU-27 (180)
2 Russian Federation (101) Venezuela (785) EU-27 (57) Argentina (174)
3 Argentina (78) Kazakhstan (724) Nigeria (45) China (164)
4 India (46) Nigeria (599) Kazakhstan (43) Germany (161)
5 Germany (40) EU-27 (544) United States (42) United Kingdom (154)
6 Brazil (38) Algeria (476) Germany (40) Belgium, Finland (153)
7 United Kingdom (37) Russian Federation (435) Indonesia (39) Indonesia (151)
8 China (35) Argentina (410)
Russian Federation, Venezuela,
France (149)
9 France (30) Indonesia (386) China (33) Poland, Spain, Viet Nam (148)
10 Italy, Spain (29) India (365) Ethiopia (32) Netherlands (146)
 Viet Nam (38)
Rank




Metric, country specified rank, number
Ranked by number of (almost
certainly) discriminatory
measures imposed
Ranked by the number of tariff
lines (product categories)
affected by (almost certainly)
discriminatory measures
Ranked by the number of
sectors affected by (almost
certainly) discriminatory
measures
1 China 402 117 130 23
2 EU-27 385 .. 94 ..
3 United States 312 94 49 13
4 Germany 287 84 66 10
5 France 256 68 53 9
6 United Kingdom 250 71 50 8
7 Italy 245 67 55 8
8 Republic of Korea 227 71 47 6
9 Japan 225 57 50 6
  10 Netherlands 221 60 47 8
Rank    Top 20 targets
Number of discriminatory
measures imposed on target
Number of pending measures, which
if implemented, would harm target
April 2011 Increase from the last
12 months
April 2011 Increase from the last
12 monthsCHAPTER 3 – POST-CRISIS PROTECTIONISM IN THE REGION
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Figure III.1. Service sector groups targeted quarter-by-quarter
Source: Global Trade Alert database, April 2011.
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CHAPTER 4
RECENT TRENDS IN FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
IN THE REGION
A. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
INFLOWS
With the start of the global economic crisis, world
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows decreased by
16% in 2008, then dropped sharply by 37% in 2009
and gained a marginal 1% increase in 2010 (UNCTAD,
2011a). The decrease was relatively more pronounced
in the developed countries. For the first time,
developing countries are expected to have absorbed
more than half of global FDI flows in 2010.
The Asian and Pacific region, and in particular China,
was one of the top destinations for FDI during the
2000s. However, the global economic crisis had an
impact on the dynamics of FDI inflows into the region,
similar to the impact it had on trade in goods and
services. FDI inflows into the region dropped by 30%
to reach $333 billion in 2009 (ESCAP, 2010). Figure 22
shows the trends in global FDI inflows and the regional
breakdown for 2003-2009. ESCAP (2010) described
these trends in some detail and this section provides
an update based on the latest available data.32
The principal factors driving the decrease in 2008 were
the financial sector problems in the United States and
elsewhere, and the liquidity crisis in the money and
debt markets. The decline of FDI in 2009 was the
result of a slump in mergers and acquisitions as well
as in greenfield projects in the manufacturing sector
(UNCTAD, 2010b), coupled with the collapse of the
capital-intensive mining and real estate sectors (fDi
Intelligence, 2011). The changes in 2010 were driven
by a geographically asymmetric recovery of production
and trade, with Asia and the Pacific on the whole
leading the recovery, although regional FDI inflows
were predicted to have fallen short of the levels of
2007 and 2008.33 As not all developing countries in the
region experienced a similar resumption of growth, FDI
inflows also reacted in very different ways from one
subregion to another (figures 23 and 24).
Figure 22. Foreign direct investment inflow, by
region, 2003-2009
Source: ESCAP, based on data from UNCTAD (2010a).
Note: The regions shown in figure 22 are based on the World
Investment Report 2010 (UNCTAD, 2010a), with the
exception of the three developed countries in the region,
namely, Australia, Japan and New Zealand, which are
included in Asia and the Pacific.
32 Because of limited availability of disaggregated data for
2010 from traditional sources (in particular, IMF and UNCTAD),
the analysis in this section relies mainly on country data
obtained from ADB, 2011; CEIC database, 2011; Economist
Intelligence Unit, 2011; and UNCTAD, 2011a, none of which
covers all economies from the Asia-Pacific region.
33 ESCAP estimate based on country data from ADB, 2011;
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Figure 24. Values of foreign direct investment
inflows, by developing subregion, 2008-2010
Sources: ADB (2011) and Economist Intelligence Unit
(2011a).
Note: Brunei Darussalam, Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, the Pacific
island States and Macao, China, were excluded due to the
lack of data. Taiwan Province of China was included in East
and North-East Asia. Data for India, the Islamic Republic of
Iran, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkey and Viet Nam
for 2010 are based on estimates.
 34  Although it is the fifth largest FDI destination in Asia and the
Pacific, Australia, a developed country, was excluded from this
analysis focusing to developing countries (ADB, 2011;
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011a).
While FDI inflows recovered in East and North-East
Asia, and in South-East Asia in 2010 after a drop in
2009, the trend was the reverse in North and Central
Asia, and in South and South-West Asia. Of all the
developing subregions, South-East Asia witnessed the
most remarkable recovery in FDI inflows after the
global economic crisis. FDI in South-East Asia fell by
around 19% in 2009, but registered a 107% annual
growth in 2010 (figure 23). While East and North-East
Asia regained inward FDI at the 2008 level, South and
South-West Asia as well as North and Central Asia
struggled to face continuous two-digit declines in FDI
inflows in 2010. In particular, the FDI drop in South and
South-West Asia was worse in 2010 than in 2009 due
to the considerable slump of India, which is the
region's leading FDI recipient.
“There is a divide in FDI performance between
East and South-East Asia recovering and North
and Central Asia and South Asia continuing
a decline”
Total FDI inflows into the Asia-Pacific developing
subregions (figure 24) can be disaggregated into two
groups – one focused on the five regional "giants" (i.e.
China; India, the Russian Federation, Singapore and
Hong Kong, China)34 in the context of FDI inflows, and
the second comprising the remainder of the
subregional economies. China, India, the Russian
Federation, Singapore and Hong Kong, China, which
Figure 23. Annual percentage changes in foreign
direct investment inflows, by developing
subregion, 2009 and 2010
Sources: ADB (2011) and Economist Intelligence Unit
(2011a).
Note: Here, North and Central Asia excludes Kyrgyzstan and
Turkmenistan due to lack of data for 2010. Similarly, East and
North-East Asia excludes the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea and Macao, China, as well as Japan as a developed
country, but includes Taiwan Province of China. South-East
Asia excludes Brunei Darussalam and Timor-Leste. The
Pacific was excluded from the analysis as the 2010 data for
Pacific island States were not available. Data for India, the
Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan,
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are characterized by either having a large domestic
market or an advanced level of economic
development, are the top FDI destinations among
developing countries in Asia and the Pacific, and are
estimated to have accounted for more than 70% of FDI
inflows into the region in 2010.35 It is, therefore, helpful
to analyse the developments in those economies
separately in order to gain a better understanding of
the drivers of FDI flows as well as identify the potential
for further FDI attraction (figures 25 and 26).
These five economies showed an improved but still
mixed picture in 2010. China posted a 12% recovery of
FDI inflows to approximately $106 billion in 2010,
almost regaining the level of 2008. FDI flows into Hong
Kong, China, in 2010 also increased by 32% to $66
billion, surpassing the 2008 level. FDI inflows to
Singapore rose sharply by 153% to reach $37 billion
in 2010 after the slump in two consecutive years (2008
and 2009). However, FDI flows into the Russian
Federation stagnated and those into India decreased
by $25 billion in 2010 (figure 25).
“China; Hong Kong, China; Singapore; the
Russian Federation and India are the top FDI
destinations in the Asia-Pacific region and have
accounted for more than 70% of FDI inflows
into the region”
The changes in FDI inflow into both South-East Asia
and East and North-East Asia have followed a similar
trend in trade in goods and services, and growth in
general before and after the global economic crisis
(figure 26). In 2010, South-East Asia quickly regained
the pre-post crisis level of FDI inflows in 2007,
relatively equally spread among the economies of the
subregion. Malaysia experienced a record jump of
more than 500%, thereby increasing its FDI inflows
 35  Includes FDI to the developed countries in the region, i.e.
Australia, Japan and New Zealand.
Figure 25.  Foreign direct investment inflows to the
five foreign direct investment "giants", 2008-2010
Sources: ADB (2011) and the Economist Intelligence Unit
(2011a).
Note: Data for India and the Russian Federation for 2010 are
based on estimates.
Figure 26. Foreign direct investment inflows to
developing subregions, excluding
the five "giants", 2008-2010
Sources: ADB (2011) and the Economist Intelligence Unit
(2011a).
Note: Brunei Darussalam, Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, the Pacific
island States, Hong Kong, China, and Macao, China, were
excluded due to lack of data. Taiwan Province of China was
included in East and North-East Asia. Data for the Islamic
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Source: ESCAP based on UNCTAD (2010a).
Figure 27. Foreign direct investment inflows, by
regional trade agreement
from $1.4 billion in 2009 to $8.6 billion in 2010.36
Indonesia also benefited from rising FDI inflows which
grew by 160% from $4.9 billion in 2009 to $12.7 billion
in 2010. However, Singapore was clearly the lead
destination for FDI in the subregion. The country is
ranked as the number one FDI destination in the world
and had 300 registered projects in 2010 (fDi
Intelligence, 2011). When Singapore is excluded, the
subregion loses on average 35% of FDI inflows in the
period 2008-2010. This means that Singapore has
been contributing more than one third of the FDI
inflows into South-East Asia. Indonesia accounts for
16% of the subregion's inflows, Malaysia for 10%,
Thailand for 13% and Viet Nam for 17%. Indonesia
outperformed both Thailand and Malaysia during 2008-
2010. One explanation for this is perhaps that FDI in
export-oriented manufacturing has expanded in
Indonesia. Indonesia also has an advantage due to the
existence of a relatively large domestic market as well
as adequate supply of labour compared with tightening
labour markets in neighbouring countries (Asian
Development Bank, 2011).
In contrast, the recovery of FDI in East and North-East
Asia was much more modest. In 2010, FDI inflows into
East and North-East Asia increased by 17%, after
witnessing a drop of 14% in 2009. When excluding
China and Hong Kong, China, from FDI inflows into
East and North-East Asia, the recovery in 2010
disappears and the slump for the remaining three
economies (Mongolia, the Republic of Korea and
Taiwan Province of China) continued in 2010 (a 29%
drop) as 98% of total FDI inflows into this subregion
went to China and Hong Kong, China.
FDI inflows into South Asia and South-West Asia have
been continuously declining since the start of the
global economic crisis. In that subregion, FDI inflows
reached a peak in 2008 ($69 billion) and declined in
2009 (25%) and 2010 (28%). India accounted for 68%
of subregional FDI inflows in 2009, and its FDI inflows
considerably decreased in 2009 and 2010 by 16% and
29%, respectively. As shown in figure 26, when India is
excluded, remaining South and South-West Asia still
recorded a large contraction in FDI inflows in both
2009 and 2010.
In North and Central Asia, most FDI is in the natural
resources sector, and is therefore long term and
cannot be suddenly withdrawn (cf. UNCTAD, 2010a).
This could partially explain why this subregion
witnessed a delayed and resilient reaction to world
trends. In 2009, while the Russian Federation, which
accounted for 68% of subregional FDI inflows,
experienced a quick drop of FDI inflows (51%), other
countries in North and Central Asia only suffered mildly
from the global crisis with FDI inflows falling by just
4%, to $15.9 billion. Yet, in 2010, FDI inflows fell by
57% to $6.8 billion, which is the worst result for any
subregion in Asia and the Pacific. This large drop was
mainly because of a fall in FDI inflows into Kazakhstan
at almost 400% in 2010 relative to 2009; Kazakhstan
accounted for 67% of the subregion's FDI inflows in
2009 (excluding the Russian Federation).
Finally, figure 27 shows FDI inflows to major trade
groupings in Asia and the Pacific, i.e. the Asia-
Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), ASEAN Free
36 The Malaysian Industrial Development Authority approved a
much larger number of investment projects (more than 910) in
2010 compared with earlier years as reported on 8 March 2011
at Malaysiadigest.com <www.malaysiandigest.com/news/
18498-mustapa-malaysias-fdi-totaled-us9bil-in-2010.html>. In
2010, Malaysia improved its rank in the World Competitiveness
Yearbook from eighteenth to tenth place (IMD, 2011) and also
was ranked twenty-first in the World Bank Doing Business
Report (World Bank, 2010a), particularly with regard to easy
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37 APTA has six member countries, i.e. Bangladesh, China,
India, Republic of Korea, Lao People's Democratic Republic
and Sri Lanka. AFTA covers all 10 ASEAN member countries.
ECOTA has 10 member countries  both from North and Central
Asia and from South and South-West Asia, i.e. Afghanistan,
Azerbaijan, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, Pakistan,
Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
SAFTA was signed by all eight South Asian countries. See
APTIAD for more details of regional free trade agreements at
www.unescap.org/tid/aptiad/agg_db.aspx.
Trade Agreement (AFTA), Economic Cooperation
Organization Trade Agreement (ECOTA) and SAFTA
in 2000, 2005 and 2009.37 In combining the four
regional trade groups, 28 countries participate in one
or two trade agreements. Unsurprisingly, APTA had the
highest FDI inflows of any trade grouping, as it
comprises some of the region's major FDI destinations,
including China and India. Despite the global economic
crisis, aggregate FDI inflows to all regional trade
groups – except for a slight decline in AFTA in 2009 –
showed positive trends throughout the 2000s. This
could be evidence of positive associations between
broadening and deepening trade liberalization as well
as increasing and diversifying FDI flows within the
region.
B. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
OUTFLOWS
While global FDI outflows in 2010 increased by 13% to
reach just over $1.3 trillion, this amount was still some
10% below the pre-crisis average (2005-2007), and
40% below the 2007 peak. Developing countries are
becoming increasingly important investors with their
share in global outflows increasing to 28% in 2010. As
developed countries are still confronting the effects of
the crisis, many transnational corporations (TNCs) in
developing countries are investing in other emerging
markets, where recovery is strong and the economic
outlook better. In 2010, 70% of investment by
developing countries was directed towards other
developing countries compared with FDI from
developed countries in developing countries, which
was about 50% of their total FDI.
Developed economies continued to account for the
biggest share of global FDI outflows, which reached
81% in 2007, similar to the pre-crisis peak, followed by
the Asia-Pacific region, which accounted for 14%
(figure 28).38 Nonetheless, FDI outflows from the Asia-
Pacific region increased by 20% in 2008 and 23% in
2009. At the same time, the share of FDI outflows from
developed economies fell to 66%, while the share of
Asia-Pacific FDI outflows almost doubled to 27% in
2009. Japan; Hong Kong, China; China; Singapore;
Australia; and India were the top six Asia-Pacific FDI
outflow sources in 2009 (UNCTAD, 2011b). This strong
success was partly due to the dynamism of TNCs from
emerging developing economies and their increasing
aspiration to compete in new markets (ESCAP, 2009b).
Figure 28. Foreign direct investment outflows,
by region, 2003-2009
Source: ESCAP, based on data from UNCTAD (2010a).
Note: Regions are based on World Investment Report 2010
(UNCTAD, 2010a), with the exception of the three developed
countries in the region, i.e. Australia, Japan and New
Zealand, which are included in Asia and the Pacific.
All six subregions in the Asian and Pacific region
recorded growth in FDI outflows during the 2000s,
although that growth varied across subregions
(figure 29).39 While developed economies (i.e.
Australia, Japan and New Zealand) in the region
recorded the highest rise in FDI outflows in 2008, they
38 The Asia-Pacific region includes the three developed
countries in the region, i.e. Australia, Japan and New Zealand.
 39  The Pacific island States registered minimal FDI outflows
(average of less than 0.1% of the region's total) and have thus
been excluded from figure 29.
“APTA had the highest FDI inflows
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Source: ESCAP, based on data from UNCTADstat.
Figure 29. Foreign direct investment outflows, by Asia-Pacific subregion, 2003-2009
 40  However, it is estimated that India decreased its overall
outward FDI by 17% in 2010 (UNCTAD, 2011b).
also recorded the sharpest drop in 2009. In contrast,
FDI outflows from East and North-East Asia fell only
slightly in 2009, gaining the largest share of regional
FDI outflows (39%), followed by Asia-Pacific
developed economies and North and Central Asia,
accounting for 31% and 17%, respectively. South-East
Asia and South and South-West Asia had shares of
7% and 6%, respectively.
India has also emerged as a leading foreign investor.40
For example, in 2010, when most economies reduced
their investment in Western Europe due to the
economic crisis, India increased its investment by
37%. India also increased its FDI in Africa by 74% in
2010, making it the joint third-leading source country of
FDI together with France. The main sectors receiving
Indian FDI are financial services and communications
(fDi Intelligence, 2011). The Russian Federation has
also gained ground as a source of FDI in recent
years. The Russian Federation is estimated to have
increased its FDI outflows by 18% to approximately
$52 billion in 2010. Outflows from these emerging
economies are expected to continue growing in 2011,
as the result of their rapid economic growth as well as
the strong drive by global and regional TNCs to
acquire mineral resources and strategic assets abroad
(UNCTAD, 2011b).
C.  INTRAREGIONAL FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT FLOWS
Developing economies of Asia and the Pacific are
gaining importance as sources of FDI in the region,
complementing FDI from those developed countries
that have been the traditional sources. For example,
low-income ASEAN members (i.e. Cambodia, Lao
People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Viet Nam
– often called CLMV countries), have experienced
increasing intra-ASEAN FDI inflows compared with the
more industrialized and higher income ASEAN
member countries such as the Philippines, Singapore
and Thailand. This is an indication that the CLMV
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more advanced ASEAN countries.41 In South Asia,
Indian enterprises have become the main investor in
smaller-sized neighbouring markets, such as those of
Nepal and Sri Lanka (ESCAP, 2011b).
Enterprises in developing countries in Asia and the
Pacific tend to invest in neighbouring but less
developed countries that offer similar socio-economic
conditions. These businesses have an advantage over
enterprises from developed countries, because their
technologies and knowledge are often a more
appropriate fit for the factor endowments and market
characteristics of the recipient less developed
countries. For example, a smaller technology gap may
put these firms in a good position to transfer and
diffuse technology and knowledge (ESCAP, 2010 and
2011a).
Although there are company-based case studies, data
on intraregional FDI flows – in particular South-South
investment flows – are still rare. In this case, anecdotal
evidence further provides an idea of the extent and
nature of those investments. Intraregional FDI flows for
China, the Republic of Korea and India are reviewed
here for this purpose.
Close to one third of investment projects in the
Asia-Pacific region in 2010 were implemented by
companies that have headquarters in the region, with
most projects located in China (fDi Intelligence, 2011).
As China is by far the largest FDI destination in the
region, it is interesting to note that most FDI in China
was sourced from other East and North-East Asian
economies, mainly Hong Kong, China.42 More
precisely, Hong Kong, China, accounted for 42% of
  41 See a detailed analysis in the Asia-Pacific Trade and
Investment Report 2010 (ESCAP, 2010), pp. 41-42, available
from www.unescap.org/tid/publication/aptir2590.asp.
  42 The high level of FDI flows from Hong Kong, China to China
could be at least partly explained by traditional indirect
investment made by TNCs from third countries to China
through Hong Kong, China (e.g. corporate investments from
Taiwan Province of China).  Compared with the 2000 share of
45%, Hong Kong, China's share in FDI inflows to China in
2009 dropped slightly.  With regard to inflows to Hong Kong,
China, on average 27% of FDI came from China in 2008
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011a), which accounted for 69%
of China's aggregate FDI outflows (China, 2009).
FDI inflows into China in 2009, followed by Japan
(13%), the Republic of Korea (10%) and Taiwan
Province of China (7%). These economies accounted
for more than 80% of total FDI inflows into China in
2009. In contrast, South-East Asia provided 7% of FDI
inflows into China in 2009. FDI from ASEAN was
relatively weaker but is expected to increase with the
increasing integration of ASEAN with China.
“Most FDI in China was sourced from East
and North-East Asian economies”
The Boao Forum for Asia (Beijing University of
International Business and Economics, 2011)
introduced interdependence indices for FDI inflows
and outflows43 for the Republic of Korea to help
measure the degree of regional integration of the
country through FDI flows (table 11). The country's FDI
inflows exhibited a high degree of interdependence
with many Asian economies and showed the
diversified FDI relationships of the Republic of Korea
with various other countries of the region, in particular
with both East and North-East Asian countries (e.g.
China and Japan) and South-East Asian countries
(e.g. Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore). In
terms of FDI outflows, the Republic of Korea also
exhibits a high degree of interdependence with
a number of Asian economies, mostly in South-East
Asia as well as East and North-East Asia; this picture
supports the rapid development of global value chains
in the region. It is noteworthy that the Republic of
Korea has developed a relatively strong level of FDI
interdependence with India as an FDI destination.
  43 The construction of these indices is similar to that of trade
interdependence indices. One index reflects the degree of
investment integration, while another measures investment
intensity. For a detailed explanation, see Beijing University of
International Business and Economics, 2011, p. 28, footnote 1.ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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  44 Mauritius, which has a double tax avoidance treaty with
India, is used by a number of foreign investors as an
intermediary to reach the Indian market to capitalize on the tax
rebates that the country as an offshore financial centre offers.
Moreover, some parts of FDI inflows from Mauritius to India
could also be round-tripping back to India for domestic
investors to avoid capital gains tax in India. In order to
understand the trend of FDI inflows to India well, company-
level FDI data can be examined although such an exercise
would be very costly (Gopalan and Rajan, 2010).
Table 11. Foreign direct investment interdependence index
for the Republic of Korea
Source: Modified from Beijing University of International Business and Economics (2011).
Note: Indices greater than 1.0 suggest that the level of FDI interdependence between two countries is relatively high. The table
shows the average of the two indices – FDI integration and intensity. Asia-Pacific economies are highlighted in bold.
FDI Inflows Integration/Intensity       FDI Outflows                     Integration/Intensity
Malaysia 40.9 Philippines 14.9
Singapore 4.5 Indonesia 4.6
Japan 4.3 China 4.1
China 4.2 Malaysia 2.2
United States 2.4 Hong Kong, China 1.8
Germany 1.9 Singapore 1.7
Philippines 1.4 Japan 1.6
Sweden 1.1 United States 1.4
United Kingdom 1.1 Taiwan Province of China 1.3
Australia 0.9 Thailand 1.2
Saudi Arabia 0.7 Netherlands 0.9
France 0.7 India 0.9
Taiwan Province of China 0.7 Australia 0.6
Hong Kong, China 0.7 United Arab Emirates 0.6
Switzerland 0.6 Brazil 0.5
India 0.3 Russian Federation 0.4
United Arab Emirates 0.2 South Africa 0.4
Canada 0.2 United Kingdom 0.3
Thailand 0.2 Italy 0.1
Figure 30 highlights the growing share of FDI inflows
from Asia-Pacific economies into India. While
Mauritius, an offshore financial centre, has dominated
FDI inflows to India (34% of total FDI inflows in
2010),44 the share of FDI from Asia-Pacific economies
in India's total FDI inflows increased from 11% in 2003
to 22% in 2010. At the same time, Europe and the
United States (two traditional sources of FDI in India)
saw their shares considerably reduced in 2003-2010,
although both increased FDI in India in terms of value.
Among the subregions in Asia and the Pacific, South-
East Asia, East, as well as North-East Asia dominated
FDI inflows into India, accounting for approximately
94% of total FDI from Asia-Pacific economies to India
(57% for South-East Asia45 and 37% for East and
North-East Asia). India's South Asian neighbours
accounted for less than 1% of FDI inflows to India.46
These results indicate a growing trend of FDI inflows
into India from other economies in Asia and the Pacific,
particularly South-East Asia, and East and North-
East  Asia.
“Economic integration of the Asian and Pacific
region not only depends on the extent of
intraregional trade but also on the extent of
intraregional FDI”
  45 Singapore has dominated South-East Asia's FDI to India,
e.g. accounting for 81% in 2010.
  46 This issue may be revisited to examine if India's
neighbouring countries may also use Mauritius as an
intermediary to facilitate their investment to India. In addition to
India, Mauritius holds the double tax treaties with four South
Asian countries, i.e. Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri
Lanka (LOWTAX, 2011).CHAPTER 4 – RECENT TRENDS IN FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE REGION
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Figure 30.  Foreign direct investment inflows into India, 2003 and 2010
Source:  ESCAP, based on data from the CEIC database (2011) and International Monetary Fund (2011b).
It is apparent that economic integration of the Asian
and Pacific region not only depends on the extent of
intraregional trade flows but also on the extent of
intraregional FDI flows, which is in line with the
emergence of global value chains in the region.
Statistical evidence also reveals that among
developing countries, China, India and the Republic
of Korea exhibit various degrees of integration
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A. ASIA AND THE PACIFIC AS THE
WORLD'S ENGINE OF GROWTH
The traditional developed economies of the Group
of Three (G3) – the European Union, Japan and the
United States – all face economic slowdown, and
acceptance is growing that the Asia-Pacific region
will be the world's next engine of economic growth.
Developing economies in Asia and the Pacific are
rapidly increasing their importance in the world
economy, having performed robustly to make a
quick recovery in 2010 and reach pre-crisis levels of
economic activity while major industrial countries
continue to struggle. According to the ESCAP
(2011a), developing Asia is expected to continue its
dynamic growth at the rate of more than 8% per
annum throughout the first-half of this decade, while
the world economy will grow on average by only 4%
per annum.
The relatively quick recovery of developing
countries in Asia, at a time when export demand
from industrial countries has been drying up, can be
explained partly by the region's unexpectedly strong
domestic demand. As explained in part I of this
report, the relative importance of the region,
especially China, in world trade has grown, both in
terms of exports and imports. The region's growing
share of global imports has strengthened the
expectation, particularly within the region itself, that
it may be able to decouple itself from the
vulnerabilities and deep impacts of business cycle
fluctuations in other parts of the world.
CHAPTER 5
IDENTIFYING TRADE AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES
"With the expectation that demand by major
economies for the Asia-Pacific
exports will be sluggish in the long term,
opportunities for export expansion
will depend largely on the growth of
intraregional demand"
Although exports from Asia and the Pacific have
been largely driven by globalization and the active
participation of various economies within the region
in globally fragmented production chains, it is
expected that intraregional final demand will
continue to grow and partially offset weak long-term
demand from the G-3. Already, part of the region's
exports has catered to intraregional final demand,
especially that of China; however, many economies
in Asia are still in the early stages of development.
China and India, for example, are projected to gain
almost 500 million new urban residents during
the next 20 years (Iimi, 2005). This massive
urbanization will provide plenty of opportunities for
expanding production and exports of consumer and
capital goods by the rest of the region.
With the expectation that demand by major
economies for the Asia-Pacific exports will be
sluggish in the long term, opportunities for export
expansion will depend largely on the growth of
intraregional demand. According to ESCAP (2011a)
and the International Monetary Fund (2011a),
exports and imports of developing countries in AsiaASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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and the Pacific will continue to grow rapidly in real
terms in 2011. This growth will remain strong
throughout the first half of the decade despite an
expected slowdown in demand by the rest of the
world (see tables in part III). China's exports and
imports, which account for almost 30% of the
region's export and import values, are expected to
grow by more than 15% per annum in real terms.
India's exports and imports are projected to grow by
more than 13% and almost 10% per annum,
respectively.
Major trading economies in South-East Asia are
also expected to strongly increase their exports
and imports. When the more advanced Asian
economies are included, the trade prospects of the
region become even more promising. Although the
growth of exports and imports by Japan and NIEs
may not have been as dynamic as those of the
large developing Asian economies, they still
account for a significant share of Asian trade.
(Japan accounts for about 14% of Asia's exports
and imports, while NIEs, excluding Taiwan Province
of China, account for about 22%.) In some cases,
they are expected to witness robust growth in the
future.
Although China currently dominates exports from
the Asia-Pacific region, rapidly rising labour costs in
that country could create opportunities for other
developing economies in the region to catch up
(see also Haddad and Shepherd, 2011). Industrial
wage inflation in China is increasing due to the
depletion of rural labour from the country's Central
and Western provinces as well as to rising workers'
demands for improvements in labour conditions.
The resulting rising manufacturing costs could be
an incentive for China's manufacturers to move up
in the industrial value chain and source more
components from low-cost neighbours. Such a
transformation of China's industrial structure would
further deepen the integration of China's production
network with that of other Asian and Pacific
economies and spur intraregional trade.
Currently, the bulk of import demand from the region
is confined to a small group of economies. Just 12
economies account for more than 90% of total Asia-
Pacific imports (table 12).47 Thus, projections for the
growth of imports by these 12 economies will
47 Excluding imports by Taiwan Province of China.
Table 12. Major Asia-Pacific importers





































































Source: Import share calculated by ESCAP, based on WTO International Trade Statistics online, downloaded on 7 April 2011.
"Currently, the bulk of import demand from the
region is confined to a small group of
12 economies"CHAPTER 5 – IDENTIFYING TRADE AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES
59
provide a strong indication of the prospects for
exports of their partners, including those in the
region. However, the expansion of imports by these
economies would also require the presence of trade
complementarities between potential partners. If
these complementarities are not very good, the
exporting economies of the region will not only have
to increase competitiveness in their current export
products but also transform their export structure to
better match demand from the importing economies
of the region. The next section explores these
issues in more detail.
B. TRADE AND INVESTMENT
OPPORTUNITIES FROM A RISING
ASIA  AND THE PACIFIC
As shown above, the demand in Asia and the
Pacific comes mainly from a handful of importing
economies. Those economies are relatively large
and have been actively involved in the development
of production networks with China and advanced
East Asian economies. Other economies in the
region play a minor role, and it is important for them
to continue their reforms and present themselves as
viable and valuable future trade and investment
partners. This section considers several indicators
that reveal the degree to which these economies
could meet trade and, indirectly, investment demand
among the large Asian and Pacific economies.
1. Measuring trade complementarity48
To what extent can other Asia-Pacific economies
meet the demand of the key Asia-Pacific importing
economies identified in table 12? The trade
complementarity index has been calculated based
on the disaggregation of Asia-Pacific traded
products into 277 groups at the 3-digit level of SITC
Rev. 3 for 2008 (see figure V.1 in the annex to this
chapter).49 On average, almost 50% of exports by
Asia and the Pacific match its import demand (for
subregional complementarities see more in ESCAP,
2011a). This implies a relatively good alignment of
the current export supply specialization of Asia-
Pacific economies and the region's import pattern.50
"On average, almost half of exports by Asia and
the Pacific match the region's import demand"
(a) Import demand of major economies in
the East Asian production network
The import demand of the major economies in the
East Asian production network (China, Japan, the
Republic of Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong,
China) tends to exhibit greater complementarity with
the exports of those same economies and of the
developing ASEAN-551 than with the exports of
other Asian and Pacific economies on average.
These results show more variation at the level of
the following individual economies.
China – On average, 41% of China's imports
showed complementarity with exports from Asian
and Pacific economies in 2008. China's import
demand appear to have relatively more
 48 The trade complementarity index shows to what extent a
particular economy's import pattern matches the export pattern
of another economy.  The index is defined as 100 (1-∑i| mik-xij|/2),
where mik is the share of good i in global imports of country k
and xij is the share of good i in all exports of country j. The
index is zero when no goods overlap and 100 when imports of
a country of interest perfectly match the export structure of
another country of interest.
49 Trade data for 2009 have not been used in the analysis in
order to avoid the possibility that during the global economic
crisis and resulting trade contraction such data could distort
actual trade complementarities. The index is calculated using
the World Integrated Trade Solution platform of trade
indicators.
 50 A major limitation of using current import demand structure to
assess trade opportunity is that the future trade pattern could
be different from what is projected today based on past data,
especially if the region has changed from external demand-
dependent to intraregional demand-dependent. Ideally, to
incorporate this concern, imports of parts and components
used in the production of final goods exported outside the
region should be excluded from the dataset. Unfortunately,
since such information is unavailable at the aggregate level,
data on Asia's imports from the world – which cover imports for
consumption in the region, imports of intermediate inputs and
raw materials used in further production for serving final
demand both within and outside the region –  have to be used.
 51 This group comprises Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the
Philippines and Viet Nam.ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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complementarity with the export pattern of the
advanced Asian-Pacific economies, major ASEAN
economies, and some resource exporting
economies in North and Central Asia, than with
exports from the region as a whole on average.
Only the following 11 economies appeared to match
more than 50% of China's import demand:
● Hong Kong, China (59%);
● Macao, China (54.5%);
● Indonesia (54%);





● New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and
the Philippines (50% each).
Japan – About 44% of Japan's import pattern was
matched by exports by Asia and the Pacific. Exports
from 17 Asian and Pacific economies, including
a few low-income developing economies, matched
more than 50% of Japan's import demand in 2008.




● Republic of Korea (61%);
● Turkey (60%);
● Indonesia  and  the Islamic Republic of Iran
(59% each);
● Australia, Malaysia, Russian Federation
and Singapore (57% each);
● Phillippines (55%);
● Brunei Darussalam and New Zealand
(52% each);
● Bhutan (51.5%);
● India and Viet Nam (51% each);
● Uzbekistan (50.5%).
Republic of Korea – On average, 43.5% of the
Republic of Korea's imports show complementarity
with exports from Asian and Pacific economies.
Only 12 economies appeared to match more than







● Viet Nam (55%);
● Philippines, Thailand and Hong Kong,China
(54% each);
● Australia (52%);
● New Zealand (51%);
● Islamic Republic of Iran (50%).
Singapore – About 44% of Singapore's imports were
matched by Asia-Pacific exports. Exports of 12 Asian
and Pacific economies, including some low-income
developing economies matched more than 50% of
Singapore's import demand in 2008. Singapore's




● Hong Kong, China (60.5%);
● Indonesia (58%);
● China (57%);
● Fiji, Thailand and Viet Nam (55% each);
● Solomon Islands (54%);
● Republic of Korea (53%);
● Myanmar and Nepal (51%);
● Timor-Leste (50%).
Hong Kong, China – Only 32.5% of imports by
Hong Kong, China, showed complementary with
exports from other Asian and Pacific economies on
average in 2008. Exports from five economies in
East and South-East Asia matched more than 50%
of import demand from Hong Kong, China:
● Malaysia (54%);
● China and Singapore (52% each);
"The import demand of the major economies in
the East Asian production network tends to
exhibit greater complementarity, on average,
with the exports of those economies and of
developing ASEAN-5 than with exports by other
Asian and Pacific economies"CHAPTER 5 – IDENTIFYING TRADE AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES
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● Macao, China (51%);
● Philippines (50%).
The relatively lower complementarity between
import structure of Hong Kong, China, and the
export structure of other Asia-Pacific economies
may be a reflection of the unique status of Hong
Kong, China, as an import-export entrepôt. Its
imports largely comprise finished and semi-finished
goods from a small group of economies in Asian
production networks for re-export, while imports of
primary commodities and raw materials from Asian
and Pacific economies generally account for a
minor share.
(b) Major importing economies in South-
East Asia
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand are the major
importing economies in South-East Asia. Their trade
complementarity patterns are detailed below.
Thailand –  About 46% of Thailand's imports
matched exports by other Asian and Pacific
economies. The country's imports were found to fit
well (more than 50%) with 19 economies in the
region, including some least developed economies
in the Pacific. The highest complementarity index
was found for exports by:
● Australia (59%);
● New Zealand (57%);
● Philippines (56%);
● Malaysia (55%);
● Indonesia, Turkey and Hong Kong, China
(53% each);
● French Polynesia, Japan and the Russian
Federation (52% each);
● China, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea
and Singapore (51% each);
● Federated States of Micronesia (50.5%);
● Brunei Darussalam, the Islamic Republic
of Iran, Viet Nam and Macao, China;
(approximately 50% each).
Malaysia – About 44% of Malaysia's imports
showed complementarity with other Asia-Pacific
exports, mostly from the advanced Asian and major
ASEAN economies:
● Singapore (58%);
● Japan, the Republic of Korea and Thailand
(57% each);
● China (55%);
● Hong Kong, China (54%);
● Philippines (53.5%);
● New Zealand (53%);
● Australia (51%).
Indonesia – Only 38% of Indonesia's imports fitted
well with exports by other Asian and Pacific
economies in general, and only Japan showed
export complementarity of more than 50% with
Indonesia's imports, at 54%. This indicates that the
integration of Indonesia into the Asian and Pacific
production networks is still at a relatively low level.52
"…most economies in the region need to
transform their productive structure and current
specialization to become viable trading partners
of the large Asian importing economies"
(c) Major importers in South and South-
West Asia
Major importers in South and South-West Asia are
India and Turkey but their import complementarity
patterns are very different from the rest of Asia and
the Pacific.
India – About 44% of India's imports have
complementarity with Asia-Pacific exports
particularly those from low-income developing
economies:
52 Evidence is found from 2007 trade data compiled by
Athukorala (2010, table II.2). The relative share of production
network exports in total exports from Indonesia is 38%,
somewhat lower than that of the Philippines (87%), Malaysia
(79%), Singapore (66.5%) and Thailand (63%).  The shares on
the import side show a similar pattern. The production network
accounted for about 37.7% of Indonesia's imports, lower than
that of the Philippines (79%), Malaysia (72%), Singapore (78%)
and Thailand (48.5%).ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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● Sri Lanka (59%);
● Fiji and Nepal (58%);
● Myanmar, Samoa, Solomon Islands and
Viet Nam (55% each);
● Indonesia (54%);




Turkey – Of the imports by Turkey, 43% matched
exports from Asia and the Pacific. Turkey's imports
have tended towards complementarity with exports
from resource-rich economies, especially land-
locked developing economies and the Pacific:
● Tajikistan (55%);
● Australia, Azerbaijan, Mongolia and New
Zealand (54% each);
● New Caledonia (52.5%);
● Kazakhstan, Lao People's Democratic
Republic and the Russian Federation (52%
each);
● Georgia and Macao, China  (51% each);
● Armenia and Papua New Guinea (50%
each).
These figures suggest that there is potential for
Turkey to diversify its resource dependence away
from the European Union to non-European Union
partners.
(d) Major importers in the rest of Asia and
the Pacific
Russian Federation – This is the only North and
Central Asian economy that appears in the group of
major Asian importers. Some 38% of imports by the
Russian Federation have complementarity with
exports of the region. The Russian Federation
imports appear to have relative complementarity
with exports by low-income developing countries,
especially small Pacific and North-East Asian
economies. Exports by the following economies had
more than 50% complementarity with the Russian
Federation's import demand:
● Tonga (61%);
● Solomon Islands (60.5%);
● Samoa (57%);
● Guam and Northern Mariana Islands (56%
each);
● Mongolia (55%);
● New Caledonia (52%).
Australia – A total of 38% of Australian imports had
complementarity with exports by Asian-Pacific




● Federated States of Micronesia and
Solomon Islands (56% each);
● Vanuatu (53%);
● Cook Islands and Samoa (52% each);
● Niue and Timor-Leste (51% each);
● Papua New Guinea (50%).
Given the assumption that world demand will shift
towards Asia and the Pacific, and China in
particular, during the next decade, the above results
imply that most economies in the region need to
change their productive structure and current
specialization in order to become viable trading
partners of the large Asian importing economies as
well as part of the dynamic Asian production
network. This is especially true for the low-income
developing economies.
2. Export diversification and market
share of individual economies
Typically, exports of any economy can be expanded
by increasing the number of different export
products and services and/or increasing the
quantity of each exported item, so-called expansion
of "extensive margin" and "intensive margin" of
exports (Hummels and Klenow, 2005).
In terms of opportunities to expand the type of
export products (i.e. export diversification),
countries that currently export relatively few
products obviously have more room for






























































































































































































































































































































number of products. Based on the 4-digit SITC
Rev. 3 export data for 2008, it was found that
exports by most Asian and Pacific economies were
quite diversified and covered a wide range of
product groups. For example, exports of products
by China and Thailand already cover more than
89% of the products exported globally. In contrast,
exports by the low-income developing countries are
much more concentrated, accounting for a smaller
fraction of globally exported products. The index
shows that the low-income developing Asia-Pacific
economies would have more trade opportunities if
they could diversify their exports (figure 31). Some
emerging economies have been able to increase
their export diversification during the past decade.
Viet Nam, in particular, increased its export
diversification by more than 20 percentage points
between 2000 and 2008.
"In contrast to low-income countries,
export products of China and Thailand already
cover more than 89% of products
exported globally"
Figure 31. Scope of exports of selected Asia-Pacific economies in the world market,
2000 and 2008
Source: ESCAP calculation, based on data from World Bank, WITS database, downloaded April 2011.
Note: Measured by using an index known as the Hummels-Klenow (2005) (products) extensive margin, available from the World
Integrated Trade Solution of the World Bank.
Most economies of the region still have
considerable potential for expanding their exports
through enhancing competitiveness of their current
exports. Based on 4-digit SITC Rev. 3 export data
for 2008, Asian and Pacific economies play a
relatively minor role in world markets for products
that they export, with a market share of no more
than 9% (figure 32). Thus, enhancing compet-
itiveness, through improved cost efficiency and
quality, of currently exported products is necessary
in order to capture a larger share of world demand.
"Most economies of the region still have
considerable potential for expanding their
exports through enhancing competitiveness of
their current exports"ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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Figure 32. Shares of selected Asia-Pacific economies in
the world market, 2000 and 2008
Source: ESCAP calculation, based on data from World Bank, WITS database, downloaded in April 2011.
Note: Measured by using the Hummels-Klenow (2005) (products) intensive margin index, available from the World Integrated Trade
Solution of the World Bank.
3. Specialization
Improving the competitiveness of exports has
always been a key factor in enhancing export
growth. The revealed comparative advantage (RCA)
index can be used to gauge the current level of
competitiveness of Asian and Pacific exports and is
calculated on the basis of the 4-digit level of
disaggregation of SITC Rev. 3 trade data. The index
also may be used indirectly to reflect a degree of
the relative attractiveness of a particular economy
for FDI, particularly in export sectors. An index
value larger than one (RCA >1) indicates that an
economy features a larger share of a certain
product in its exports than the world average export
share in that product. In such a case, the economy
is said to have a revealed comparative advantage in
that product and is therefore a relatively attractive
investment destination. RCA indices are also used
to assess export potential.53 In principle, the largest
potential for inter-industry trade (i.e. trading of
goods categories into different industrial sectors) is
between economies that reveal quite different
comparative advantages. In contrast, similar RCA
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values signal a narrow scope of potential inter-
industry trade, but this does not exclude a potential
for the intra-industry trade.
For economies in East Asia, RCA values greater
than unity appear to be concentrated in industrial
and manufacturing products (SITC sectors 5-8),
indicating that the comparative advantage of that
subregion in those products (table 13). The
revealed comparative advantage of South-East
Asia, which is more diversified, is dispersed across
various sectors, and is relatively more prominent in
industrial and manufactured products (SITC 6-8) as
well as food products (SITC 0). In South and South-
West Asia, India and Turkey lead the subregion in a
number of competitive sectors, dominated by food
products (SITC 0), manufactured goods (SITC 6)
and miscellaneous manufactured articles (SITC 8).
The North Asia, Central Asia and Pacific subregion
have a relatively small number of product groups
with revealed comparative advantage, especially if
Australia and New Zealand are excluded. The
comparative advantage of these subregions
appears to be concentrated in food (SITC 0), fuel
and mining (SITC 3), and manufactured goods
(SITC 6).
Comparative advantage patterns, as discussed
above, could suggest opportunities for inter-industry
trade between economies within the region. For
example, East Asia, which is the centre of the
region's import demand, would continue to provide
a potential market for exports of primary products,
i.e. food, raw materials, fuel and mineral products.
This does not mean that there are no opportunities
to export industrial and manufactured goods to East
Asia. It only indicates that to export non-primary
products to East Asia, more attention should be
given to the development of capacity for intra-
industry trade. To enhance intra-industry exports,
Asia-Pacific economies will need to build horizontal
specialization in differentiated products or vertical
specialization in different stages of the value chain.
Opportunities for the rest of the region to export to
developing South-East Asia and India tend to be
more in intra-industry trade than inter-industry trade,
because the revealed comparative advantage of
those economies appears to be diversified across
various sectors. On the other hand, exports of
industrial and manufacturing products to South and
South-West Asia, North and Central Asia, and the
Pacific still have considerable scope for expansion
because their specialization is quite different from
the rest of the region even though the size of
individual markets in those subregions is relatively
small.
C. OPPORTUNITIES AND PROSPECTS
FOR FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT
Asia and the Pacific is leading the recovery of
global FDI, and opportunities in the region for
attracting FDI thus remain high. At the same time,
various emerging developing economies in the
region have increased their importance as FDI
sources, both within and outside the region. In
particular China, India, Indonesia, the Russian
Federation, Singapore and Hong Kong, China, are
expected to play an increasingly important role in
terms of both inward and outward FDI in the region.
As developing economies in Asia and the Pacific
are gaining importance as sources of FDI,
opportunities for intraregional South-South FDI are
emerging. South-South FDI would also facilitate
technology and knowledge transfer, which in turn
would enhance sustainable and inclusive
development in the less developed economies of
the region.
"FDI in high value-added industries and in
services is expected to become increasingly
important for Asia and the Pacific"
While many lower-income developing countries in
Asia and the Pacific may have relatively small
"To enhance intra-industry exports, Asia-Pacific
economies will need to build horizontal
specialization in differentiated products or
vertical specialization in different stages
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able 13. Patterns of revealed comparative advantage, by economy
, 2008
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domestic markets, they have relatively stable
economies and political climates as well as low-cost
(but typically unskilled) labour that help to generate
business and investment opportunities. Some
advanced developing economies, such as China,
are losing competitive advantage in labour-intensive
sectors, mainly due to increasing labour costs; less
advanced economies could therefore capture
emerging opportunities by taking over from China
some of the production operations in regional and
global value chains through South-South FDI. For
example, some countries such as Bangladesh
and Cambodia have already captured such
opportunities in the apparel and garment sector.54
Future prospects of South-South FDI in the region's
less advanced economies depend on their ability to
strengthen supply-side capacities, e.g. development
of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and
supporting industries, and provide an enabling
environment for investment (see also chapter 7).
FDI in high value-added industries and in services
sectors is expected to become increasingly
important for Asia and the Pacific. Already, the
global top three sectors attracting FDI comprise
information and communications technology (ICT),
business services and financial services. Most
recently, FDI in the ICT and software sectors
surpassed FDI in financial services, and in 2010
accounted for 11% of global projects (fDi
Intelligence, 2011). This opens new opportunities
for those countries that have competitive
advantages in those sectors. Furthermore,
economies with abundant natural resources will
continue to attract FDI, especially if supported by
domestic reforms and productivity growth (see
box 5.1. for investment opportunities in Central Asia).
What are the prospects for FDI in China and India,
the two largest emerging economies in Asia and the
Pacific?
China is expected to remain a top FDI destination
as transnational corporations (TNCs) eye China's
rapidly growing market and because China still
relies on transfer of advanced technologies from
developed economies. Despite the need for
development in inland provinces in China, most FDI
has so far targeted coastal provinces, mostly in
sectors that cater to the domestic market, or
acquisitions of domestic companies to establish a
local presence rather than for exporting. China's
recently released twelfth Five-Year Plan identifies
new development objectives, motivated mainly by
the need for climate change mitigation, and with the
focus on seven strategic sectors, i.e. energy saving
and environmental protection, next-generation
information technology, biotechnology, high-end
manufacturing, new energy, new materials and
clean-energy vehicles. The Plan's objective is to
raise the share of those sectors in GDP from the
current 3% to 15% by 2020. Those sectors are
expected to attract large inflows of FDI (Stern,
2011). FDI inflows would therefore grow and reach
an average of $114 billion per year during 2011-
2015 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011b). As for
outward FDI, Chinese companies are expected to
continue acquisitions of overseas assets at an
accelerating level, particularly in the agricultural,
minerals and energy sectors, to ensure a steady
supply for the expanding home economy.
"China's recently released twelfth Five-Year
Plan identifies new development objectives,
motivated mainly by the need for climate
change mitigation"
India has yet to see inward FDI recovery. To change
the trend, India is expected to relax restrictions on
FDI in some key sectors (especially services such
as retailing) in an effort to simplify FDI procedures
and remove bottlenecks (Economist Intelligence
Unit, 2011c). India is expected to continue strong
growth of real GDP and further economic
liberalization, resulting in a growing need for both
public and private investment (especially in
infrastructure and industrial development). Thus, a
more investor-friendly climate needs to be
established in order to attract higher FDI inflows, as
was clearly indicated by the Doing Business Survey
2011 (World Bank, 2010a) in which India was again
54 However, those countries should strive to diversify their
economies and decrease dependence on single commodities
or export products. Such diversification efforts would also
attract further South-South FDI from neighbouring developing
countries.ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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ranked low at 134. Indian enterprises are also
showing increasing interest in investing in foreign
markets (fDi Intelligence, 2011).55 India's FDI is
therefore expected to grow in the mid- to long term,
despite the country's decreases in FDI outflows in
2009 and 2010 (UNCTAD, 2011b).
It is apparent that corporate and industrial
restructuring in the wake of the global economic
crisis, coupled with ongoing development of
international production networks or regional and
global value chains, have created new investment
opportunities for forward-looking enterprises in both
developed and developing economies.
However, prospects for continued growth of outward
FDI from the region are somewhat dimmed by rising
risks, including "unpredictable global governance",
uncertainties over domestic demand in developed
countries, fiscal and financial vulnerabilities,
sovereign debt crises, rising energy prices, inflation
risks and currency volatility in addition to
earthquake-related damage in Japan (cf.
International Monetary Fund, 2011b). As a result,
the possibility exists that the weak recovery of FDI
outflows may become even weaker during 2011.
Finally, FDI opportunities could arise from the ever-
increasing number of RTAs covering investment
provisions in Asia and the Pacific (box 8.2). While
such provisions are not a major determinant of FDI
the overall package of some agreements, including
deep commitments to, and wide coverage of
industrial sectors, is expected to increase
  55 For example, India is currently emerging as an investor in
selected outsourcing services in other Asian countries, such as
the Philippines (box 5.2).
Box 5.1. Capturing investment opportunities:  Central Asiaa
Discussions on investment opportunities in the Asian and Pacific region frequently focus on economies that are
growing rapidly on the basis of exports of manufactured goods and the development of production networks. However,
Central Asia contains a group of economies with quite different characteristics but significant trade and investment
potential. Although landlocked, they are relatively rich in natural resources. The opportunities in these economies are
different from those in other Asian subregions.
The abundance of natural resources ensures a steady flow of foreign exchange to Central Asian economies. In addition
to oil and gas, this subregion is also rich in gold and other precious metals such as silver and platinum, and some base
metals such as copper, molybdenum, lead and zinc. As a result, the region is highly resource-dependent. In Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan, for example, hydrocarbons and minerals account for more than 50% of their exports, while oil and gas
account for more than 25% of their fiscal revenue.56 This resource abundance has attracted considerable FDI inflows to
the region; a ninefold increase was recorded during 1993-2008, two thirds of which went to the energy sector
(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011).
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2011) as workforce of the subregion is also
part of its strength. Central Asian economies have a relatively young workforce and almost universal literacy rates
(OECD, 2011). From 1993 to 2008, the productivity of the subregion grew nearly 5% faster than the world average.
These factors have contributed to a strong economic performance by the subregion during the past decade, resulting in
an annual GDP growth rate of 8%.
(Continued on page 69)
  56 Centrat Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook,
2011. Available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/fields/2011.html
"The possibility exists that the weak
recovery of FDI outflows may become
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Box 5.1 (Continued)
Central Asia labour productivity growth relative to world average, 1993-2008
Source: OECD (2011).
The subregion presents not only great opportunities, but also challenges. Several economies in Central Asia are
remote and landlocked, which leads to high trade costs, especially transportation, for traders and investors. The World
Bank "Doing Business" databaseb covers six of the Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC)c members
(Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). The average cost of importing
a container to these six countries is around $3,000, compared with less than $1,000 in East Asia and $450 in
Singapore. The costs of shipping a container from the United States east coast to Tajikistan can reach $9,000, with the
leg from Georgia to Tajikistan accounting for two-thirds of this amount. The World Bank (2004) estimated that trade
logistics costs amount to 23% of the value of Tajikistan's external trade and that total logistics costs, including domestic
movement of goods, amount to 27% of GDP.
Because of these challenges, the subregion needs to improve its roads, rail system, pipelines and communications
infrastructure to reduce trade costs. Trade facilitation measures are also a priority. Although tariff barriers in the region
are quite low, analysts point to the presence of non-tariff (but man-made) barriers associated with customs clearance,
transit fees, complicated systems of trade permits, "unofficial payments" and limited progress towards installation of
modern information systems.d
a ESCAP defines Central Asia as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
b Available from www.doingbusiness.org/EconomyRankings/.
c The Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Programme is an Asian Development Bank supported
initiative that was established in 1997 to encourage economic cooperation among countries in the Central Asian region.
It currently has 10 participating members: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia,
Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The CAREC Programme has, to date, focused on financing
infrastructure projects and improving the region's policy environment in the priority areas of transport (especially road
transport), energy (including the water-energy nexus), trade policy and trade facilitation (especially customs
cooperation).
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intraregional FDI flows. Expectations are high for an
increase in FDI flows between China and ASEAN
countries and also between the members of the
Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), which are
about to negotiate liberalization commitments on
investment. The realization of the ASEAN Economic
Community in 2015 is also expected to increase
intra-ASEAN investment flows, which will benefit the
less developed ASEAN members. At the same time,
developing economies in the region, including least
developed countries and landlocked developing
countries, would benefit from membership in
selected RTAs such as Economic Cooperation
Organisation Trade Agreement and South Asian
Free Trade Area. Such benefit would be in terms
not only of trade but also of investment, provided
that these RTAs are effectively implemented as
well as expand their coverage, deepen their
commitments and are willing to accept new
members.




In response to the current long-term global
economic downturn, proactive economic measures
to promote new industries are necessary. Climate-
smart goods and technologies (CSGTs) in particular
are receiving considerable attention as a potential
source of growth, as on a global scale such growth
in environmental goods and services will create
huge international business opportunities. In
exploring CSGT trade opportunities within and
outside the region, this section shows that there is
an untapped trade potential in these promising
sectors for Asia-Pacific countries, including
intraregional trade.
1. What are climate-smart goods and
technologies and how much trade in
climate-smart goods and
technologies is there?
CSGTs are defined broadly as products,
components and technologies that tend to have
a relatively less adverse impact on climate change
(i.e. greenhouse gas emission) in particular and on
the environment in general. CSGTs constitute low-
carbon technologies such as solar photovoltaic
systems, wind power generation, clean coal
technologies and energy-efficient lighting. Trade
and investment in CSGTs and climate-smart
services have recently received much attention as
a triple win scenario where trade, climate and
environment, and development all benefit. In China,
for example, 5.3% of its RMB4 trillion (about $585
million) economic stimulus package has been given
to an environment-related budget. In 2009, the
Government of Japan allocated 10% of its ¥15.4
billion (around $165 billion) economic stimulus
package to environmental measures. More recently,
the nuclear disaster in Japan has triggered global
awareness of the needs to seriously promote
CSGTs. The achievement of low-energy con-
sumption is now regarded as a key not only to
solving climate-change problems but also to
reducing reliance on nuclear power. Outside the
Asia-Pacific region, the Government of the United
States has introduced a $150 billion, 10-year
renewable energy initiative, and the European
Union has taken active measures to support the
switch to low-emission vehicles.
"Asia and the Pacific is the most dynamic
region when it comes to trade in climate-smart
goods, with China and Japan the top two
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Figure 33 shows that global trade in CSGTs is
gradually rising.57 The value of world CSGT exports
was around $410 billion in the pre-crisis year of
2008, and exports and imports accounted for about
3% of global trade. Although most CSGT exporters
are developed economies, some developing
economies are also emerging as important players
as will become more evident from the discussion
below.58
Asia and the Pacific is the most dynamic region
when it comes to trade in climate-smart goods, with
China and Japan the top two exporting countries. In
2008, the Asia-Pacific region59 accounted for about
31.9% of world trade in CSGTs. The value of CSGT
exports and imports tripled during 2002-2008, with
regional exports (mainly from China) increasing
from $39.3 billion to $132 billion, or on average by
22.7% annually. Not surprisingly, Asia-Pacific trade
in CSGTs with the world fell in 2009; exports and
imports declined by 16.8% and 15.9%, respectively,
from the previous year as a result of the global
economic crisis.60
East and North-East Asia, and South-East Asia
account for the largest share of total Asia-Pacific
CSGT trade, in terms of both exports and imports
(more than 90%) and thus drive the CSGT trade of
the whole region (figure 34). China and Japan are
the region's largest exporting economies of CSGTs
(table 14). China is also the leading importer of
CSGTs, followed by the Republic of Korea.
Regional exports and imports of CSGTs are
geographically very concentrated, with China and
Japan representing 67% of total regional exports,
and China, the Republic of Korea and Japan
absorbing 53.4% of regional imports.
The intraregional share of trade in CSGTs has
remained relatively stable and accounts for some
50% of total trade of the region in these goods,
except on the export side in 2010 (figure 35).61
CSGT imports of the region show a strong bias
towards Europe, which takes a quarter of the total
CSGT imports. On the export side, the share of
  57 In a forthcoming ESCAP study on Trade, Investment and
Climate Change (2011c, forthcoming), CSGTs cover the same
64 items under 6-digit HS 2002 codes. Following the World
Bank (2008), the ESCAP study divides these 64 goods further
into clean coal technologies (HS codes 840510, 841181 and
841182), wind energy (HS codes 848340 and 848360), solar
photovoltaic systems (HS codes 850720, 853710 and 854140)
and energy-efficient lighting (HS codes 853931). The study
also considers "other codes" as the fifth group, which consists
of all HS codes not considered in the four categories of
renewable energies. All these 64 CSG items are considered as
a single trade item in this report.
  58 See also ESCAP, 2011c forthcoming. The rise of developing
economies is, in particular, in heat and energy management
equipment, noise and vibration abatement, and environmental
services such as air pollution control and solid waste
management. For more details, see Jha, 2009.
  59The Asia-Pacific region is defined as the regional members
and associate members of ESCAP (see annex for more details
and the list of economies in that group). However, data are not
always available for all economies; therefore "Asia-Pacific"
may have a slightly different coverage in different sections of
this report.
  60As trade data for 2009 were still not fully available at the
time of preparing this report, the figures for 2009 should be
considered as an estimate.
Figure 33. Exports and imports of climate-smart
goods and technologies in the Asia-Pacific
region, 2002-2009
Source: ESCAP calculation, based on United Nations Comtrade
data downloaded from World Bank, World Integrated Trade
Solution (WITS) database, accessed on 14 September 2010.
Note: RHS, the right-hand side axis. LHS, the left-hand side axis.
  61 Calculated based on data downloaded from United Nations
Comtrade. However, Comtrade does not have data for a
number of smaller Asia-Pacific economies. Inclusion of imputed
data for those economies, provided by the Statistics Division of
ESCAP, leads to shares of intraregional trade in CSGTs of
more than 50% for all years and for shares of trade with the












































































Imports (value) Exports (value)
Imports (share) Exports (share)ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
72
Source: Calculation based on United Nations Comtrade data downloaded from World Bank, WITS database and on data provided by
ESCAP Statistics Division.
Europe as a destination increased to reach almost
20% in 2009.62 This was probably the result of the
rapid adoption of climate-smart development
legislation and policies in many European countries,
such as feed-in tariffs during period under review.
  62  In 2010 this share was halved. However, the trade data are
far from complete for 2010, and this result is just an early
estimate.
Figure 34. Total exports and imports of climate-smart goods and technologies by
the Asia-Pacific subregion, 2002-2008



















































Rank  Economy             Exports (%)               Economy Imports (%)
The rest of the world, including many developing
economies in, for example, Latin America, plays a
much more significant role in Asia-Pacific exports of
CSGTs than in their imports.
"Intraregional share in trade of CSGTs accounts
for some 50% of total
Asia-Pacific trade in these goods"
Table 14. Top 10 traders of climate-smart goods and technologies, 2008
(Ranked by percentage share of total exports and imports of CSGTs by the ESCAP region)
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Figure 35. Regional distribution of exports and
imports of climate-smart goods and
technologies, 2002-2010
Source: Calculated from United Nations Comtrade data
downloaded from World Bank, WITS database.
Note: ROW, rest of the world.
2. Exploring potential for trade in
climate-smart goods and
technologies  for the region
Although China and Japan dominate CSGT exports,
the analysis of the revealed comparative
advantages at the sector level shows that some
Asia-Pacific developing economies have the
potential to become CSGT exporters in at least
some of these products (table 15). The production
of solar photovoltaic and efficient lightning appear
to be both the most developed and most
competitive as the largest number of economies
feature in these two CSGT categories; China,
Japan and Malaysia appear in almost all product
categories, while India and Sri Lanka feature as
potential leaders in South Asia. The wind power
category is arguably the most challenging as
only Japan reveals a comparative advantage in
the production and export of these two products.
Clean coal is associated with the production of
generators and comparative advantage is found
in New Zealand, Pakistan and Singapore.
A simple gravity model is used to estimate "trade
potential" based on 2008 trade data.63 The
"Estimated export potential of climate-smart
goods in Asia and the Pacific was  $30 billion
to $35 billion in 2008"
  63 The "trade potential" is the export gap defined as the
difference between actual exports and the predicted value
based on the gravity model (see annex to this chapter). A
positive "trade potential" suggests that there is scope for an
economy to increase its exports of climate-smart goods to a
particular trading partner.
estimated export potential in 2008 for climate-smart
goods in Asia and the Pacific was $30 billion to $35
billion. If Asian and Pacific economies were able to
utilize this potential, their exports of CSGTs would
increase by nearly $7.34 billion. Among these
economies, India ($4.2 billion) was top, followed by
the Russian Federation ($1.51 billion), Pakistan
($980 million), Hong Kong, China ($590 million),
and Azerbaijan ($6.7 million).
Intraregional demand for CSGTs was also very high
in 2008, but many economies could not fulfil the
import demand. The actual level of intraregional
imports was $61.2 billion during the observed
period, and these economies could increase their
imports of CSGTs by nearly $20 billion only through
intraregional trade. The major economies with
CSGT import potential were the Republic of Korea
($15.78 billion), Pakistan ($2.79 billion), Armenia
($7.37 million) and Bangladesh ($1.26 billion).
3. Investment opportunities in climate-
smart goods and technologies
Economies that import CSGTs could possibly
replace some of these imports – and even create
export potential – by additional investment including
FDI in the domestic capacity in these sectors.
Unsurprisingly, China, Japan and the Republic of
Korea are the biggest investors in CSGTs, but the
potential for more investment in these and other
economies is huge.
Gauging investment potential is even more complex
than estimating trade potential. Data for FDI in
CSGTs are virtually non-existent, but if investment
is defined as total expenditure by the private and
public sectors in development and production of
CSGTs, some general observations can be made.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to assess
investment data for the group of 64 CSGTs that
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opportunity. The exact scope of these business
opportunities will naturally depend on the level of
ambition of policymakers, the policy mix chosen and
the degree of enforcement.
According to International Energy Agency (IEA),
2010 estimates, close to 50% of the required
investments during 2010-2050 will be in the
transport sector, followed by buildings (27%), and
It has been estimated that reducing emissions to
the desired level (450 ppm CO2 will require
additional global investments of more than $1 trillion
annually during 2010-2050. Approximately half
of this amount is expected to be needed for the
Asia-Pacific region, i.e. approximately $600 billion
per year over and above current investment levels.
China is expected to make up more than half of
these mitigation-related investment needs in the
region, followed by India and the remainder of the
developing economies at around 17% each.
While these investment needs will imply large
expenditures and thus a financing challenge for
Governments, the private sector and consumers,
they will simultaneously present a huge business
Table 15.  RCA index for smart energy technologies, by individual economy, 2008
(actual value of the RCA index in brackets)



























































For a voltage not exceeding 1,000 V
Photosensitive semiconductor devices, including
photovoltaic cells whether or not assembled in
modules or made up into panels; light emitting diodes
Gears and gearing, other than toothed wheels, chain
sprockets and other transmission elements presented
separately; ball or roller screws; gear boxes and other
speed changers, including torque converters
Clutches and shaft couplings (including universal joints)
Producer gas or water gas generators, with or without
their purifiers; acetylene gas generators and similar water
process gas generators, with or without their purifiers
Fluorescent, hot cathode
Source: ESCAP calculations, based on United Nations Comtrade data downloaded from World Bank, WITS database on 19 May
2011.
"Reducing emissions to the desired level
(450 ppm CO2 ) will require additional global
investments of more than $1 trillion
annually during 2010-2050"CHAPTER 5 – IDENTIFYING TRADE AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES
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power generation, transmission and distribution
(a combined 21%) (International Energy Agency,
2010). Efficiency investments – primarily related
to end-use efficiency – will form the majority of
all energy-related investments, followed by
renewables. Finally, in the services sectors, the
market for energy-efficiency services should
experience drastic increases, e.g. in relation to
energy-efficiency consulting services for all the
above services sectors, including process
improvements in industry.
Several Asian and Pacific economies are already
well positioned to benefit from the expected
transformation towards climate-smart growth. With
extensive manufacturing capabilities, China has
established itself as a leader in the manufacture of
a number of low-carbon energy technologies. In
2009, China produced 40% of the world's solar
photovoltaic supply, 30% of the world's wind
turbines (up from 10% in 2007), and 77% of the
world's solar water collectors (REN21, 2010). Of the
10 major wind turbine manufacturers globally, two
were in China and one in India. Among solar
photovoltaic manufacturers, 4 out of 10 were in
China.
With high capacity in automotive manufacturing,
research and development, and a large export
share, both Japan and the Republic of Korea should
be able to benefit from the expected dramatic
increases in low-carbon automobile sales, including
electric, hybrid and plug-in hybrid vehicles.
Likewise, with large internal markets for vehicle
sales (Abe, 2010), expected increases in demand
and already sizeable production capacities, China
and India should be able to benefit. Other
economies, such as Thailand, are currently
implementing action to attract low-carbon vehicle
production and should therefore also stand to
benefit from this change.
While some economies have taken a clear lead in
the development and utilization of CSGTs others
can follow and integrate in regional climate-smart
value chains. As the above analysis reveals, various
economies have untapped CSGT investment and
export potential at the aggregate level. Many lower-
income developing economies have opportunities to
become suppliers of CSGT parts and components
to the leading economies. Further analysis at the
product and company levels would provide more
details for explaining why this potential exists (e.g.
due to cost advantage, availability of productive
resources or knowledge and technology, and
location). However, a supporting policy environment
is essential to becoming market leaders in this area.
In particular, trade and investment policies play an
important role in helping economies to fully exploit
their potential. These policies are explored in
considerable detail by ESCAP (forthcoming, 2011c);
the following subsection provides a brief summary.
4. Policies to promote trade and
investment in climate-smart goods
and technologies
Various policies exist for promoting trade and
investment in CSGTs. Reducing tariffs on trade in
CSGTs is important while imposing trade barriers to
goods perceived to have a high carbon footprint are
more controversial. Trade in CSGTs comprises
mainly components trade (i.e. inputs to cleaner
technologies). Cost efficiency of the whole CSGT
value chain is highly sensitive to tariffs and other
trade costs, because components have to be traded
across borders several times at different stages of
production.
While the imposition of trade barriers to products
perceived to have a large carbon footprint may run
afoul of international trade rules, trade policies can
and should be adopted to promote trade in CSGTs
and climate-smart services. For that reason, both
at-the-border and behind-the-border obstacles to
such trade need to be removed. As the negotiations
on the liberalization of environmental goods and
services are stalled at the multilateral level,
unilateral liberalization, or liberalization under
regional and bilateral trade agreements, appears to
be the only solution. However, negotiations on the
liberalization of trade in CSGTs and climate-smart
services are generally hampered by a lack of
consensus on the definition of an environmental or
climate-smart good or service as well as on the
modalities for reducing barriers to their trade. At theASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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bilateral or subregional level, the possibility is higher
that such a consensus could be forged. In the
meantime, various trade and transport facilitation
measures could be introduced, such as paperless
trade in all goods and the adoption of single
windows, which would help in reducing carbon
emissions associated with trade.
Investment policies play an important role, both in
promoting domestic and foreign direct investment in
the production of CSGTs and in the provision of
climate-smart services. TNCs are at the forefront of
developing CSGTs, and a conducive and enabling
environment for such investment is therefore
essential.64 Such an environment includes an
enabling regulatory framework, appropriate
infrastructure and availability of local expertise,
availability of incentives or privileges for climate-
smart investment, and an appropriate level of
intellectual property rights (IPR) protection.
Investment promotion agencies could engage in
specific targeting of climate-smart investment.
At the same time, the capacity of domestic SMEs in
the area of CSGTs should be enhanced so that they
can evolve into suppliers of low-carbon TNCs and
effectively become integrated in low-carbon value
chains. Countries should also ensure that regional
or bilateral trade agreements or international
investment agreements to which they are a party
do not unduly undermine their policy for pursuing
low-carbon growth, but instead are conducive to
such growth.
Other policies related to standards and labelling,
feed-in-tariffs, development of infrastructure as well
as research and development capacity, technology
development and transfer, financial mechanisms to
promote trade and investment in CSGTs, and
effective legislation are also important. These are
discussed in more detail in ESCAP (forthcoming,
2011c). The development and transfer of climate-
smart technologies, i.e. renewable energy
technologies, assumes particular importance.
However, in many developing economies a number
of factors stand in the way of introducing effective
policies for deployment of cleaner technologies,
such as: (a) insufficient technical knowledge and
absorption capacity to produce technologies locally;
(b), insufficient market size to justify local production
units; and (c) insufficient purchasing power and
financial resources to acquire  innovative products
(Jha, 2009).
 "Given the cross-border nature of GHG
emissions, regional cooperation is
indispensable"
While national level actions and policies to mitigate
climate change are important, climate change is
most effectively tackled through international
cooperation. Although various voluntary schemes
related to the mitigation of climate change already
exist in the context of subregional organizations –
e.g. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),
ASEAN, the Pacific Forum Secretariat and the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) – a region-wide approach is still lacking.
Given the cross-border nature of greenhouse gas
emissions, regional cooperation is indispensable.
This report therefore proposes a "Regional Trade
and Investment Cooperation Partnership/
Agreement for Mitigation of, and Adaptation to
Climate Change". At the core of this Partnership
would be a "Regional Trade and Investment
Agreement on Mitigation of Climate Change". The
regional partnership/agreement would include, inter
alia, measures for:
(a) The liberalization and joint promotion of climat-
smart trade and investment;
(b) Adopting regional climate-smart sectoral and
industry standards and labels;
(c) Exploring the feasibility of a regional carbon
tax and a regional emission trading system;
(d) Providing modalities for the effective joint
development and transfer of climate-smart
technology;
(e) Joint promotion and targeting of climate-smart
FDI;
  64 For a comprehensive overview of issues related to FDI in
low-carbon goods, see UNCTAD, 2010a.CHAPTER 5 – IDENTIFYING TRADE AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES
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(f) The development of the required supportive
legal, institutional and physical infrastructure,
expertise and establishment of a regional
financial support mechanism for climate-smart
SMEs and climate-smart growth in general,
tapping at least part of the huge international
reserves of selected economies.
E.  OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXPANDING
SERVICES TRADE
Services are a key economic sector, and in many
countries the largest contributor to GDP and
employment, and an important provider of essential
inputs to other economic activities. In 2009, at the
peak of the global economic crisis, the share of
exports of commercial services reached 20% of
merchandise exports for Asia and the Pacific.
Increasingly, services are considered to be
an irreplaceable factor for further industrial
development and for the expansion of merchandise
trade, as they also play crucial role in supporting
trade facilitation efforts (see chapter 6 of this
report).
"Inefficiencies in the services sector of
a developing economy have a negative impact
on the export competitiveness of the agriculture
and manufacturing sectors"
In addition to opportunities in more traditional
tradeable services such as tourism, potential export
opportunities are especially present in the
infrastructure services sector.65 The G-20 Seoul
Summit (November 2010) endorsed a Multi-Year
Action Plan on Development to reduce
infrastructure deficits and bottlenecks in growth.
Various stimulus packages of developing
economies have targeted infrastructure deve-
lopment, and a part of this spending interlinks with
the development of CSGTs. Globally, $400 billion
(0.7%) of world GDP has already been allocated to
support infrastructure services investment, with a
major portion directed to clean infrastructure and
technologies (UNCTAD, 2011c).
The growth of the infrastructure service sector is
interlinked with opportunities for construction
services, which are required for building
infrastructure facilities. It also fosters growth of
communications and financial services, including
transport, which are at the core of developing
logistics services deemed conditio sine qua non for
improving overall trade efficiency. Inefficiencies in
the services sectors of a developing economy have
a negative impact on the export competitiveness of
the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, and thus
contribute to an unfavourable balance of trade.
Furthermore, an efficient infrastructure service
sector leads to lower service link costs, a key
determinant in the development of production
networks. Communications and logistic infra-
structure are the two major factors making just-in-
time production possible.
FDI plays a key role in the services trade, including
trade in infrastructural services. It is a major source
of capital, technology transfer and improved
managerial skills in host developing economies.
During 1990-2008, annual world FDI inflows to
infrastructural services increased tenfold to $500
billion (48%) of global FDI inflows to the services
sectors.
During 2006-2008, developing economies captured
22% of global FDI inflow to the services sectors, the
vast majority of which targeted financial services
(69%), followed by transport and communication
services (23%), and electricity, gas and water (8%).
South-South investment has risen in importance
with the rise of TNCs from Brazil, China, the
Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Hong Kong,
China. The increase of South-South FDI in these
sectors will also increase South-South trade and
technology transfer between FDI home and host
developing economies in the future.
The potential for services trade by Asia-Pacific
developing economies is substantial, especially
trade within the region (see box 5.2). In particular,
developing Asia-Pacific economies have a
comparative advantage in labour-intensive services.
65 Also known as the ISS and comprising five subcategories:
communication, transport, energy and water, financial services,
and other related services.ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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Box 5.2. India outsourcing business services to
the Philippines
According to government sources in the Philippines
and recent unofficial news articles quoting a report
released by IBM in October 2010 (IBM Global
Business Services, 2010), the Philippines has
overtaken India as the global call centre of the world
and is now the leading global player in the business
back-office operations outsourcing market in terms of
the number of people employed. The Government of
the Philippines has predicted that the industry's
revenues will hit $12 billion-$13 billion in 2011, rising
to $100 billion by 2020 to account for about a 20%
share of the global market. According to local
sources, the Philippines had call centre revenues
amounting to $5.5 billion in 2009 compared with $5.3
billion in India.
In 2009, the Philippines had more than 500,000
people working in call centres and related services
compared with 330,000 in India. Indian companies,
carrying out outsourcing work for many United States
companies, were setting up call centres in the
Philippines to take advantage of the latter country's
cultural ties to the West and language more similar to
the English spoken in the United States. For
example, India's Tata Industry Services announced in
early December 2010 that it had launched a business
process outsourcing operation in Manila, its first in
South-East Asia. While business process outsourcing
has been dominated by call centres, the Philippines
is gaining in other areas of services as well, such as
logistics, finance, accounting and software research
and programming, computer-aided design, animation
and graphic design. While local industry groups
concede that India still has a huge lead in the more
complex outsourced services such as engineering,
and software design and programming, the
Philippines is gaining competitiveness in these areas
as well.
Source: Agence France-Presse, "Philippines
overtakes India as call centre capital", 6 December
2010.
  66The McGuire (2002) study includes seven countries
members of ESCAP (India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Turkey) and seven
countries outside the ESCAP region (Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Mexico, South Africa, Uruguay and Venezuela). The Shepherd
and Van Der Marel (2010) study covers all APEC member
economies.
They have an abundance of low- and semi-skilled
labour, which is a major input to tourism,
construction and transport services. However,
regional cooperation in trade and related
regulations, particularly South-South cooperation,
needs to be promoted to exploit this potential. For
developing countries, this is very challenging.
Liberalization of trade in services by developing
countries always lags behind general trade
liberalization, although many preferential trade
agreements signed among the economies in the
region include services (see chapter 8). According
to McGuire (2002) and Shepherd and Van Der
Marel (2010), developing Asian-Pacific economies
tend to have a relatively high level of trade res-
trictiveness in the services sectors66 (figure 36).
This leads to the conclusion that policy-
related trade transaction costs are higher in Asia
and the Pacific than in the world, on average.
Therefore, there is extensive scope for improving
the efficiency of services trade through the
implementation of properly designed regulatory
reforms.
However, many service providers, especially in the
infrastructure services sector as discussed above,
have been regarded as natural monopolies.
Although privatization has reduced the role of
governments in the services sectors, they often
maintain substantial stakes in state-owned services
providers, especially in developing countries
(UNCTAD, 2011c). The resulting distortions in trade
and investment, and often inefficient operations of
those services providers, call for proactive
comprehensive reforms to promote trade and
investment in services in the region. Shepherd
"There is extensive scope for improving the
efficiency of services trade through
the implementation of properly designed
regulatory reforms"CHAPTER 5 – IDENTIFYING TRADE AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES
79
(2010) emphasized the role of so-called backbone
services sectors such as transport, retail/distribution
and logistics, and telecommunications in facilitating
services and trade in general.
F. THE WAY FORWARD:
REBALANCING SOURCES OF
GROWTH
A key challenge for economies in Asia and the
Pacific during the next decade is to maintain their
dynamic export prospects that are key drivers of
economic growth and employment generation of the
region. The recovery of G-3 is expected to be
sluggish, and it is increasingly recognized that the
centre of global demand growth is shifting towards
Asia and the Pacific. Many of the region's
economies have been able to demonstrate a robust
recovery and they still have tremendous potential to
expand their domestic consumption. However, a
key concern is whether the region's economies are
capable of reducing dependence on the current
export model (where exports are mostly determined
by the level of final demand outside the region) and
replacing it with a model that gives more weight
to the importance of domestic demand in the region
as a key driver of economic growth. Such a
transformation would require major changes, both
on the export and the import sides, but it would also
offer opportunities for intraregional trade.
Many commentators have singled out China as the
world's next consumption centre as well as the need
for that country to expand domestic demand.
However, this report argues that other economies in
the region also need to reform and strengthen their
positions as viable and valuable trading partners of
China and other important regional economies that
have potentially large import demand.
This report suggests several possible strategies
that could be pursued simultaneously for
maintaining the region's growth momentum. One
involves enhancing trade complementarity among
economies in the region. In this regard, special
attention must be given to improving export
specialization of countries in the region in order to
match products that are demanded by the region.
This does not mean that Asia and the Pacific should
decouple from the global market and refocus just on
intraregional markets. Domestic demand in major
Asian importers can only partially offset demand
from outside the region; in the foreseeable future
the region's growth will still rely on extraregional
final demand. Thus, the Asian and Pacific
economies should develop synergies between the
benefits of openness and diversification of their
exports in order to capture emerging trade and
investment opportunities in new markets and new
export products. Export diversification is particularly
important for the low-income and resource-rich
Asia-Pacific economies, which have relatively high
commodity export concentration.
Figure 36. World Bank trade policy index in
services
Source: Gootiiz and Mattoo (2009), as cited in Shepherd and
Van Der Marel (2010), figure 3.2.
Note: The World Bank definition of East Asia and the Pacific
includes Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Lao People's
Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pacific
islands, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Republic
of Korea, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam. The World Bank
definition of South Asia includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In
ESCAP, Asia and the Pacific also covers some countries in
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan), and
a country in the Middle East and North Africa group (Islamic
Republic of Iran) as well as Australia and New Zealand (also
included by the World Bank in the OECD group), Brunei
Darussalam, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Hong
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FDI can be a key catalyst to export diversification,
especially through links between TNC subsidiaries
and domestic producers in the production network.
FDI by export-oriented TNCs, especially those from
the region, could generate spillovers within or
between sectors. For example, if demand by TNC
subsidiaries for intermediates creates viable variety
and quality improvements, downstream local
producers in the same or other sectors that share
those inputs may also benefit from the improvement
of input supply.  Those local producers may
enhance their production process to boost
exports.67 Furthermore, the presence of TNCs could
generate information spillovers to host-country
producers, especially those sharing a common
marketing structure and export facilities, about new
market opportunities and ways of lowering the costs
of entering foreign markets. In this regard, FDI-
attracting polices are conductive to export
diversification. Among key activities, the priority
should be: (a) removing trade and investment
restrictiveness against foreign investment, by
pursuing trade and investment liberalization in
goods and services; (b) facilitating development of
domestic intermediate input suppliers; and (c) the
reduction of transaction costs that distort linkages
along supply chains. Trade facilitation measures
discussed in chapter 6 provide more details about
some of these issues.
New export opportunities are driven by dynamic of
consumer preference and technological changes. In
this regard, focus should be on the promotion of
trade and investment in climate-smart goods and
technologies that could lead to a potential triple win
generating benefits for trade, the environment and
development. Tax- and subsidy-type policies can
contribute to accelerating adaptation of new
technologies that lead to "green trade". However,
implementing such policies should not introduce
discrimination against trade partners, otherwise it
will create new trade distortions in the global market
(Wemelinger and Barnes, 2010). Services are
another sector with great potential for trade and
investment. This report highlights the infrastructural
services sector as it provides additional value in
enhancing the overall efficiency of a national
economy.
"Regulatory reforms will be a key factor in
effectively capturing emerging but unexploited
trade and investment opportunities"
In support of the above-mentioned transformation
process, regulatory reforms will be a key factor in
effectively capturing emerging but unexploited trade
and investment opportunities. Asia-Pacific
economies should continue to reduce tariffs and
non-tariff barriers, and associated trade costs with
a view to promoting intraregional trade. Proactive
measures to liberalize trade and investment in parts
and components are necessary for the development
of climate-smart goods and technologies in the
region. In addition, liberalization of trade and
investment in services needs to be moved forward,
not only because of the many untapped trade and
investment opportunities in the various services
sectors, but also because services directly and
indirectly contribute to strengthening an economy's
international competitiveness. Such efforts need to
be accompanied by measures for strengthening
supply-side capacities. In this regard, trade
facilitation and policies that strengthen the capacity
of SMEs are particularly important. In addition,
seeking regional alliances and forging stronger
regional cooperation appears to be the only option
available for achieving advances in some of the
above areas. The following chapters will review
these issues in greater detail.
  67 Empirical research supports this argument. See, for
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 1 380210 Activated carbon.
 2 392690 Articles of plastics and arts. of other materials of 39.01-39.14, n.e.s. in Ch. 39.
 3 392010 PVC or polyethylene plastic membrane systems to provide an impermeable base for landfill sites
and protect soil under gas stations, oil refineries, etc. from infiltration by pollutants and for
reinforcement of soil.
 4 560314 Non-wovens, whether or not impregnated, coated, covered or laminated, of manmade filaments;
weighing more than 150 g/m2 for filtering wastewater.
 5 701931 Thin sheets (voiles), webs, mats, mattresses, boards and similar non-woven products.
 6 730820 Towers and lattice masts for wind turbines.
 7 730900 Containers of any material, of any form, for liquid or solid waste, including municipal or dangerous
waste.
 8 732111 Solar driven stoves, ranges, grates, cookers (including those with subsidiary boilers for central
heating), barbecues, braziers, gas-rings, plate warmers and similar non-electric domestic
appliances, and parts thereof, of iron or steel.
 9 732190 Stoves, ranges, grates, cookers (including those with subsidiary boilers for central heating),
barbecues, braziers, gas-rings, plate warmers and similar non-electric domestic appliances, and
parts thereof, of iron or steel.
10 732490 Water-saving showers.
11 761100 Aluminium reservoirs, tanks, vats and similar containers for any material (specifically tanks or vats
for anaerobic digesters for biomass gasification).
12 761290 Containers of any material, of any form, for liquid or solid waste, including municipal or dangerous
waste.
13 840219 Vapour-generating boilers, not elsewhere specified or included, hybrids.
14 840290 Super-heated water boilers and parts of steam generating boilers.
15 840410 Auxiliary plants for steam, water and central boilers.
16 840490 Parts for auxiliary plant for boilers, condensers for steam, vapour power unit.
17 840510 Producer of gas or water gas generators, with or without purifiers.
18 840681 Turbines, steam and other vapours, over 40 MW, not elsewhere specified or included.
19 841011 Hydraulic turbines and water wheels of a power not exceeding 1,000 kW.
20 841090 Hydraulic turbines and water wheels; parts, including regulators.
21 841181 Gas turbines of a power not exceeding 5,000 kW.
22 841182 Gas turbines of a power exceeding 5,000 kW.
23 841581 Compression type refrigerating, freezing equipment incorporating a valve for reversal of cooling/
heating cycles (reverse heat pumps).
24 841861 Compression type refrigerating, freezing equipment incorporating a valve for reversal of cooling/
heating cycles (reverse heat pumps).
25 841869 Compression type refrigerating, freezing equipment incorporating a valve for reversal of cooling/
heating cycles (reverse heat pumps).
26 841919 Solar boiler (water heater).
27 841940 Distilling or rectifying plants.
28 841950 Solar collector and solar system controller, heat exchanger.
29 841989 Machinery, plant or laboratory equipment whether or not electrically heated (excluding furnaces,
ovens etc.) for treatment of materials by a process involving a change of temperature.
30 841990 Medical, surgical or laboratory stabilizers.
31 848340 Gears and gearing and other speed changers (specifically for wind turbines).
32 848360 Clutches and universal joints (specifically for wind turbines).
33 850161 AC generators not exceeding 75 kVA (specifically for all electricity-generating renewable energy
plants).
Table V.1. List of climate-smart goods and technologies compiled by ESCAP for
the trade potential analysis
 HS 6 Digit
(2002)
Definition  No.CHAPTER 5 – IDENTIFYING TRADE AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES
85
 34 850162 AC generators exceeding 75 kVA but not 375 kVA (specifically for all electricity-generating
renewable energy plants).
35 850163 AC generators not exceeding 375 kVA but not 750 kVA (specifically for all electricity-generating
renewable energy plants).
36 850164 AC generators exceeding 750 kVA (specifically for all electricity-generating renewable energy
plants).
37 850231 Electric generating sets and rotary converters; wind-powered.
38 850680 Fuel cells using hydrogen or hydrogen-containing fuels such as methane to produce an electric
current, through an electrochemical process rather than combustion.
39 850720 Other lead acid accumulators.
40 853710 Photovoltaic system controller.
41 853931 Discharge lamps, (ex ultraviolet), fluorescent.
42 854140 Photosensitive semiconductor devices, including photovoltaic cells whether or not assembled in
modules or made up into panels; light-emitting diodes.
43 900190 Mirrors of other than glass (specifically for solar concentrator systems).
44 900290 Mirrors of glass (specifically for solar concentrator systems).
45 903210 Thermostats.
46 903220 Manostats.
47 700800 Multiple-walled insulating units of glass.
48 730431 Tubes, pipes and hollow profiles (excl. of 7304.10-7304.29), seamless, of circular cross-section, of
cold-drawn/cold-rolled (cold-reduced) steel.
49 730441 Tubes, pipes and hollow profiles (excl. of 7304.10-7304.39), seamless, of circular cross-section, of
stainless steel, cold-drawn/cold-rolled (cold-reduced).
50 730451 Tubes, pipes and hollow profiles (excl. of 7304.10-7304.49), seamless, of circular cross-section, of
alloy steel other than stainless steel, cold-drawn/cold-rolled (cold-reduced).
51 840682 Steam turbines and other vapour turbines (excl. for marine propulsion), of an output not >40 MW
52 841012 Hydraulic turbines and water wheels, of a power >1,000 kW but not >10,000 kW.
53 841013 Hydraulic turbines and water wheels, of a power >10,000 kW.
54 850239 Electric generating sets n.e.s. in 85.02.
55 850300 Parts suit. for use solely/principally with the machines of 85.01/85.02.
56 850440 Static converters.
57 902830 Electricity meters, incl. calibrating meters therefore.
58 903020 Cathode-ray oscilloscopes and cathode-ray oscillographs.
59 903031 Multimeters.
60 903039 Instruments and app. for measuring/checking voltage/current/resistance/power (excl. 9030.31),
without a recording device.
61 890790 Floating structures other than inflatable rafts (e.g. rafts [excl. inflatable], tanks, coffer-dams,
landing-stages, buoys and beacons).
62 847989 Machines and mech. applications having individual functions, n.e.s./incl. in Ch. 84.
63 842129 Filtering/purifying mach. and app. for liquids (excl. of 8421.21-8421.23).
64 842139 Filtering/purifying mach. and app. for gases, other than intake air filters for int. comb. Engines.
Source: ESCAP secretariat.
 HS 6 Digit
(2002)
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Annex note: Estimation of export
potential for CSGTs
ESCAP has created a simple gravity model to
estimate the export potential trade of CSGTs in the
Asia-Pacific region.  The following gravity model
was used for the analysis: xij = ß0 + ß1GDPi + ß2GDPj
+ ß3PCGDPi + ß4PCGDPj + ß5DTij + ß6Dcontig +
ß7Dcomlang + ß8Dcomlang_ethno + ß9Dcolony + ß10Dcomcol +
ß11Dcol45 +ß12Dsmctry + εij
where xij denotes the value of country i exports to
country j, GDPi and PCGDPi denote the exporting
country's GDP and per capita GDP, respectively;
GDPj and PCGDPj  denote the GDP and per capita
GDP of the partner of the exporting country,
respectively; DTij denotes the distance between the
exporting economy and its partner; Dcontig, Dcomlang,
Dcomlang_ethno, Dcolony, Dcomcol, Dcol45 and Dsmctry, are the
dummy variables for contiguity, common language,
colony, common colony, colony from 1945 and small
country, respectively.  All of these variables (except
for dummies) are in log values to overcome a
heteroscedasticity problem.
Trade data for CSGTs (in value, thousands of
United States dollars) is taken from the United
Nations Comtrade data (www.comtrade.un.org) for
2008. GDP and per capita GDP data are taken
World Bank Development Indicators (www.
worldbank.org\data) for the corresponding year.
Distance between countries and other dummy
variables are taken from the dist_cepii.xls file of
CEPII database (www.cepii.fr). Total observation is
reduced after combining all the variables for each
pair of trading partners.68 This filtered data set is
used in the empirical analysis. The estimated
coefficients and their statistic results are presented
in the following table.
  68 This study considers fully-matched data only.
a = 1%, b = 5% and c = 10%.
Considering only statistically significant coefficients the estimated export of CSG is:
xij = -49.27 + 1.605 GDPi + 0.94 GDPj -0.28 pcgdpi -0.93 DTij + 0.69 Dcmcl + 2.99 Dsmctry
This estimated gravity equation is then used to get the predicted export value of the reporting economy in the
data period. The difference between the actual exports and the predicted value is considered as "trade
potential" of the observed period. A positive trade potential suggests that scope for an economy to increase its
exports of climate-smart goods and technologies with a particular trading partner during that period.
Intercept -49.2722a 1.717189 -28.6935 6.7E-156
GDP_reporter 1.605207a 0.045923 34.95458 1.1E-216
GDP_partner 0.940022a 0.035135 26.75493 3.3E-138
pcgdp_reporter -0.28074a 0.052835 -5.31359 1.17E-07
pcgdp_partner -0.07698 0.051787 -1.48651 0.137275
distw -0.9346a 0.105363 -8.87032 1.39E-18
contig 0.142705 0.439915 0.324391 0.74567
comlang_off 0.017709 0.356485 0.049675 0.960385
comlang_ethno 0.576956c 0.314579 1.83406 0.066769
colony 0.83704 0.786272 1.064568 0.287179
comcol 0.689932a 0.246621 2.797538 0.00519
col45 1.12345 0.947884 1.185219 0.236048
smctry 2.995375a 0.79718 3.757463 0.000176
Results of the trade gravity model for the export of climate-smart goods in 2008
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During the past two decades import tariffs have
decreased significantly and the importance of
non-tariff measures aimed at further reducing
international transaction costs, i.e. trade facilitation,
has become more apparent. Even if international
shipping and other non-tariff costs are excluded,
costs associated with completing documentary and
other import and export procedures for international
trade can account for up to 15% of the value of
traded goods (ADB/ESCAP, 2009). Enabling firms
to move goods more efficiently from the factory floor
to foreign buyers’ warehouses has become
essential to capturing and creating new trade
opportunities. With the shifting of growth potential
away from developed countries to economies within
the Asian and the Pacific region, increased attention
to intraregional trade facilitation is needed.
“Trade costs of many economies of the region
have decreased, largely due to tariff cuts,
but much remains to be done to address
non-tariff trade barriers”
Measuring trade facilitation performance precisely,
including  the costs of international trade trans-
actions, remains a challenging exercise, not least
because of the lack of a precise definition and
agreement on the various cost components
that should  be included in the measurement.
Comprehensive trade cost estimates by ESCAP
account for all additional costs involved in
conducting a transaction across borders rather than
FACILITATING INTRAREGIONAL TRADE
within borders.69  According to that definition,
apart from Singapore and Hong Kong, China, the
top-ranked economies in the ESCAP Trade Cost
Database are Malaysia, the United States, China,
the Republic of Korea and Thailand, with Japan and
Germany following closely.70 Some less developed
economies in the region have also made rapid
progress, such as Viet Nam, whose non-tariff trade
costs with Japan decreased by 25% between 2003
and 2008.
Overall, however, many variations exist across
economies and trading partners. Trade costs of
many economies of the region have decreased,
largely due to tariff cuts, but much remains to be
done to address non-tariff barriers (NTBs).
Non-tariff trade costs of many Asia-Pacific
developing economies – particularly with regard to
trade with developed economies – have shown little
change, and have sometimes even increased. In
fact, although ESCAP estimates reveal that many
economies of the region have made significant
progress in reducing costs over the past decade,
they also show that in many cases nearly half the
cost reduction may be attributed to tariff cuts. Given
that non-tariff trade costs account for at least 90%
69The comprehensive trade cost estimate is an objective
measure based on macroeconomic data rather than perception
survey data. It is a very broad aggregate measure of
international trade costs including, inter alia, direct and indirect
costs related to fulfilling regulatory import and export
requirements as well as costs resulting from differences in
currencies, languages, culture and geographical distance.
Domestic and international shipping and logistics costs
associated with imports and exports are also included.
70For details, see Duval and Utoktham, 2011.ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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of overall trade costs, economies should pay
greater attention to addressing NTBs, including
those arising from unnecessarily cumbersome
procedures and regulations or inadequate logistics
services, if they are to make further progress.
B. INTRAREGIONAL TRADE COSTS
REMAIN HIGH71
Intraregional trade facilitation performance varies
greatly among the subregions of Asia and the
Pacific. However, the non-tariff costs of trade by
economies in the region with each other often still
exceed those faced when trading outside the
region. ASEAN has achieved high levels of
international trade efficiency with tariff-equivalent
non-tariff trade costs of only 49% in its largest
middle-income members (i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines and Thailand), on a par with the
costs prevalent in developed country groupings,
such as the members of the North American Free
Trade Area (NAFTA) and the European Union.72 In
comparison, intraregional trade costs in South,
North and Central Asia are more than double those
of the ASEAN economies. Non-tariff trade costs in
East and North-East Asia are also high (table 16),
but this is mainly because of the high costs faced by
Mongolia. Indeed, non-tariff trade costs between
China, the Republic of Korea and Japan are among
the lowest in the world, averaging only 39%, which
is remarkable, given the absence of free trade
agreements between those countries during the
period reviewed.
“The non-tariff costs of trade between
economies in the region often still exceed those
faced when trading outside the region”
Comprehensive intraregional trade costs are usually
expected to be lower than interregional trade costs
due to the geographic proximity between countries
of the same region as well as similarities in
languages and culture. Table 16 shows that this
holds true for all Asian subregions, although barely
so in the case of South Asia; the trade costs
associated with intraregional trade by SAARC
members are only 4% lower than those between
SAARC and ASEAN. This is explained by the lack
of transit facilitation between South Asian countries.
The costs of trade between Asia-Pacific economies
of different subregions are higher than those with
non-Asia-Pacific economies or subregions. For
example, the non-tariff costs of trade between
ASEAN and SAARC are nearly 15% higher than the
costs of trade between ASEAN and NAFTA.
Similarly, the costs of trade between North and
Central Asia, and North and South Asia are 60%
higher than between North and Central Asia and the
European Union.
All subregions in Asia and the Pacific made
progress in reducing non-tariff trade costs with at
least one other subregion between 2003 and 2007.
South Asia made significant improvements in both
intra- and extraregional trade costs, particularly with
North and Central Asia and NAFTA. However, North
and Central Asia, the subregion with the highest
international trade costs, made little progress in
reducing either its intra- or interregional trade costs
during that period. While its non-tariff trade costs
with South Asia, East Asia and the European Union
fell, its costs with ASEAN and NAFTA rose.
C. BARRIERS TO TRADE  BEING
REDUCED AT AND BEHIND-THE-
BORDER
Improving at-the-border and behind-the-border
procedures is at the core of trade facilitation, as
defined in the ongoing WTO negotiations on that
subject. The time it takes to complete all trade
procedures involved in moving goods from factory
to ship at the nearest seaport – or vice versa – in
Asian and Pacific developing economies decreased
on average by about 16% between 2005 and 2010
(see tables in part III). South-East Asia made the
most progress, cutting its average time for
71 Here “regional” refers to more narrowly defined subregions
within Asia and the Pacific, such as South-East Asia (or
ASEAN), South Asia, North and Central Asia etc.
72 Trade costs are defined here as all additional costs involved
in trading internationally as opposed to domestically. See Duval
and Utoktham, 2010a, for a discussion of the comprehensive
measure of trade costs associated with this definition.CHAPTER 6 – FACILITATING INTRAREGIONAL TRADE
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completing trade procedures to only 19 days.
Cambodia and Thailand cut their time by more than
40% during the same period. India and Pakistan
achieved improvements of a similar magnitude,
although trade procedures in South and South-West
Asia still take 50% more time to complete than in
South-East Asia (30 days). No significant progress
was made in the Pacific. The mainly landlocked
economies of North and Central Asia, made some
small improvements, but the time taken by most of
the economies of that subregion to clear procedures
for moving goods to a seaport remains lengthy
(52 days on average).73
Overall, while significant progress has been made,
it still takes three times longer to complete trade
procedures in Asia-Pacific developing economies
than in Asia-Pacific developed economies
(Australia, Japan and New Zealand), suggesting
that there is considerable room for improvement.
“It still takes three times longer to complete
trade procedures in developing economies
than in developed economies of Asia
and the Pacific”
The direct cost of completing procedures for moving
goods from factory to seaport increased marginally
in most Asia-Pacific economies between 2005
and 2010, ranging from $633 per container in
South-East Asia, to almost $2,200 in North and
Central Asia. This may be partially attributable to an
Source: ESCAP Trade Cost Database.
Note: Trade costs may be interpreted as tariff equivalents. Percentage changes in trade costs between 2003 and 2007 are in
parentheses. ASEAN-4: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. European Union-5: France, Germany, Italy, Spain and
the United Kingdom. SAARC-4: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
Table 16.  Non-tariff intra- and extraregional trade costs in Asia and the Pacific, 2007
(Percentage)
73 Importers and exporters also often face cumbersome
business and investment procedures at home, which
sometimes have an even larger adverse effect on trade than
the trade-specific procedures (Duval and Utoktham, 2010b).
49 132 259 117 85 105 101
 (-1) (n.a.) (10) (-4) (-2) (2) (3)
East and 132 105 193 201 143 127 109
North-East Asia (n.a.) (n.a.) (n.a.) (n.a.) (n.a.) (n.a.) (n.a.)
North and 259 193 148 258 313 161 244
Central Asia  (10) (-5) (12) (-6) (-4) (-3) (10)
117 201 258 113 145 124 137
 (-4) (n.a.) (-6) (-5) (0) (-2) (-7)
Australia- 85 143 313 145 61 122 122
NewZealand (-2) (n.a.) (-4) (0) (3) (0) (6)
European 105 127 161 124 122 59 104
Union-5 (2) (n.a.) (-3) (-2) (0) (-3) (1)
101 109 244 137 122 104 50
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increase in the cost of labour, increased demand for
logistics and transport services as trade volumes
increase, and exchange rate fluctuations in some
cases. During 2005-2010, average costs increased
the most in economies of South and South-West
Asia, rising by 16.6%. In North and Central Asia, the
costs of completing trade procedures increased by
an average of 9%.
Interestingly, as shown in the import/export cost and
time ratios presented in part III, no significant
differences were found between export time or cost,
and import time or cost in most economies of the
region. This suggests that most Governments now
recognize the benefits associated with import
facilitation, an often essential component of
strategies aimed at increasing the participation of
local firms in production networks and higher-value
exports. Import procedures still cost more than
export procedures in most economies of the region,
arguably because of the regulatory controls applied
to imports. However, as of 2010, import time equal
or shorter than export time in many economies of
the region, including Kazakhstan, Malaysia,
Sri Lanka and the Solomon Islands. This implies
that those countries have taken steps to enhance
border clearance procedures.
D. HOW HAS PROGRESS IN
TRADE FACILITATION
BEEN ACHIEVED?
Trade facilitation measures are wide-ranging in
complexity and resource requirements, and need to
take into account the level of infrastructure and
quality of the business regulatory environment in
order to be effective. Simple measures aimed at
increasing transparency can go a long way towards
facilitating trade, and require only limited resources,
e.g. the timely publication of trade regulations and
procedures. While there is scope to further improve
implementation of transparency measures, progress
has been acknowledged by the private sector in
many countries of the region, in particular through
increased institutionalization of consultations
between regulators and the private sector.
At the national level, many countries of the region
are now also implementing more advanced trade
facilitation measures, often taking advantage
of modern information and communications
technologies (ICT). One such measure is the
development of risk management systems for
inspection and clearance of goods, which enable
customs and other trade control agencies to limit
physical inspection of goods to shipments identified
as high-risk. Physical inspection typically more than
doubles goods clearance time (from 1.55 days on
average for East Asia and the Pacific, to 3.36 days;
World Bank, 2010b); implementation of a risk
management system can significantly reduce the
number of shipments that need to be inspected. In
China, for example, less than 9% of shipments are
now physically inspected, compared with 100% in
some of the economies that have yet to adopt this
measure.
Many countries have also undertaken the
development of national electronic Single
Windows, or systems that enable the electronic
exchange of trade data and documents between
traders, customs authorities, and other government
agencies and stakeholders. Most countries already
have electronic data interchange (EDI) systems and
allow electronic submission of at least some of the
required data and documents. The long-term goal is
often to implement a Single Window facility allowing
traders to not only submit all data and information
needed by all relevant government agencies online
and at one time, but to also pay duties and receive
relevant authorization and clearance online as well
as to interact with logistics service providers and
other private sector stakeholders.
The Republic of Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong,
China, are world leaders in establishing national
Single Windows, increasing their connectivity by
cutting the time and costs of trade procedures
behind and at their borders (box 6.1). It is worth
noting that in all cases implementation required
strong political will as well as the establishment – or
pre-existence – of a strong multi-agency public-
private institutional mechanism through which trade
facilitation issues could be regularly and openly
discussed.CHAPTER 6 – FACILITATING INTRAREGIONAL TRADE
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Box 6.1.  The road to a Single Window in the Republic of Korea
The export volume of the Republic of Korea reached $363.5 billion in 2009, up from $100 million in 1964. During that
period, handling the huge amount of trade-related paperwork and the resultant high costs quickly became one of the
biggest concerns of all parties involved. Thus, in 1989, the Government adopted paperless trading as a major trade
facilitation policy in order to enhance its competitiveness and efficiency in trade. The Ministry of Commerce, Industry
and Energy developed the “Basic Plan for Foreign Trade Process Automation”, which laid out the fundamental
institutional base for adopting paperless trade. A Trade Business Automation Project Team was then established in the
Korea International Trade Association (KITA), the foremost trade promotion organization in the Republic of Korea.
The Republic of Korea has gone through three stages in establishing a national Single Window:
(a) An introductory stage (1989-1993) to prepare the ground for introducing EDI-based trade automation.
During that period, the “Basic Plan for Foreign Trade Process Automation” (October 1989) was
prepared, followed by other measures such as the establishment of the Korea Trade Network (KTNET)
(June 1991) and enacting of the Act on Promotion of Trade Business Automation (December 1991);
(b) A growth stage (1994-2001), during which the scope of electronic documents was expanded to cover
the electronic processes of major export/import-related tasks in order to enhance the efficiency of
export/import procedures;
(c) A take-off stage (2001-2007), during which the paperless trading project was accelerated. This stage
included the development of an Internet Management System of Logistics (eLogisFrame) (December
2001), the establishment of the National e-Trade Committee (July 2003) and culminating with the
launch of the uTradeHub in May 2007.
Figure 6.1 uTradeHub, the Republic of Korea,s Single Window
The uTradeHub, the Republic of Korea
,
s Single Window, is a paperless trade platform that enables traders to process
electronic trading with government organizations, customs services, banks and logistics firms online through
a seamless system interface (see figure below). The major users of the uTradeHub are trading firms (24,570). The
remaining uTradeHub users comprise forwarders (2,838), logistics firms (2,180) and customs brokers (1,116) who
provide export/import, customs clearance, trade financing and financial settlement services.
Compared with the traditional off-line trade, paperless trade delivers many benefits including: (a) less time to complete
export/import process by saving time for issuing and circulating documents electronically; (b) guaranteed security of
electronic documents; and (c) more transparency by enabling real-time reports on the transaction process and the
handling of documents.
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E. FACILITATING TRADE THROUGH
REGIONAL AGREEMENTS
While it is now widely acknowledged that trade
facilitation begins at home, it has long been
recognized that additional benefits could be reaped
through bilateral and regional cooperation on trade
facilitation. The full benefits of Single Windows and
other electronic trade data exchange systems
cannot be achieved until electronic data and
documents in a national Single Window can be
accepted by authorities in the partner country. While
international standards have been developed to
address technical issues related to cross-border
data exchange, little progress has been made in
developing an appropriate international legal
framework for the cross-border electronic exchange
of trade data and documents. Indeed, the
pioneering ASEAN Single Window initiative, which
aims at developing a regional Single Window
environment for its member countries by 2012, has
struggled to establish the necessary legal basis for
electronic exchange among participating member
countries.
Most RTAs – and economic partnership agreements
– among economies of the region now include trade
facilitation provisions (figure 37 and chapter 8 in
this report). The latest ASEAN Trade in Goods
Agreement, which came into force in 2010, includes
an entire chapter on trade facilitation. The third
round of negotiations of APTA also resulted in a
Trade Facilitation Framework Agreement among its
six members (Bangladesh, China, India, the Lao
People’s Democratic Republic, the Republic of
Korea and Sri Lanka) in 2009.
A comparative study of recent RTAs conducted by
ESCAP found that all agreements commit to
increasing transparency, including through an
obligation to publish laws and regulations affecting
trade. They all also recognize the importance of
using international standards for trade facilitation.
The uTradeHub is estimated to create economic benefits of approximately $3 billion annually. Firstly, the electronic
export/import process is expected to save around $550 million by reducing labour costs as well as costs of issuing and
circulating documents. Secondly, it is expected to save $2.9 billion by reducing costs of warehousing and inventory
management. Finally, estimated cost cutting is approximately $320 million from the reduction of redundant investment
in IT. These benefits far outweigh the cost of implementation and operation.
Several conditions have to be met in establishing a Single Window. Firstly, it is fundamental that strong government
leadership and cooperation with the business sector is secured as trading involves all B2G, G2B, B2B interactions.
Secondly, a national information system needs to be set up to enable the paperless trade processes. In the Republic of
Korea, this was done through the uTradeHub and its linkage with the logistics and customs clearance systems. Thirdly,
legislation should be updated to ensure the validity of electronic documents issued and circulated through the system.
(In the Republic of Korea, an e-Trade Facilitation Act was passed). Fourthly, it is necessary for stakeholders to
embrace the change, as paperless trade may be regarded as a paradigm shift with which stakeholders need to be able
to cope.
Source: United Nations Network of Experts on Paperless Trade for Asia and the Pacific (UNNExT) Brief No. 3, May
2010, available from www.unescap.org/unnext/pub/brief3.pdf; and ESCAP (2010).
Figure 37. Number of bilateral/regional trade
agreements with trade facilitation provisions in
Asia and the Pacific
Source: Duval (2011), based on data downloaded in March
2011 from the ESCAP Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment
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ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement and its detailed
commitment to implement a Trade Facilitation Work
Programme is interesting in this regard, as it
provides a specific way forward in order to ensure
that progress is made in actual implementation of
the many trade facilitation measures mentioned in
the agreement.
At least in the initial stage of bilateral or regional
cooperation on trade facilitation, a pragmatic
approach may be most effective. In the case of
neighbouring countries, for example, a starting point
can be informal meetings between customs officials
on both sides of the border to agree on common
operating hours and days. As trust builds up, this
may then be followed by discussions on more
advance border measures, such as an agreement
to adopt single-stop customs clearance procedures
at the border – with inspection and clearance of
shipments being carried out jointly at one place and
one time – instead of separately on each side of
a border. Such advanced trade facilitation
measures, however, are often difficult to put in
place, highlighting the need for coordinated support
from regional organizations in this area (box 6.2).




While it is crucial to streamline regulatory
procedures and other import and export processes
domestically in order to maintain or improve
competitiveness, a long-term holistic trade
facilitation strategy should necessarily address gaps
in trade and logistics infrastructure as well as
services. Such gaps have indeed been found to
contribute to at least 25% of the variation in
non-tariff trade costs across countries of the region
(box 6.3).
The World Bank Logistics Performance Index (LPI),
based mainly on a perception survey of inter-
national freight forwarders and express carriers,
suggests that developing economies in the region
as a whole performed strongly, with no evidence of
backsliding, during 2007-2009. Private sector
Other measures that appear to be increasingly
common include those on automation/use of ICT,
risk management, advance ruling and Single
Windows.74
Transit facilitation measures are, in general, not
specifically covered in trade agreements, although
they are essential, particularly with regard to
intraregional trade facilitation. While separate
bilateral and regional transit agreements are often
in place among developing economies of the
region, the extent to which they are implemented –
as well as their consistency with existing multilateral
trade commitments (e.g. WTO, GATT Article V) –
is not always clear. Significant barriers to transit
trade remain in place in South and Central Asia.
South-East Asia has made more progress in
facilitating transit trade through a mix of bilateral,
subregional and regional agreements and
initiatives. However, reports from logistics operators
that the comprehensive GMS Cross-border
Transport Agreement is still not fully operational,
although it was signed more than half a decade
ago, shows how difficult it is to facilitate cross-
border trade and transit. Apart from political will, a
main issue impeding implementation of effective
transit systems is the lack of collaboration between
trade, transport and/or customs authorities and the
limited involvement of local (at-the-border) public
and private stakeholders at early stages of
negotiations.
Overall, in most agreements, trade facilitation
provisions in RTAs are still of a “best endeavour”
nature, making it difficult to assess the extent to
which they are implemented. Short of making trade
facilitation measures unconditional, advancing trade
facilitation as part of an RTA may best be done by
setting a strong institutional mechanism through
which procedural issues will be identified and
addressed, after an agreement enters into force on
a regular basis. Action plans and peer reviews
would then be part of the institutional framework
put in place, as would be the establishment or
designation of a national trade facilitation body/
committee – which would ideally be the same for all
RTAs that a particular economy enters into. The
74 For more details see Duval, 2011.ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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Box 6.2. Trade facilitation: the role of regional organizations
A number of organizations have been actively promoting trade facilitation for better regional connectivity and
integration. APEC has played a significant role in promoting trade facilitation, although its Asian membership is limited
to South-East and East Asian countries, and does not include any least developed or landlocked developing countries.
The voluntary but systematic approach of APEC, involving the preparation by each member of an individual trade
facilitation action plan and annual reporting of progress, provides a potentially useful model for strengthening regional
cooperation in this area, including by providing an inventory of trade facilitation measures and by highlighting examples
of effective practices.
Among subregional and regional organizations, ASEAN has been the most active in pursuing regional connectivity and
trade facilitation since 1993, and is an excellent example and source of experience for other (sub)regions. Major
initiatives on trade facilitation have included the ASEAN Customs Agreement (1997), the ASEAN Framework
Agreement on the Facilitation of Goods in Transit (1998), the ASEAN Agreement on Multimodal Transport (2005) and
the implementation of a number of Sectoral Mutual Recognition Arrangements  for the mutual recognition or
acceptance of test reports and equipment certification in certain sectors.
As part of the strategy for ASEAN Customs Integration (2002), an 8-digit level ASEAN Harmonized Tariff Nomenclature
was developed, based on the 6-digit level nomenclature developed by the World Customs Organization (WCO). The
most far-reaching and ambitious initiative of ASEAN on trade facilitation is certainly the ASEAN Single Window
initiative, agreed in 2005 with the aim of achieving a regional Single Window facility by 2012. While these initiatives
have contributed to lowering trade costs within ASEAN, wide differences in trade efficiency in the individual ASEAN
countries remain.
ESCAP also has a long-standing programme on trade facilitation, which has focused on the promotion of international
standards for trade facilitation – such as those developed by UN/CEFACT and WCO – and building capacity in
low-income, least developed and landlocked economies of the region, including those in South Asia, Central Asia and
the South Pacific. The current focus is on building capacity for paperless trade and Single Window facilities.  This is
mainly delivered through the United Nations Network of Experts on Paperless Trade for Asia and the Pacific (UNNExT),
a community of knowledge and practice established by ESCAP and ECE to empower experts from developing
countries and transition economies from the region to implement Single Window and paperless trade.
The regional expert community develops tools to facilitate implementation of paperless trade, and organizes training
workshops and advisory services in collaboration with ESCAP. Another key modality in the efforts of ESCAP to transfer
knowledge and experience on trade facilitation is the Asia-Pacific Trade Facilitation Forum, now held annually in
cooperation with ADB and other partners.
respondents had mixed views on whether signi-
ficant improvement in logistics have taken place
since 2005 in many economies of the region,
although there was wide acknowledgement of
improvements in information and communications
technology infrastructure as well as, to a lesser
extent, the quality of private logistics services. Other
areas requiring policy attention in many economies
are corruption and capacity-building of trade control
agencies other than the customs authorities (World
Bank, 2010b).
The quality of, and access to logistics services have
improved, but continuous consolidation of the
maritime industry may affect competitiveness of
small trading economies. As 80% of international
trade is conducted through seaports, improvement
of maritime infrastructure and services is a
particularly important aspect of trade facilitation.
The UNCTAD Liner Shipping Connectivity Index
(LSCI) provides a measure of an economy’s level of
integration into the existing global liner shipping
network.75 China typically leads the LSCI ranking,
75 The index is calculated based on five components:
(a) number of ships; (b) the container carrying capacity in 20-
foot equivalent units (TEUs) of those ships; (c) the number of
companies; (d) the number of services; and (e) the maximum
ship size, always referring to ships that are deployed to provide
liner shipping services to an economy’s port(s). The underlying
data are derived by UNCTAD from Containerization
International online at www.ci-online.co.uk.CHAPTER 6 – FACILITATING INTRAREGIONAL TRADE
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Contribution of selected factors to changes in non-tariff policy-related trade costs
(percentage)
a Includes availability of credit information, contract enforcement process, and investor protection.
Box 6.3. Accounting for non-tariff trade costs: what matters most?
Trade facilitation performance is affected by a wide range of factors. Some are inherent in the location, culture or
history of trading partners and may be difficult to address through policy, at least within a reasonable time frame.
Others, such as the availability of logistics infrastructure and services, a favourable exchange rate, a favourable
business environment, or transparent and streamlined border procedures, may be influenced by policymakers.
According to a new study conducted by ESCAP, using a comprehensive measure of international trade cost, physical
distance explains 20% to 21% of the variation in non-tariff bilateral trade costs. Contiguity of countries and common
language account for an additional 1% to 1.5%. These time-invariant and policy-independent factors taken together
therefore account for nearly 23% of non-tariff trade costs across economies, confirming that geography and cultural
factors, or “natural” trade costs, remain highly significant barriers to trade in goods in the global economy.
In isolating policy-related trade costs from these “natural” trade costs, the study found that about 25% of the changes in
the remaining trade costs could be explained by the liner shipping connectivity index, i.e. by access to effective
maritime services and related port infrastructure (see table below). Liner shipping connectivity in the exporting
economy is generally more important than connectivity in the importing economy in affecting bilateral trade costs.
These results suggest that policies and measures aimed at developing these services should be given highest priority
for implementation in those economies that want to reduce trade costs.
The second most important factor identified in reducing trade costs is access and usage of ICT, which accounts for
10% of changes in non-tariff policy-related trade costs. In particular, the level of Internet usage in the exporting
economy accounts for 7% of bilateral trade cost changes. This implies that policies and measures aimed at enhancing
ICT infrastructure and services – and their usage through, for example, education – should receive special attention in
economies that want to facilitate trade.
The three indicators of the behind-the-border business regulatory environment included in the study together account
for about 10% of the changes in non-tariff policy-related trade costs. Half of the trade cost effect is accounted for by the
credit indicator. This result supports the prioritization of behind-the-border policies and measures aimed at increasing
the availability of trade finance, in particular through increasing transparency and availability of information on
creditworthiness of exporters and trade partners.
Importer liner shipping connectivity 10.58
Importer level of ICT (Internet) use 3.91
Importer business environmenta 3.64
Direct cost of import procedures 0.24
Exporter liner shipping connectivity 14.33
Exporter level of ICT (Internet) use 7.40
Exporter business environmenta 7.58
Direct cost of export procedures 0.27
Other factors 52.05
Total 100.00
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Figure 38.  Liner shipping connectivity in Asia
Source: ESCAP, based on data from UNCTAD (2009).
Note: Asia-Pacific economies are classified as: (a) East Asia – China (including Hong Kong, China), Japan and the Republic of
Korea; (b) South-East Asia – Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and
Viet Nam; (c) South Asia – Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka; and (d) Pacific islands: Fiji, French Polynesia,
Kiribati, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu.
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Interestingly, the direct cost of moving goods from/to factory to/from ship deck, including inland transportation, customs
clearance and preparation of documents, is significant but ultimately only accounts for 0.5% of the variation in non-tariff
policy-related trade costs overall. The result highlights that what matters most is not the direct cost of completing the
procedures, but the indirect and hidden costs associated with them (e.g. the reluctance to engage in trade in new, more
regulated, or perishable products because of uncertainties regarding the time and costs of the trade process or the lack
of transparent procedures).
Disentangling these indirect and hidden costs remains a challenge. However, the fact that more than 50% of the
changes in non-tariff policy-related trade costs across economies were not captured by the relatively wide-ranging
trade cost factors included in the study suggests that they play a crucial role in trade facilitation.
Source: Duval and Utoktham (2011).
followed closely by a number of other Asian
economies such as Singapore, the Republic of
Korea and Malaysia.76 South-East Asia has
achieved good port connectivity overall (figure 38),
although it remains significantly lower than East
Asia on average, due to the inclusion of least
developed countries. The largest economies in
ASEAN have better LSCI scores than many
developed economies. In contrast, most South
Asian economies are still lagging behind, although
they have made significant improvements since
2004. The Pacific island States together have the
lowest liner shipping connectivity scores, with no
improvements since 2004.77
Looking at the underlying LSCI indicators, the trend
is for fewer companies with larger carrying capacity
offering fewer services (routes) using larger ships.
This is true both for Asia and the Pacific and
globally.78 While this reduces costs via economies
of scale, further consolidation of the industry may
ultimately reduce competition, leading to higher
costs. Importantly, this trend has the potential to
reduce connectivity and increase trade cost of
  77 It is worth noting that landlocked countries are not included
in the subregional averages as they have no maritime services
of their own – and therefore no LSCI score.
   78 See ESCAP, 2010.
 76 The LSCI ranking is available in the Annex to the UNCTAD
Review of Maritime Transport, available from www.unctad.org/
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economies with smaller ports and trade volumes,
particularly where they are unable to secure the
investment necessary to build the facilities to
accommodate larger ships.
The importance of port connectivity in lowering
trade costs highlights the inherent disadvantage
faced by many landlocked countries in benefiting
from global trade. Facilitating transit trade, and
enhancing the movement of goods to and from
international sea ports in neighbouring economies,
is therefore likely to remain a main trade facilitation




Recurrent trade facilitation issues identified in many
developing economies and subregions in Asia and
the Pacific include: (a) a lack of inter-agency
coordination and public/private sector consultations
at both the national and regional levels; (b) limited
application of ICT to trade procedures; (c) limited
emphasis on intraregional trade facilitation; and
(d) the absence of an integrated approach to
address trade facilitation issues, including those
related to transit and logistics. While these issues
are national in nature, they have a direct impact on
connectivity of an economy with its neighbours and
the region. The following six actions are therefore
recom mended.
(a) Establish and strengthen institutional
mechanisms for identifying trade facilitation
bottlenecks and developing solutions
Although the institutional structure may take varied
forms in different economies to account for their
specific context, some form of institutionalization is
essential to making progress in trade facilitation,
given the number of stakeholders involved and the
need for a holistic approach, as proposed in the
ESCAP trade facilitation framework (figure 39). To
be effective, these mechanisms should have high-
level political support and bring together the many
ministries and agencies involved in international
trade transactions and control as well as the private
sector.79 Designation of a single national lead
agency for trade facilitation, in turn, makes it easier
Figure 39. Step-by-step trade facilitation – a framework for action
Sources:  ADB/ESCAP (2009); modified from ESCAP (2004).
79 In some cases, separate mechanisms have been
established as part of uncoordinated technical assistance/
capacity-building projects or initiatives.
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to develop effective mechanisms for trade
facilitation at the regional level, including as part of
RTAs.
(b) Initiate or accelerate plans to establish national
electronic Single Windows, incorporating
existing international standards to ensure
cross-border inter-operability
at the technical level
A full-fledged Single Window is likely to be a long-
term and complex endeavour in some of the
developing economies of the region. However,
setting it as a national goal may provide the
necessary impetus for implementing a systematic
action plan to cut red tape, starting with a detailed
analysis of the trade processes and procedures to
be streamlined and then automated. Regional and
regular sharing of experiences to facilitate planning
and implementation should be considered. This
could be facilitated by UNNExT.
(c) Develop a harmonized regional framework
for electronic exchange of trade data
and documents
The development of a harmonized regional
framework for electronic exchange of trade data
and documents is essential to maximizing the
benefits from paperless trade initiatives. Developing
such a framework may be facilitated by a regional
agreement on electronic exchange of trade data
and documents, which would also provide a
framework for economies lagging in this aspect to
develop their national e-commerce laws and
regulations.
(d) Facilitate transit as part of trade
facilitation plans
As part of a more integrated approach to facilitating
trade, it is important to systematically and
specifically endeavour to facilitate transit as part of
trade facilitation plans. Transit issues are of the
utmost importance to the many landlocked
developing economies of the region and it is
noteworthy that, while the ongoing WTO trade
facilitation negotiations do include negotiations
on freedom of transit and related issues, bilateral
and regional trade and/or economic partnership
agreements typically do not contain transit
facilitation provisions. Transit is often still treated as
a fully separate and distinct issue. However,
integrating or clarifying the linkages between
bilateral/regional trade and transit agreements,
when both exist, would certainly contribute to
making international trade procedures more
transparent.
(e) Create an Asia-wide coordination mechanism
bringing together representatives of key
regional organizations active in trade
facilitation
The establishment of an Asia-wide coordination
mechanism that brings together representatives of
key regional organizations active in trade facilitation
(such as ADB, APEC, ASEAN, ESCAP and
SAARC) will enable the promotion of intraregional/
subregional trade facilitation in general, and transit
facilitation in particular. This mechanism could also
be used to increase coordination with bilateral and
global donors, many of whom are active in trade
and transport facilitation. It could be linked to the
annual Asia-Pacific Trade Facilitation Forum
organized by ESCAP, in collaboration with ADB and
an increasing number of other organizations.
(f) Encourage trade infrastructure and
logistics services development
In the context of trade facilitation, policies aimed at
(a) liberalizing logistics and related services as well
as (b) increasing competition among service
providers should be readily considered, with a view
to maximizing efficiency at any given level of hard
infrastructure development. Establishment of public-
private partnerships to accelerate the development
of the national trade logistics infrastructure should
also be actively pursued.CHAPTER 6 – FACILITATING INTRAREGIONAL TRADE
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A. SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED
ENTERPRISES: CONTRIBUTIONS
AND CHALLENGES
In Asia and the Pacific, small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) remain a critical source of
employment creation (in many economies of Asia
and the Pacific contributing 60% or more of jobs)
and income generation (Asian Association of
Management Organizations, 2007). While SMEs
enhance dynamism in economies by providing
flexibility and fresh ideas, they can also stabilize
societies by providing safety nets for disadvantaged
workers. In this regard, the SME sector has
occupied a prominent position in the development
agenda of all developing economies in the region;
thus, promotion of SME development has been
regarded as an important policy issue in those
economies.
Another important contribution of SMEs has been in
the export sector (table 17), in terms of volume and
diversification as well as in technology and skills
development. Export operations also expand the
base of domestic enterprises, and allow them to
develop capacity to compete globally. Thus, SMEs
contribute to national competitiveness as apart from
income generation. The share of SMEs’ contri-
bution to exports varies widely among economies in
the Asia-Pacific region, lying between 14.2% for
Malaysia and 69.2% for China. This varying ability
of SMEs to export may be seen as an indication of
(a) how such businesses can or cannot compete in
regional and global markets, and (b) where specific
support measures may be needed to improve their
CHAPTER 7
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performance.81 In addition, the SME contribution to
exports is generally higher in developed economies
than in developing economies of Asia and the
Pacific.82
With growing governmental concern over SME
development, more reforms in SME policies have
been witnessed in Asia and the Pacific. SMEs
involved with export-oriented products and services
as well as those operating the supporting industry
for exports have been promoted, and have been
recognized for their importance in the export- and
FDI-led development strategy that almost all Asia-
Pacific countries have adopted. However, SMEs in
the region currently face significant resource
constraints and have limited capabilities to compete
80 Inputs by Paradai Adisayathepkul to this chapter are
gratefully acknowledged.
81 Definitions of what constitutes an SME vary quite widely in
Asia and the Pacific and even within single economies. An
extreme example is that of China, which defines medium-sized
enterprises as those with less than 2,000 employees, while
medium-sized enterprises in Malaysia are those with 75 or less
employees. Developing economies in Asia and the Pacific
typically define SMEs, including micro enterprises, as
commercial entities with less than 100 up to 300 employees
(ESCAP, 2011b).
82 For developed economies, exports are not particularly large
components of GDP, while developing economies in Asia and
the Pacific are reliant on exports as a significant source of GDP
growth (e.g. Malaysia and Thailand) due to their export-
oriented development strategies. Generally speaking, a trend
can be seen, in that as nations rise to high-income status, their
reliance on exports as a driving force of GDP growth is
diminished – most likely the result of strong domestic demand
growth. In addition, SMEs appear to be the driving source of
exports in developed economies, compared with developing
economies, at least in the Asia-Pacific region.ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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Sources: World Bank, 2011. Columns (2)-(4): Asian Development Bank (2001); Bank Negara Malaysia (2005); European
Commission (2009); Eurostat; General Statistics Office of Viet Nam, Viet Nam; Statistics Korea, Republic of Korea; National SME
Development Council, Malaysia (2010); OECD (2005 and 2011);  Office of Small and Medium Enterprises Promotion, Thailand;
Small and Medium Enterprise Administration, Taiwan Province of China (2010); Tambunan (2009a and 2009b); United States
Agency for International Development (2004); and United States International Trade Commission (2010).
a Value-added.
b Share of total sales revenue.
Table 17. Contribution by small and medium-sized enterprises in selected economies,
various years during 2001-2009
(Percentage)
effectively in global and regional markets. Despite
their tremendous potential, SMEs are still in a
disadvantaged position with regard to essential
business factors, such as capital, profitability,
managerial skills, trained labour, brands and
networking. Unless the complex issues and
processes of SME development are well
understood, isolated efforts to energize the SME
sector may not achieve a significant degree of
success.
Within this context, a number of bilateral and
multilateral development agencies have designed
and implemented SME development interventions
in Asia and the Pacific, particularly in less
developed economies (ESCAP, 2009a). The
Developed countries
France 23.0 42.4 99.8 61.4
Germany 41.0 55.9 99.7 79.0
Japan 13.0   53.8a 99.7 70.2
Spain 23.0 68.5a 99.9 78.7
United Kingdom 28.0 45.9 a 99.6 54.0
United States of America 11.0 22.2 99.9 55.8
European Union n.a. 43.4 99.8 67.4
Asia and the Pacific
China 27.0 69.2 99.0 74.5
India 20.0 40.0 n.a. n.a.
Indonesia 24.0 20.0 99.9 99.6
Malaysia 96.0 14.2 99.2 65.1
Pakistan 13.0 30.0 97.9 78.5
Republic of Korea 50.0 39.0 99.9 87.7
Russian Federation 28.0 54.0b 97.6 60.9
Singapore 221.0 16.0 91.5 51.8
Taiwan Province of China n.a. 17.0 97.8 77.2
Thailand 57.5 30.6 99.6 69.0
Viet Nam 68.0 20.0 99.9 77.3
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strategic approaches by major bilateral and
multilateral development and donor agencies were
reviewed in terms of their focused areas and
modalities.83 It was found that their specific and
detailed interventions to improve value additions in
the SME sector, and strengthen their contributions
to their respective economics, broadly covered the
following seven key areas:
(a) Enabling policy and regulatory environ-
ment, including effective institutional
framework and pro-business fiscal policy;
(b) Supporting infrastructures for business;
(c) Entrepreneurship, including management
skills and human resources;
(d) Access to finance;
(e) Technology capability-building and
adaptation;
(f) Business development services;
(g) Corporate social responsibility.
Based on the analysis as presented above,
several key points can be taken for future policy
interventions in the field of SME development,
particularly in Asia and the Pacific. Firstly, there
appears to be a commonly agreed approach for
SME development, covering the seven key areas.
However, such a comprehensive approach has
not been fully adhered to among the various
development agencies and donors. This has
resulted in scattered activities in various areas/
sectors, and the resulting lack of coordination
among donors’ activities has produced limited
results. Secondly, entrepreneurship and its culture
have been recognized as one of the key factors for
SMEs’ growth and competiveness enhancement;
however, traditional technical assistance has not
focused on the issue. A comprehensive “entre-
preneurship training programme” should be
launched, particularly in rural areas. Special
preferences could be given to women and youth
entrepreneurs to further their development. Thirdly,
conventional policy interventions to SMEs have
neglected technology development and adaptation,
and thus are weak in technical issues and practical
solutions. Finally, the importance of SMEs,
penetration into regional and global markets has
been attracting more attention. The past activities of
SME development were typically focused on
domestic issues, missing the linkage with existing
trade and FDI-driven development strategy.
B. EMERGENCE OF REGIONAL AND
GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS AND
OPPORTUNITIES FOR SMALL AND
MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES
1. Overview
One of the most crucial challenges facing SMEs in
Asia and the Pacific is how to create new business
(and, therefore, investment) opportunities in global
and regional markets, particularly in major emerging
economies in Asia and the Pacific such as China
and India. In small economies with a limited
domestic market, exports play a crucial role in
achieving high economic growth and rapid
socio-economic transformation. SMEs supplying
competitive products and services with greater
potential for backward and forward linkages could
contribute substantially to exports and, hence, to
higher national income and overall socio-economic
progress. Therefore, development of export-led
SMEs should be an important part of national
economic development strategy.
In this regard, recent experiences from a wide
range of Asian and Pacific economies, particularly
in North-East Asia and South-East Asia, strongly
indicate that domestic SMEs can access
international markets through global and regional
value chains (GVCs). These value chains provide
a full range of value-added business activities
across borders, and provide a product or service
from conception, through design, sourcing raw
83 The corporate strategies of 13 bilateral and multilateral
development and donor agencies on SME development in Asia
and the Pacific were reviewed (ESCAP, 2011a). Those
agencies include the Asian Development Bank,  2000; Asian
Productivity Organization, 2007; United Kingdom, Department
for International Development, 2008; German Technical
Cooperation (GTZ); International Labour Organization, 2009;
Japan International Coopeartion Agency, 2006; OECD, 2005;
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, 2010; UNDP,
2007; UNIDO, 2010; United States Agency for International



























































materials and intermediate inputs, production,
marketing, distribution and support to the final
consumers (figure 40). Such GVCs are expected to
provide an efficient network by establishing linkages
with large enterprises or even with other efficient
SMEs. They help to boost SMEs’ value-added
activities in international trade, as SMEs currently
play a limited role due to low value-addition and
lack of proper networking (ESCAP, 2007a).
“Less advanced developing countries
can take over some production operations
within regional and global value chains
through South-South FDI”
Increased intraregional FDI has accelerated the
development of GVCs in Asia and the Pacific.
Anecdotal evidence reveals that developing
economies in Asia and the Pacific are gaining
importance as sources of FDI, complementing FDI
from traditional sources in developed economies.84
It is noteworthy that compared with the more
industrialized and higher income economies, lower
income economies have experienced increasing
shares of intraregional FDI flows. This indicates
that lower income developing economies have
received South-South FDI from their more
advanced neighbours, which serves as evidence in
support of the “flying geese” paradigm – the
catching-up process of industrialization in less
advanced  economies (ESCAP, 2009a).
Less advanced developing economies can take
over some production operations within regional
and global value chains through South-South FDI.
This trend is expected to lead to a gradual industrial
transformation from relatively low value-added
sectors (e.g. agriculture and garments) to high
value-added sectors (e.g. automotive parts and
 Figure 40. An example of regional and global value chains –
apparel and garments sector
Source: Gereffi and Memedovic (2003).
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electronics or advance manufacturing, ICT and
services). FDI in high value-added sectors can
facilitate technology and knowledge transfer and
diffusion to less advanced developing economies.
In this connection, it may be desirable to explore
further investment opportunities for Asia-Pacific
SMEs in advanced manufacturing and related value
chains.
However, the emergence of GVCs has also resulted
in intensified competition in high value-added
activities and a need for continuous skills
development. Such competition is likely to widen
economic and development disparities in the region,
at both the national and the company levels, unless
national policymakers, in cooperation with business
people and international development agencies,
create an environment to maximize SMEs’ benefits
from GVCs. In order to effectively participate in
GVCs, SMEs must break high entry barriers by
meeting a wide range of increasingly stringent
global standards with regard to quality, price,
timely delivery and flexibility. As reviewed above,
however, SMEs in Asia and the Pacific typically
lack the environment to improve their capacity,
including a proper policy and regulatory framework,
supporting infrastructures, access to finance, strong
entrepreneurship culture, technology incubation and
business development services (ESCAP, 2009b).
2. Challenges for Asia-Pacific small
and medium-sized enterprises in
regional and global value chains
The practical challenge for SMEs in developing
economies in Asia and the Pacific is to become and
remain competitive suppliers, particularly in GVCs.
SMEs, which seek to establish partnerships in
regional and global value chains, should understand
the governance of the specific value chain process
and structures. As international trade is mostly
undertaken by large enterprises of global
reputation, and since leading firms in global/regional
value chains are the key decision makers in
managing global production systems and trade,
they would be the ones influencing the participation
of smaller firms in such chains. It is important that
the structure of a specific value chain and the
specific characteristics of the lead companies are
fully understood.
“In the absence of support services,
SMEs in Asia and the Pacific developing
economies cannot establish effective value
chain connections at either
the regional or the global level”
It is a fairly well-established fact that a product’s
quality and value not only depend on regular
innovations in the production process but also on
innovations outside the production process (e.g.
design and marketing) in order to cater to different
customers and markets. Therefore, with the
provision of support services, both from public
sector agencies and business associations, is
a necessity for SMEs. In the absence of such
services, SMEs in Asia and the Pacific developing
economies cannot establish effective value chain
connections at either the regional or the global
level. Governments must therefore play a leading
role in facilitating SME growth, by providing the
necessary support for export-oriented SMEs as well
as industrial SMEs to allow them to form strong
partnerships in regional and global value chains.
Participation in these chains often implies ability of
SMEs to break high entry barriers by meeting
a wide range of increasingly stringent global
standards with regard to quality, price, timely
delivery and flexibility. SMEs in Asia and the Pacific
typically lack the standards and infrastructure
necessary to enable them to demonstrate
conformity with such standards. Therefore,
additional efforts by Governments as well as
reliance on new approaches to breaking these
barriers (such as mutual recognition agreements in
ASEAN or the use of private certification) are
required. These and other challenges can best be
understood within the context of specific industry
value chains that have particular relevance for
regional economies. In this context, three sectoral
value chains of actual and potential relevance for
Asia and the Pacific were selected in this analysis
to illustrate the challenges, i.e. agribusiness,
garments and apparel and automobile components
(box 7.1).ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
108
Box 7.1. Challenges in regional and global value chains: three case studies
A. Agribusinessa
The agribusiness sector has been one of the most vibrant growth sectors internationally, with many of its products
sourced from developing economies in Asia and the Pacific. The evolution of agribusiness GVCs, coupled with the
dominance of large retailers/supermarkets that control the brands of agro-products and access to regional and global
markets for agro-products imported from developing economies, threatens the exclusion of suppliers unable to meet
the new requirements. However, it also provides significant opportunities for those who can do so. For example, the
trend towards product differentiation such as organic produce, driven both by the tastes of global consumers and by
strategies of retailers for higher revenue, is producing significant opportunities for qualified Asia-Pacific SMEs to serve
niche markets that are regional or even global in nature. Furthermore, outsourcing by global retailers of technically
sophisticated activities, such as bar-coding, labelling and the preparation of ready-to-eat food, provide important
opportunities for upgrading within the agribusiness GVCs in Asia and the Pacific.
B. Garments and apparelb
The garment and apparel industry, which is one of the oldest and largest export industries, and a classic “starter”
industry for export-oriented industrialization, has played a key role in the industrialization and development of Asia and
the Pacific. It represents a typical buyer-driven value chain/network, with a highly competitive and widely dispersed
global industry structure, including regional and local competitors. Entry barriers are relatively low for most “assembly”
garment factories, and they increase with movement up the global and regional value chains from textiles to fibres. Two
key factors shape the structure and dynamics of the apparel GVCs: (a) pressure to meet stringent international
standards (e.g. labour and environmental); and (b) demands from global buyers for cheaper products, higher quality
and shorter lead times.
The increasing concentration of production in economies with the capability for “full package production,” particularly
China and India, are also expected to have a significant “demand side” effect. It is expected that large retailers will
demand further price cuts as well as reduce the number of their suppliers. This will place significant pressure on those
exporting countries without primary textile industries, such as Bangladesh and Cambodia, and on smaller producers
whose present capabilities to upgrade within a GVC are limited.
C. Automobile componentsc
The automobile components industry comprises a complex mixture of firms of very different sizes, types and
geographic scope, producing an enormous variety of products ranging from very simple parts to technologically very
complex systems. The potential for local sourcing is particularly high because of the large number, size and weight of
components and materials required by the sector. For those SMEs able to participate even at the lowest tiers of
production, the automotive components industry can offer significant opportunities for those SMEs in the region that are
able to participate, even at the lowest tiers of production, to access regional and global markets.
In Asia and the Pacific, cost competitiveness of the automotive component industry is often based less on productivity
and more on low factor input costs, which are now rising in many countries (e.g. the cost of labour and land).
Therefore, the key challenge for automotive parts suppliers in the region is to improve productivity and lower their costs
in order to maintain or improve their competitive performance within a GVC. In this context, a coordinated strategy of
production relocation and integration within the region could provide opportunities for neighbouring less developed,
lower-cost economies to become lower-tier suppliers of selected components for the existing automotive parts cluster.
Such cross-border production linkages could provide an entry point to the automotive parts GVC and exposure to its
significant developmental benefits while at the same time strengthening the competitive performance of local SME
suppliers.
 a  Particularly useful sources for this case study include Humphrey (2005); and Dolan, Humphrey and Harris-Pascal, 2000study.
 b  Particularly useful sources for this case include Gerefi and Memedovic (2003), International Trade Centre UNCTAD/
WTO (2005), and Nadvi and Thoburn (2003).
 c  Particularly useful sources for this case study include Global Production Networks (2003), Veloso and Kumar (2002),
and Sturgeon and Lester (2001).CHAPTER 7 – INTEGRATING SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES INTO THE REGIONAL AND GLOBAL MARKETS
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3. Implications and opportunities for
small and medium-sized enterprise
development
The above analysis reveals the following key policy
implications as well as opportunities for SME
development in Asia and the Pacific.
(a) Opportunities for new entrants
It is now possible for SMEs to become inter-
nationally competitive in an increasingly wide range
of industries, based on a single function or a small
number of functions, as suppliers in GVCs.
Similarly, through participation in GVCs it is possible
to achieve large-scale exports of specialized
outputs in niche product markets that are regional
or even global in scale. Ultimately, SMEs can
emerge as overseas investors in their own right
and, as they grow, develop their own value chains
through forging backward and forward linkages.
(b) Opportunities for value creation
In a world of GVCs, key differences in the
competitive performance of SMEs lie less in the
industries of which they are a part than in the
functions or activities in which they choose to
specialize. It is not the industry or sector that is
most important but a firm’s core capabilities within
a particular industry value chain. Opportunities for
value-creation exist anywhere along the industry
value chain through specialization and upgrading.
(c) “Match the best”
International business is increasingly being
characterized by fragmented and specialized
production within the framework of GVCs, driven
by strategic decisions on the reorganization and
relocation of production. To be competitive, SMEs
have to be the “best in their class” for each activity,
function or output they choose (e.g. manufacturing
activities, design, logistics and marketing). Unless
they are able to “match the best” they are unlikely
to be able to compete effectively in regional and
global markets, given the range of globally available
supplier options in most industries.
(d) Cooperate to compete
Cooperation through SME clusters plays a key role
in SMEs in the region achieving competitive
success. Such SME clusters are anchored in
partnerships along three dimensions: (a) SME-to-
SME, through joint task-related activities and
initiatives that also support building trust and shared
experiences; (b) between core producer enterprises
in such clusters and supporting institutions that
provide key services such as training, logistics and
business development services; and (c) business-
government cooperation to strengthen GVC-related
business institutions.
(e) New challenges for development strategy
Local SMEs must increasingly have the required
capabilities to even be considered by first-tier global
suppliers or lead firms in GVCs. In this context,
a key role of government is to assist in developing
the required supplier capabilities, including
assistance in strengthening industry-related
institutions as well as to ensure the availability of
competitive support systems such as logistics
services. This is an essential element in supporting
the competitive performance of domestic firms in
international markets and increasingly in attracting
investment.
(f) New directions in regional trade facilitation
Within the framework of global value chains, it is
essential to ease exports and imports of parts and
components as well as of final products. This
requires effective trade-facilitation processes (such
as customs procedures, and import and export
regulations) as well as competitive support services
such as the transport and communications
infrastructure within the framework of integrated
trans-border logistics systems. The related
challenge to regional cooperation is to move
towards a more integrated approach to transport,
trade and transit within the framework of market-
oriented and relatively open trade policy regimes,
which is focused on specific industry value chains of
shared interest.ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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“The transformation of regional businesses
by the emergence of global value
chains signals potentially new and important
directions for SME development
in Asia and the Pacific”
C. FOUR ADVANTAGES OF
THE VALUE CHAIN APPROACH
FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED
ENTERPRISES
SMEs in Asia and the Pacific form the largest
generator of domestic employment and provide
a livelihood for more than 60% of the region’s
workforce, especially women and young people.
The most serious challenge facing SMEs is how to
create new business opportunities for more value-
added products and services, especially tradable
ones, which are very much in line with the region’s
commonly-accepted trade and FDI-led development
strategy. Obtaining access to profitable export
markets is crucial to fostering SME growth and
productivity, especially given the increasing
globalization and market liberalization.
The transformation of regional businesses by the
emergence of global value chains signals potentially
new and important directions for SME development
in Asia and the Pacific. The GVC approach, in
particular, provides the following four advantages
for SME development at the national and regional
levels:
(a) In recognition of the diversity of developing
economies of the region in terms of economic
status and condition, and natural endowment,
the specific sector value chain-based approach
could identify development issues more easily,
while the “one size fits all” tailored approach
may not be workable in all participating countries;
(b) The approach covers the seven essential
issues for SME development, as mentioned
above, through comprehensive development
programmes;
(c) The value chain approach will force policy-
makers to adopt a programme for regional
cooperation that moves the development
assistance paradigm beyond national borders;
(d) The value chain approach is closely linked to
the attraction of appropriate FDI, which plays
an important role in the development of value
chains and, therefore, helps in promoting
intraregional FDI.CHAPTER 7 – INTEGRATING SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES INTO THE REGIONAL AND GLOBAL MARKETS
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CHAPTER 8
86 As pointed out in communication from Sisira Jayasuriya.
87 This number includes RTAs under implementation by
Turkey, which most frequently chooses partners outside Asia
and the Pacific. More details on the difficulties in counting
RTAs are available in APTIAD, 2010.
A. INTRODUCTION
Only 20 RTAs85 involving at least one member from
the Asia-Pacific region were in force in 1995. By
May 2011, this number had grown to 122.
Furthermore, the contribution of Asia and the Pacific
to the global trend towards regionalism has also
become dominant; since 2005, the region has
contributed at least half of all agreements that have
entered into force annually.
In terms of trade coverage of RTAs, the ESCAP
Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Agreements
Database (APTIAD) reports that, on average, about
38% of total exports of Asian and Pacific economies
involved in RTAs are directed to other member
countries of those RTAs (APTIAD, 2011). In other
words, close to 60% of the region’s exports is to
economies with which Asia-Pacific economies do
not have a trade agreement (mostly the European
Union and the United States).
“Since 2005, the region has contributed at least
half of all agreements that have entered into
force annually...yet more than 60% of its exports
is directed to non-RTA trading partners”
Some economies, particularly in East and South-
East Asia, enjoy a relatively high coverage of trade
under RTAs to which they are a party. For example,
Malaysia, Singapore and Viet Nam all cover
between 50% and 70% of their total exports with
RTA partners. In contrast, for China and Australia,
RTAs cover only 31% and 21.5%, respectively of
their total exports (see part III tables for more
details on the number and coverage of RTAs per
economy). However, a relatively low percentage of
revenues from exports to partners in RTAs can
mask the enormous qualitative importance of the
trade links that could be forged through intra-
regional trade and investment.86 The rest of this
chapter discusses how RTA channels in Asia and
the Pacific could be made more effective in lowering
intraregional trade and investment costs and
enabling economic integration.
B. FEATURES OF REGIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS IN ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
An increasing number of agreements have been
concluded between partners at different levels of
economic and political power and development
(North-South). Furthermore, trade agreements are
increasingly including partners from different
geographical regions, often economies that do not
share borders. This trend also applies to Asia-
Pacific trade agreements. Before the end of the
twentieth century, three quarters of Asia-Pacific
RTAs that were under implementation were among
partners in the region, while since 2000 less than
half of all agreements that have entered into force
have been among partners in the region.87
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88 It is not only tariff reduction that provides incentive to
increased trade. There are many NTBs and other behind-the-
border barriers that may or may not be effectively tackled by an
RTA. The impact comes over and above the tariff liberalization
impacts. Furthermore, there are indirect sources of trade
growth related to investment and production pattern changes;
these are discussed below.
 Sources: APTIAD and WTO, RTA-IS accessed in May 2011.
“...since 2000 less than half of all
agreements entered into force have been
among economies of the region”
The scope of Asia-Pacific RTAs has gradually
widened to cover more than just preferential tariffs
on goods, irrespective of the development levels of
the parties involved. Post-2005 RTAs tend to cover
services trade, investment, trade facilitation,
standards and technical regulations, intellectual
property rights protection, dispute settlements and
competition in addition to liberalization of trade in
goods while still lagging with regard to addressing
environmental and labour issues (figure 41).
ESCAP (2009a) provides a detailed description
of the depth and coverage of Asia-Pacific RTAs.
It appears that trade agreements, often called
“comprehensive economic partnerships”, are
increasingly being signed in order to expand current
goods trade and pursue new areas of economic
cooperation; they do not always create new trade
(known in the literature as trade on extensive
margin). While the provisions for economic
cooperation are addressed more fully in the newer
agreements, they do not necessarily lead towards
economic integration with harmonized policies and
institutions. Thus, the focus of regionalism in Asia
remains trade and investment expansion (see
box 8.1, which lists some of the most salient
features of the region’s trade agreements).
In general, trade agreements have not met the
expectations with regard to generating intraregional
trade. This is due, in part, to the fact that many at-
the-border and some behind-the-border barriers to
trade have been eliminated either multilaterally or
autonomously; thus, it is difficult to attribute the
growth of trade to any of the liberalization
processes.88  As noted above, in addition to merely
providing additional mechanisms to reduce trade
barriers, RTAs were meant to (a) enhance
intraregional investment flows (box 8.2), and
(b) enable the development of production networks
and expansion of intra-industry trade among the
parties to trade agreements – thus providing a
channel for deeper market integration. However, as
Zhang and Shen (2011) argued, once RTAs were
put in place they might instead be disruptive to
cross-border production networks. Other research
indicates that RTA support for intra-industry trade
and integration is associated, to a greater extent,
with North-South RTAs and less with South-South
RTAs (Foster and Stehrer, 2010, and ARTNeT,
2011a).
The utilization of negotiated preferences is another
important aspect in assessing the impact of
individual RTAs. Actual utilization is normally not
that high as it not only depends on the supply
capacities of producers and traders, but also
increasingly on the definition and complexity of the
rules of origin (RoO), which differ among RTAs and
are often cited by developing economies as
amounting to significant non-tariff barriers (see
annex note VIII.1).
Figure 41. Recent agreements cover more areas
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Box 8.1. Prominent characteristics of Asia-Pacific regional trade agreements
(a) Membership in RTAs includes economies of various sizes and at different levels of development, and
even from other (and distant) regions, with more than half the members in recent agreements located
outside the Asia-Pacific region.
(b) The noodle bowl phenomenon not only prevails but appears to be getting worse as many countries
find themselves signing different RTAs with the same partners, covering the same products or areas of
trade concessions differently.
(c) Most of the so-called “Singapore issues” have found their way into RTAs, in particular in RTAs
involving developed countries. Of these “issues”, it appears that only government procurement is still
not prominent in RTAs, even though the extent of government spending in the recent global economic
crisis might have caused more interest in the Agreement on Government Procurement under WTO.
The other Singapore issues, in particular trade facilitationa and investment, have become more regular
components of new RTAs.
(d) While labour mobility is an issue of utmost relevance for most countries of the region (irrespective of
their level of development), this issue is not normally covered in RTAs. Of all enforced RTAs in the
region, only one third include some provisions on the temporary movement of natural persons as
service providers; however, the extent of liberalization beyond GATS commitments is very modest and
in practice excludes semi- or unskilled labour.
(e) Similarly, environmental issues are not normally covered in RTAs, although some have clauses
indicating that the RTA provisions should not interfere with countries’ abilities to protect the
environment.
(f) RTAs are most efficient in reducing or eliminating tariffsb and quantitative restrictions on goods’ trade,
but in principle do not go beyond WTO agreements in the area of safeguards and standards. RTAs
could potentially also be more effective in removing barriers to trade in services or investment than
multilateral trade disciplines (especially barriers to trade among developing economies). However,
RTAs normally do not cover issues such as export subsidies and domestic regulation.
(g) A number of RTAs have provisions on differential treatment of their members that are least developed
countries or are at a low level of economic development.
a   See chapter 6 in this report.
b  RTAs use most-favoured-nation applied tariff rates as base rates to negotiate tariff liberalization. This is in contrast to
the multilateral approach, which uses MFN bound rates. Consequently, RTAs often offer more in terms of market
access. RTAs, however, use both positive and negative list approaches. For more details, see APTIAD (http://
www.unescap.org/tid/apiad).
As discussed in various ESCAP secretariat
reports,89 negotiations on preferential RoO are
often a difficult and cumbersome affair, and the
negotiated outcomes affect trade transactions within
production networks in different countries.90 The
89 See, for example, ESCAP, 2009a and 2007b, and Bonapace
and Mikic, 2007.
90 For example, Zhang and Shen, 2011, argued that Japan
switched from a supporter of multilateralism to actively pursue
RTAs “because it was a major player in the East Asian
production network. East Asian FTAs excluding Japan would
impair the interests of Japanese companies with well-
developed business networks in the region”.
Japan External Trade Organization (2007) showed
that, based on a survey of Japanese firms, 30% of
the respondents believed that RoO in RTAs signed
by Japan with partners were increasing the cost of
trade and production. Kawai and Wignaraja (2011)
similarly showed that, on average, 22% of the firms
they surveyed in six economies91 believed that
complex RoO had an adverse impact on the cost of
91 China, Japan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea,
Singapore and Thailand.ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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Box 8.2. Investment provisions in Asia-Pacific regional trade agreements
Of all the expanded areas of coverage by RTAs, provisions on investment promotion, protection, liberalization and
cooperation assume special importance as investment has traditionally been a sensitive area, and all attempts to forge
a multilateral agreement on investment have failed. In the meantime, investment provisions have increasingly been
included in regional and bilateral trade and economic agreements while the number of international investment
agreements, in particular bilateral investment treaties (BITs), has also risen steadily. It is estimated that at the end of
May 2010, there were almost 2,800 BITs worldwide (although only about 2,000 were ratified). About 50% of these BITs
involve countries in Asia and the Pacific.
In addition, of those RTAs involving an ESCAP member State, more than 50 have investment provisions. Most of these
provisions refer to investment cooperation or contain provisions very similar to those found in BITs, with emphasis on
investment promotion and protection. Only a few comprehensive agreements include provisions on investment
liberalization, most notably the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA).a Several other “ASEAN plus
one” agreements have advanced investment chapters, most notably the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA. Since all
of these agreements only entered into force in 2010, it is too early to assess their impact on investment patterns in the
region.
ACIA is probably the most advanced regional investment agreement in force among developing countries anywhere in
the world. It combines the ASEAN Investment Area and ASEAN Investment Guarantee Agreement and has provisions
for investment cooperation, promotion, liberalization and protection. Investment is defined broadly and includes foreign
portfolio investment. ACIA is innovative as it includes more comprehensive and clearer definitions of concepts, and
contains provisions for dispute settlement between States and investors that are among the most comprehensive found
in any investment agreement. However, its effectiveness in promoting intraregional investment and linking it to
initiatives aimed at closing development gaps within ASEAN has yet to be demonstrated.
The Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) has also made progress in the area of investment. APTA Participating States
have all signed the Framework Agreement on the Promotion, Protection and Liberalization of Investment, which is
currently in the process of ratification. The Framework Agreement provides a mandate for the negotiation of an APTA
Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, and commits Participating States “to enter into
negotiations to progressively improve their investment regime with a view to promoting freer investment among the
APTA Participating States”. These negotiations will commence when the ratification process has been completed. In
the meantime, Participating States are discussing implementation modalities and time frames of the four schedules
contained in the Framework Agreement, i.e. cooperation and facilitation, promotion and awareness, liberalization, and
protection.
a However, ACIA is a separate agreement from the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) or ASEAN Trade in Goods
Agreement (ATIGA) and is part of the actions undertaken towards establishing the ASEAN Economic Community.
production. Most firms in Singapore were of the
view that RoO were not helping them to trade
cheaper and faster; however, firms in China held a
more favourable view. A more recently adopted
approach (e.g. in negotiations on the ASEAN-
Australia-New Zealand FTA) allowing traders
alternative methods of proof of origin for the same
product. This approach enables traders and
producers to utilize the concessions under
individual RTAs more effectively and thus improve
their overall impression of the benefits they are able
to derive from the RTAs. However, this benefit may
lessen in parallel with an increasing number of
different RoO per destination.
The effective utilization of preferences under
RTAs is also hampered by the lack of awareness
among businesses of their existence. In fact,
a number of studies (e.g. Kawai and Wignaraja,
2011, and ARTNeT, 2011b forthcoming) show that in
developing countries many firms, particularly SMEs,
often lack the necessary information or access to
soft (and hard) infrastructure to effectively utilize the
preferences. However, large firms might be affectedCHAPTER 8 – USING TRADE AGREEMENTS TO TRADE EASIER AND CHEAPER, WITH MORE BENEFITS FOR ALL
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more directly by the multiple RoO, as they trade
more products across more countries than SMEs,
which often do not trade directly (see chapter 7 in
this report).




Traditionally, economic integration blocs were
perceived as fortresses that built walls of
protectionism against non-parties (cf. literature on
the European Economic Community). GATT
Article XXIV refers, inter alia, to the condition that
partners in an FTA or customs union must not erect
barriers against non-members that are higher than
the barriers they had on average before integration.
In general, since current modalities of regionalism
rarely involve customs unions, this issue is not
really a problem. However, another type of wall is
erected against potential new members.
“The conditions for membership in existing
RTAs in Asia-Pacific are neither
very transparent nor overly simple”
In contrast to the principle of “open regionalism”
adopted by APEC member economies, the
conditions for membership in existing RTAs in the
Asia-Pacific region are neither very transparent nor
overly simple.  Firstly, not all RTAs have a clause
on accession; in fact, only 15 of the plurilateral
trade agreements and 21 of the bilateral trade
agreements involving a regional economy contain
provisions for accession. Furthermore, even if an
RTA has accession provisions, such provisions may
apply only to designated countries, e.g. those
located in a particular geographic area (see tables
in the annex to this chapter). In this regard, two
thirds of the plurilateral agreements restrict
membership to economies from a specific
geographic area or other kind of country group and/
or with a particular level of development. Perhaps
expectedly, none of the bilateral trade agreements
has such restrictions, implying that the original
negotiating parties presumed that the agreements
would not be expanded to new members.
Not surprisingly all agreements require negotiations
on the terms of accession with the new (potential)
member. In practice, negotiations on accession of
new members are proceeding in only three
plurilateral trade agreements: (a) Mongolia, which
has been negotiating accession to APTA since
2010; (b) Timor-Leste, which has applied to accede
to ASEAN; and (c) Australia, Malaysia, Peru, the
United States and Viet Nam, which are negotiating
accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement. In contrast, none of the bilateral
agreements involving a regional economy is known
to be considering adding a third member.
Part of the explanation of geographical restrictions
to new members prevalent in plurilateral trade
agreements may be that potential competition from
new members could undermine the current impact
of the agreement. Furthermore, a number of these
agreements have a long history of broader-than-
trade cooperation, and thus might contain specific
non-economic objectives that would make
membership expansion difficult.
Notwithstanding the above analysis, it should be
noted that free trade agreements and customs
unions were given exemptions from the most-
favoured-nation (MFN) principle in GATT trading
rules under “the general belief that regional
liberalization, by providing deeper market access
was complementary to the multilateral trading
system”.92 As such, RTAs have been viewed as
building blocs of global free trade. However, in
practice, RTAs have not necessarily contributed to
an expansion of “free” global trade; the relationship
between RTAs and the multilateral trading system
92 WTO, 2007, p. 305. However, as pointed out by Sisira
Jayasuriya in personal communications and elsewhere in the
literature, the “building block” argument may also be seen as
an ex-post rationalization of the acceptance of exemptions to
MFN rules implicit in RTAs. In reality, GATT would have not
been possible due to pre-existing preferences embedded in
the post-World War Two world economic order. Thus the
allowance of FTA and customs union exemptions was a
pragmatic compromise rather than an outright acceptance of
RTAs as enablers of free trade.ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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93 There is also a risk that the present WTO Dispute
Settlement Mechanism will start losing its credibility and “teeth”
if WTO as an institution loses its credibility among the
members. However, Bown (2010) rejected such fears and
argued that the viability of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism
was not conditional on the conclusion of the Doha Round.
(MTS) has been quite complex, but there is no
doubt that both are necessary and interdependent
components of world trade and the global economy.
Their interdependence plays an important role in
determining the outcome of the current multilateral
round of trade negotiations, the Doha Development
Agenda.
D. BENEFITS OF THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM AND COSTS OF
DOHA ROUND FAILURE
The global economic crisis of 2008/2009 has best
demonstrated the value of the MTS. The fear of run-
away protectionism as a response to global
economic contraction did not materialize. The global
system of binding trading rules managed to keep
tariff increases in check. However, the same could
not be said for safeguarding global trade against
“murky” forms of protectionism (see chapter 3 of
this report).
The role of WTO becomes indispensable with
regard to monitoring protectionist trends, policy
bindings, and advocating the role of trade in
economic growth and recovery from the crisis. The
MTS is the only system that comprises a universal
body of enforceable, non-discriminatory rules
governing international trade negotiated by
members and accepted by consensus. This system
of rules has enhanced the stability, transparency
and predictability of international trading en-
vironment and warrants support from all WTO
members. A successful conclusion of the Doha
Round of multilateral trade negotiations would send
a strong signal that the global economy remains
open and committed to trade. It would also preserve
the MTS and WTO, and prevent that organization
from evolving into a litigation body only.93  No
number of RTAs can replace the MTS; on the
contrary, there are certain areas where only
multilateral disciplines could be effective (e.g.
domestic support, export subsidies in agriculture or
a dispute settlement mechanism). Concluding the
Round could also contribute to halting the loss of
confidence in multilateral cooperation that has
been growing in the past decade not only in relation
to trade agenda with security of market access
and opportunities for poor countries, including aid-
for-trade, but also climate change, financial
architecture, food security etc.
“A failure to conclude Doha Round would
lead to potential export losses twice the size
of the current trade account
surplus of China with the world”
While WTO members, including those from the
Asia-Pacific region, remain committed to a
conclusion of the Doha Round in 2011, positions
remain far apart in various areas of negotiations,
particularly in the area of non-agricultural market
access (NAMA). A recent proposal made by the
European Union has sought to break the stalemate
and efforts are under way to accelerate the
conclusion of the Round. Making this happen is the
responsibility of each and every WTO member
collectively. Yet, in May 2011, there were no signs
that WTO members were ready to compromise in
order to move closer to a completion of Doha
Round.
A failure to conclude the Doha Round would lead to
potential export losses twice the size of the current
trade account surplus of China with the world.94 This
projection is based on estimates by Bouët and
Laborde Debucquet (2009) of some $360 billion of
direct gains in terms of expansion of exports in
addition to variable amounts of indirect gains,
depending on the actual scenario of liberalization
being used in modelling.95 However, this monetary
94According to economic and financial indicators published by
The Economist on 30 April 2011, the trade surplus of China in
March 2011 for the latest 12-month period was $169.3 billion.
95 Among the many modelling attempts at estimating DDA
gains (and/or losses), Hufbauer, Schott and Wong (2010)
report the minimal gain of the current Doha package on
agriculture and NAMA for the 22 largest trading countries being
$63 billion or only 0.1% of their aggregate GDP. Deeper
reduction of barriers in services and the agreement on trade
facilitation lead to doubling or tripling of these gainsCHAPTER 8 – USING TRADE AGREEMENTS TO TRADE EASIER AND CHEAPER, WITH MORE BENEFITS FOR ALL
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Table 18. Comparing opportunities provided by regional trade agreements
and the multilateral trading system
value of the cost of not concluding the Doha Round
could rise considerably if the cost of possible loss of
confidence in MTS and resulting risk of increasing
disputes (or even a trade war) are also taken into
account.
These benefits of the multilateral system of rules
are hardly replaceable. This does not mean,
however, that the process of reaching an agreement
under the framework of MTS could not be improved
upon. While the weaknesses of this process could
be by-passed by pursuing RTAs that are difficult to
achieve through multilateral negotiations (table 18),
simply signing more RTAs would not overcome the
basic problems of MTS.
Negotiation under regional trade agreements
Negotiating results are tangible and more quickly
obtained, but prone to be diminished by multilateral
liberalization.
Easier to align interests of special groups with concrete
outcomes of negotiations.
More direct involvement of stakeholders in the process of
negotiations and vetting of the results.
Ability to address regional- or subregional-specific
issues.
Cannot handle disciplines on domestic support or
regulation.
Better equipped to deal with groups of policies or
interventions (such as Singapore issues).
More flexible in implementing even partially agreed deals
(e.g. early harvest programmes).
Compensation for harm done could be given in a financial
form.
Create so-called “noodle bowl” effect from overlapping
commitments among the same pair of economies in the
same areas, resulting in higher trade costs.
Negotiation under multilateral trading system
Prolonged process of negotiation, with less opportunity to
attach ownership of a result to a particular negotiating
group.
Larger focus on the interest of the society as a whole and
less focused on defending interests of special groups.
Larger distance between Government and stakeholders in
the consultation process and less ability to influence the
ratification of the negotiated results.
More oriented towards longer-term interests at the level of
the whole country.
Lends itself to impose disciplines on domestic support in
particular sectors.
Better equipped to deal with specific types of trade flows
(e.g. merchandise trade, commercial services trade and
agricultural trade).
Focused on having a comprehensive liberalization
package with uncertain possibilities for partial
implementation (known as “single undertaking”).
Compensation for harm done is in the form of a new or
enhanced discriminatory measure, mostly hurting some
groups in the imposing country.
Potential to create a simple, transparent and stable set of
rules resulting in lower trade costs.
E. IF YOU CAN’T BEAT THEM,
JOIN THEM!
RTAs are here to stay. The real risk of a Doha
negotiations impasse persisting indefinitely will
only add oil to the fire, as many RTAs are already
under negotiation or at the stage of “study and
consideration”. APTIAD indicates that there are
more than 50 active negotiations involving at least
one member from Asia and the Pacific, but this
estimate is a conservative one. Previous reports of
ESCAP expressed concern about the possible
adverse effects that this proliferation of RTAs –
known as the noodle bowl effect-might have on the
cost of trade, and hence on production and
investment decisions. Apart from the social costs of
negotiation and implementation of RTAs, there is
the issue of private cost that traders must incur if
they wish to use such agreements for trade under
preferential treatment. Obviously, traders do not
have to use the preferences, as they can always
trade under MFN terms, but that begs the question
of why the RTAs have been negotiated in the first
place.ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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99 Figure 42 portrays only bilateral and regional agreements
under implementation, very few which are in an advance stage
of negotiations (e.g. BIMSTEC and PACER+), but not the
various GSP schemes given unilaterally. In addition, it does not
feature GSTP, which is a global reciprocal scheme.
“...the additional costs imposed through
overlapping and complex RoO range from 3%
of the value of the export for companies
in developed countries to 8%
or higher – in some cases, those costs
can be prohibitive”
The RoO are the most important part of a free trade
agreement as they contain criteria for conferring
origin – the key to use the negotiated preferences.
These rules include differential details across the
agreements, affecting the compliance costs for
producers and traders, especially smaller ones and
those in lower-income countries. The “search” on
where to export or import from is not always quick
as the necessary information and/or resources are
sometimes not readily available, and compliance
with the rules becomes too expensive. Furthermore,
with production becoming more and more
fragmented across borders, business decision-
making on where to invest and produce, and
where to export from, is becoming more complex; in
fact, some opportunities to enhance production
networks might be lost due to this complex rules
environment.96 The additional costs imposed
through overlapping and complex RoO are
estimated to range from 3% of the value of the
export for companies in developed countries, to 8%
or higher in some lower income countries.97 The
additional costs can sometime be prohibitive, and
cases of abandoning the use of preferences and
resorting to “ordinary” (that is, MFN) trade are not
rare.
Clearly, for a trader to use preferential route, the
margin of preference must cover the cost of
compliance.98 Comparison of average MFN applied
tariffs and preferential tariffs for the major
trading arrangements indicate that this margin
is not very wide (e.g. in the case of ASEAN it is
1.58 percentage points). These costs can be
approximated from the additional time a trader
must spend on filling in the certification documents
associated with preferential RoO compared with
documentation under the MFN regime. Empirical
research shows that a reduction in the cost of
border-crossing procedures by 1% might result in a
similar percentage increase in the value of exports
(Duval and Utoktham, 2010b). If the “noodle bowl”
and complex RoO account for an additional
procedural cost of 25% to export/import then,
ceteris paribus, simplifying the rules would be
associated with up to a quarter of percentage point
increase in exports. Based on the pre-crisis 2008
value of the Asia-Pacific intraregional exports, this
would amount to more than $20 billion (equivalent
to the total exports of Pakistan in 2008).
“Simplifying the RoO for Asian RTA
could increase intraregional
export by $20 billion”
So what can be done to make all the RTAs signed
so far help the region to trade faster, more cheaply
and more extensively? Figure 42 hints at the core of
the problem – the process is driven solely by
individual countries without obvious coordination
and linkages between the agreements.99 Two
factors are immediately apparent from figure 42:
(a) Individual economies create an intricate web of
different preferential trade rules (and hence
affect trade costs), while the “regional trading
blocs” are not connected at all;
(b) The Asia-Pacific region is clearly fragmented
into three distinct subregions – the Pacific,
Central Asia with the Russian Federation, and
the rest of Asia (i.e. East, South-East and
South Asia – with very little connection
between them).
96 See also the discussion in Zhang and Shen, 2011, pp. 22-23.
97 For the survey of literature with estimation of costs of
restrictive RoO see Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing, 2007.
 98 Literature shows that on average the compliance costs are
the lowest for a change in the tariff classification, somewhat
higher for regional value content restrictions and highest for
technical requirements (Carrere and de Melo, 2004).CHAPTER 8 – USING TRADE AGREEMENTS TO TRADE EASIER AND CHEAPER, WITH MORE BENEFITS FOR ALL
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then converge on the same lower level, irrespective
of the agreement. However, as there are no
effective linkages among the individual blocs, it is
not realistic to expect that these blocs would
propose such an initiative. Therefore, in order to
assist Governments whose traders may experience
difficulties in utilizing the negotiated preferences
due to a lack of linkages among the various RTAs,
the ESCAP secretariat will redouble its own efforts
in providing forums, mechanisms and best practices
to enable parties to work towards the consolidation
of rules and deeper economic and social integration
in Asia and the Pacific. One initiative that ought to
be supported especially by developing countries,
as it would benefit integration of their smaller
producers in the regional and global production
networks, is to lobby for RoO based on the “Made in
Asia”101 cumulation rules (this could be interpreted
as the multilateralization of regional benefits).
It is also obvious that the lesser advanced
developing countries are much less covered by the
web of these agreements but presumably they have
non-reciprocal preferential schemes that leave them
facing the similar problems as those with RoO
arising from RTAs.
The optimal solution would be to replace this large
number of independent rules with a consolidated
set of rationalized rules that follow the same
approach, and which set the same criteria for
conferment of origin (not, however, with the same
margins of preference because that would defeat
the purpose of RTAs). In other words, all
agreements would follow the same template for
RoO, and the negotiations would be focused on the
removal of tariffs as well as non-tariff and other
barriers to trade. The revised RoO would allow less
restrictive cumulation rules, e.g. a diagonal or full
cumulation and roll-up process, duty drawback,
outsourcing and higher de minimis levels, and more
trader-friendly methods of proving origin such as
self-certification.100 The costs of compliance would
Figure 42. Missing links in the web of Asia-Pacific regional trade agreements
Source: Based on the APTIAD noodle bowl of the Asia-Pacific preferential trade agreements.102
102 The rearrangement of the original APTIAD portrait of the noodle bowl in this new configuration was suggested by
John Moon, former staff of Transport Division of ESCAP.
100 Capacity-building programmes, greater harmonization of
customs procedures, and adequate provisions for control and
monitoring also need to be put in place in parallel.
101 “Made in Asia” refers to a branding modality of products,
the production of which involves a variety of Asian economies
and applies simple cumulative RoO. It is not related to the
existing commercial venture “Madeinasia.com Asia factory
directory”, available from www.madeinasia.com/.ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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Several other changes in the negotiation of RTAs
could be considered by the region’s economies:
(a) Time-bound MFN exemptions of preferentially
negotiated concessions (e.g. 10 years), after
which these preferences would automatically
be multilateralized;
(b) RTA commitments should at least always
match, if not improve, the signed multilateral
commitments (this could be known as the
“regionalization of multilateral level of liber-
alization”);103
(c) Financial compensation in the case of negative
impacts of a RTA on non-members.
However, if the regionalism route becomes too
difficult, and simplification of RoO turns out to be
impossible, the next best option is to pursue
deepening of MFN liberalization in the sectors of
greatest interest for the region’s economies. That
would thin the margin of preference sufficiently to
make the RTAs irrelevant for tariff liberalization
(i.e. market access) purpose.
F. ROLE OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
IN TRADE GOVERNANCE
The Asia-Pacific region comprises the most
dynamic group of trading economies in the world. It
is also one of the highest trade-dependent regions
in the world and most active in concluding RTAs.
Given those credentials, the region has the potential
to influence the international trading system in a
positive way. The region could therefore not only
drive the Doha Round to a successful conclusion
but could also steer the direction of MTS and,
indirectly, the global and regional economies.
“The Asia-Pacific region comprises
the most dynamic group of trading economies
in the world...and therefore
has the potentialto influence the international
trading system in a positive way”
RTA- and MTS-based governance of international
trade is interlinked and does not present an either/
or option. The two systems are complementary,
each with unique features and each bringing
potential benefits. The Asia-Pacific economies can
influence development in the international trading
system and improve the coexistence of RTAs and
MTS, as discussed above.
In parallel, WTO members should design ways to
improving MTS with regard to addressing the
challenges of contemporary trading as well as the
needs of developing countries. One area requiring
urgent consideration is the adoption of a more
flexible approach to future negotiations, including a
move away from the principle of single undertaking,
and the introduction of better ideas on new and
more relevant rules for sustainable development
(Hufbauer, Schott and Wong, 2010). Another area
for consideration is finding ways to facilitate the
accession of the few economies that are still outside
MTS. The existence of non-members provides
impetus to the RTA approach if they are potentially
important trading partners of others; therefore,
bringing these countries under the umbrella of MTS
would remove at least one (however small) reason
to pursue RTAs. An open discussion on the
approach to decision-making would also be timely.
Finally, selecting more specific areas for future
negotiations would allow faster progress, and thus
would return some of the earlier effectiveness of
MTS at the time when it had a narrower scope.
  103 This term is drawn from a seminar presentation of
Mr. Rudolf Adlung, Counsellor, WTO Services Department,
who described how many countries negotiate GATS minus
commitments in RTAs on services, and proposed that these
countries instead accept the level of commitments agreed on in
GATS.CHAPTER 8 – USING TRADE AGREEMENTS TO TRADE EASIER AND CHEAPER, WITH MORE BENEFITS FOR ALL
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Annex
Table VIII.1. Multi-party (regional, country-bloc and global) regional trade agreements or Customs
Union agreements with accession provisions
APTIAD ID Title Parties Type Scope Is accession Are accession Relevant
of open to all negotiations provisions
agreement countries? required?
APTA Asia-PacificTrade Bangladesh, China, PTA Regional No (open only to Yes Art 30
Agreement (previously India, Republic of Korea, ESCAP developing
known as the Bangkok Lao People's Democratic member countries)
Agreement) Republic and Sri Lanka
BIMSTEC Bay of Bengal Initiative Bangladesh, Bhutan, PTA Regional No (open only to Yes Art 14
for Multi-Sectoral India, Myanmar, Nepal, BIMST-EC
Technical and Economic Sri Lanka and Thailand members)
Cooperation Free Trade
 Area  Framework
Agreement
CISFTA Commonwealth of Armenia, Azerbaijan, FTA Regional No (open only to Yes Art 24
Independent States Belarus, Georgia, CIS member





EFTA- Free trade agreement Iceland, Liechtenstein, FTA Country - No (open only to Yes Art 10.4
KOREA between the EFTA Norway, Switzerland and Bloc EFTA member
States and the Republic Republic of Korea States)
of Korea
EFTA- Free Trade Agreement Iceland, Liechtenstein, FTA Country - Yes Yes Art 70
SINGAPORE between the EFTA Norway, Switzerland Bloc
States and Singapore and Singapore
EFTA- Agreement between the Iceland, Liechtenstein, FTA Country - No (open only to Yes Art 32
TURKEY EFTA States and Turkey Norway, Switzerland Bloc EFTA member
and Turkey States)
EurAsEC Agreement on Customs Belarus, Kazakhstan, CU Regional Yes Yes Art 63
(or EAEC) Union and Single Kyrgyzstan, Russian
Economic Area between Federation and




GSFTA Singapore – GCC (Gulf United Arab Emirates, FTA Country - No (open only to Yes Art 10.3
Cooperation Council) Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Bloc GCC member
Free Trade Agreement Oman, Qatar, Kuwait States)
and Singapore
MSG Trade Agreement Fiji, Papua New Guinea, PTA Regional No (open only to Yes Art 16
Among  the Melanesian Solomon Islands and MSG or South
Spearhead Group Vanuatu Pacific Forum
(MSG) members)
Countries
NAFTA North American Free Canada, Mexico and the FTA Regional Yes Yes Art 2204
Trade Agreement United States of AmericaASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
124
APTIAD ID Title Parties Type Scope Is accession Are accession Relevant
of open to all negotiations provisions
agreement countries? required?
PICTA Pacific Island Countries Cook Island, Fiji, Kiribati,  FTA Regional Yes Yes Art 27




SPARTECA South Pacific Regional Australia, Cook Island,  PTA Regional No (open only to No Art XIV.2
Trade and Economic Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall South Pacific






TPS-OIC Framework Agreement Bangladesh, Cameroon,  PTA Cross- No (open only to Yes Art 12.2
on Trade Preferential Egypt, Guinea, Islamic  Continental OIC member
System Among the Republic of Iran, Jordan,  Plurilateral States)
Member States of the Lebanon, Libya,
Organization of the Malaysia, Maldives,




TRANS- Trans-Pacific Strategic Brunei Darussalam, FTA Regional Yes Yes  Preamble,
PACIFIC Economic Partnership Singapore, New Zealand Art 20.6
SEP Agreement and Chile
Source: APTIAD.
Note: Agreements that allow accession to all countries are highlighted.CHAPTER 8 – USING TRADE AGREEMENTS TO TRADE EASIER AND CHEAPER, WITH MORE BENEFITS FOR ALL
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Table VIII.2. Bilateral free trade agreements with accession provisions
APTIAD ID Title Parties Type Scope Is accession Are accession Relevant
of agreement open to all negotiations  provisions
countries? required?
ANZCERTA Australia-New Zealand Australia and FTA Bilateral   Yes Yes Art 24
Closer Economic New Zealand
Relations Trade
Agreement
ARMENIA- Agreement between Armenia and FTA Bilateral  Yes Yes Art 18
MOLDOVA the Government of Moldova
Republic of Armenia
and the Government
of Republic of Moldova
on Free Trade
ARMENIA- Agreement between Armenia and FTA Bilateral Yes Yes Art 19
RUSSIAN the Government of the Russian
FEDERATION Republic of Armenia Federation
and the Government
of the Russian Federation
on Free Trade
AUSTRALIA- Australia-Chile Free Australia and Chile FTA Bilateral Yes Yes Art 23.2
CHILE Trade Agreement
AUSTRALIA- Australia-Thailand Free Australia and FTA Bilateral Yes Yes Art 1905
THAILAND Trade Agreement Thailand
AUSTRALIA- Australia-United States Australia and the FTA Bilateral Yes Yes Art 23.1
US Free Trade Agreement United States
GEORGIA- Agreement on Free Trade Georgia FTA Bilateral Yes Yes Art 19
ARMENIA between the Government and Armenia
of the Republic of Georgia
and the Government of the
Republic of Armenia
GEORGIA- Agreement on Free Trade Georgia and FTA Bilateral Yes Yes Art 17
AZERBAIJAN between the Government Azerbaijan
of Georgia and the
Government of the Republic
of Azerbaijan Free Trade
Agreement
GEORGIA- Agreement on Free Trade Georgia and the FTA Bilateral Yes Yes Art 19
RUSSIAN between the Government Russian Federation
FEDERATION of the Republic of Georgia
and the Government of the
Russian Federation
INDIA- Comprehensive Economic India and FTA Bilateral Yes Yes Art 16.4
SINGAPORE Cooperation Agreement Singapore
between the Republic of
India and the Republic of
Singapore
KORUS Korea – United States Free Republic of Korea FTA Bilateral Yes Yes Art 24.4
[pending] Trade Agreement and the
United States
KYRGYZSTAN- Free Trade Agreement Kyrgyzstan and FTA Bilateral Yes Yes Art 17
ARMENIA between the Government Armenia
of the Kyrgyz Republic and
the Government  of ArmeniaASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
126
APTIAD ID Title Parties Type Scope Is accession Are accession Relevant
of agreement open to all negotiations  provisions
countries? required?
KYRGYZSTAN- Agreement on Free Trade Kyrgyzstan and FTA Bilateral   Yes Yes Art 17
MOLDOVA between the Government Moldova
of Kyrgyz Republic and the
Government of the Republic
of Moldova
KYRGYZSTAN- Agreement of Free Trade Kyrgyzstan and FTA Bilateral   Yes Yes Art 20
RUSSIAN between the Government the Russian
FEDERATION of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan Federation
and the Government of the
Russian Federation
NEW ZEALAND- New Zealand-Hong Kong, New Zealand and FTA Bilateral   Yes Yes Art 3
HONG KONG, China Closer Economic Hong Kong, China  Chap 20
CHINA Partnership Agreement
NEW ZEALAND- Agreement between New Zealand FTA Bilateral   Yes Yes Art 79
SINGAPORE New Zealand and Singapore and Singapore
on a Closer Economic
Partnership
NEW ZEALAND- New Zealand-Thailand New Zealand FTA Bilateral   Yes Yes Art 18.5
THAILAND Closer Economic and Thailand
Partnership  Agreement
PANAMA- Panama-Singapore Free Panama and FTA Bilateral   Yes Yes Art 18.6
SINGAPORE Trade Agreement Singapore
PATCRA Agreement on Trade and Australia and FTA Bilateral   Yes Yes Art 23
Commercial Relations Papua New
between the Government Guinea
of Australia  and the
Government of  Papua
New Guinea
SINGAPORE- Singapore-Australia Free Singapore and FTA Bilateral   Yes Yes Art 4
AUSTRALIA Trade Agreement Australia Chap 17
SINGAPORE- Singapore-Peru Free Singapore and FTA Bilateral   Yes Yes Art 19.6
PERU Trade Agreement Peru
UNITED United States-Singapore United States and FTA Bilateral   Yes Yes   Preamble,
STATES- Free Trade Agreement Singapore Art 21.6
SINGAPORE
Source: APTIAD.
Note: Non-CIS members' agreements are highlighted.CHAPTER 8 – USING TRADE AGREEMENTS TO TRADE EASIER AND CHEAPER, WITH MORE BENEFITS FOR ALL
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Singapore ranks top in almost all the lists
considering efficiency in trading. The Singapore
Customs authority maintains a webpage on RoO
where traders can find the necessary information on
RoO to facilitate their use of preferences available
through various trade agreements.  The following
categories of RoO are listed:
(a) GSP (offered by Canada and the Russian
Federation);
(b) Commonwealth Preferences (offered by
Mauritius and Seychelles for Singapore
exports);
(c) GSTP (reciprocal trading arrangement
among 44 developing countries);
(d) Free trade agreements (16 agreements listed
with the links to the tables104 that provide
comparisons of their RoO.
Annex note VIII.1
Rules of origin: The case of Singapore
Inspection of the comparator tables quickly provides
examples of differences in treatment of the same
product (6 digits HS code) with different partners
(which is expected) but also different with the same
partner (e.g. Singapore has doubled or tripled trade
agreements with Australia, New Zealand, China,
India, Japan, Republic of Korea; as member of
ASEAN and as an independent country).
The following table shows a comparison only for
one product and only for the proof of origin. Other
regulations (e.g. use of clauses on de minimis
length of keeping documents, etc.) mainly differ
from one agreement to the next.
104 Tables available from www.customs.gov.sg/leftNav/trad/
Rules+of+Origin.htm.ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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Qualifying criterion Are there Waiver of
Agreement to confer origin operations that do De minimis certificate of origin
not confer origin?
Australia-Singapore Not mentioned No No
FTA
China-Singapore Yes-Article 17 of Yes Yes-value not
FTA Chapter 4 on RoO exceeding $600
India-Singapore Production from Yes-Article 3.6 of No No
Comprehensive materials other than Chapter 3 RoO
Economic those of subheading
Cooperation 850720, and provided
Agreement there is a local value
added content of at
least 40% based on
direct method or not
more than 60% based
on indirect method
Japan-Singapore Yes-Article 26 of Yes Yes-value not
new Age Economic Chapter 3 on RoO exceeding ¥200 000
Partnership
Agreement
Korea-Singapore A change to Yes-Article 4.16 of Yes Yes-value not
FTA subheading 8 507.10 Chapter 4 on RoO exceeding $1 000
through  8 507.40 from
any other heading.
Peru-Singapore A change to Yes-Article 4.3 of Yes Yes-value not
FTA subheading 8 507.20 Chapter 4 on RoO exceeding $1 500
from any other heading,
provided that there is
a qualifying value content
of not less than 45%
AANZFTA Regional value Yes-Article 7 of Yes Yes-value not
content 40% Chapter 3 on RoO exceeding $200
Comparison of rules of origin for 850720 – other lead-acid
accumulators across agreementsCHAPTER 8 – USING TRADE AGREEMENTS TO TRADE EASIER AND CHEAPER, WITH MORE BENEFITS FOR ALL
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Qualifying criterion Are there Waiver of
Agreement to confer origin operations that do De minimis certificate of origin
not confer origin?
ASEAN-China RVC 40%; or if the total Yes-Rule 7 of No Yes-value not
FTA value of the materials, Annex 3 (RoO) exceeding $200
part or produce
originating from outside
of the territory of a Party
(i.e. non-ACFTA) does
not exceed 60% of the
FOB value of the product
so produced or obtained
provided that the final
process of the
manufacture is performed
within the territory of
the Party.
ASEAN-Korea Regional value Yes-Rule 8 of Yes Yes-value not
FTA content 40% Annex 3 (RoO) exceeding  $200
ASEAN-Japan RVC 40% + the final Yes-Article 30 of Yes Yes-value not
FTA process of production Chapter 3 on RoO exceeding $200
has been performed
in the Party
Ordinary (non- Manufactured in Yes-Annex A Yes No
preferential) RoO Singapore with (Updates to the
minimum 25% of  origin criterion for
local content based  the issuance of
on the ex-factory non-preferential
price of the finished  (ordinary) certificate
product; or attained of origin)
a change of tariff
classification at 6 digit
level i.e. change in
tariff sub-headingASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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A. Composition of geographical groupings
The economies that are regional members and associate members of the Economic and Social Commission
for Asia and the Pacific are included. The composition of the subregional geographical groupings is as
follows:
Subregion Economy
East and North-East Asia 1. China*
2. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea




7. Republic of Korea*
South-East Asia 8. Brunei Darussalam*
9. Cambodia*
10. Indonesia*


















North and Central Asia 29. Armenia*
30. Azerbaijan
31. Georgia*





















51. Northern Mariana Islands
52. Palau







Australia, Japan and New Zealand form the developed economies group, and the remaining economies in the
above list form the developing economies group.
European Union includes its current 27 members for all years, unless otherwise indicated.
B. Data sources
Historical data (2000-2010) on merchandise trade data (exports and imports) and commercial services trade
were obtained from the WTO International Trade Statistics database (http://stat.wto.org/Home/
WSDBHome.aspx?Language=E) based on SITC Rev. 3 classification of trade statistics. Data used in the
preparation of the indicators were downloaded on 24 March 2011 (for merchandise trade) and 24 May 2011
(for services trade).
Sectoral composition of merchandise trade (2007-2009) is based on data from United Nations Comtrade
database (http://comtrade.un.org/) downloaded on 29 April 2011.PART III – TRADE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
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Historical data on country specific service import and export (tables 17-23) were downloaded on 18 May 2011
from the United Nations Service Trade database (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/ServiceTrade).
Historical data (2000-2009) on services value added and trade in services as percentage of GDP
(tables 15-16) were obtained from the World Development Indicators online database (http://data.
worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators), World Bank.
Historical GDP data (1998-2009, table 8) were obtained from the UNSD National Accounts Main Aggregates
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/Introduction.asp) and downloaded on 7 January 2011.
Data on tariff protection (table 11) were obtained from the WTO Tariff Profiles 2010 (http://www.wto.org/
english/res_e/booksp_e/tariff_profiles10_e.pdf) and Trade Profiles 2010 (http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/
booksp_e/anrep_e/trade_profiles10_e.pdf).
Historical data on inward and outward FDI flows and stocks were obtained from the UNCTAD World
Investment Report 2009 (http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2009_en.pdf).
All trade facilitation indicators were calculated using data from the Doing Business Reports 2006 and 2010,
downloaded from the World Bank Doing Business Database (DBD) at http://www.doingbusiness.org.
Forecast rates of export and import in real terms (table 24.1 and 24.2) were obtained from IMF, World
Economic Outlook Database (April 2011) (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/).
Data on preferential trade agreements (table 25) were obtained from the Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment
Agreements Database (APTIAD) (http://www.unescap.org/tid/aptiad/AllAgreementsGrid.aspx).
C. Methodology
“Intraregional” is defined at the level of Asia and the Pacific comprising only economies which are regional
members and associate members of ESCAP.
Indicator values for the subregions were aggregated from the absolute values of trade for the subregion’s
members, unless otherwise indicated.
Formulae for the calculation of indicators are available from the APTIAD website (http://www.unescap.org/tid/
aptiad/).
Treatment of missing data. While the Comtrade database is the most comprehensive international database
on merchandise trade, covering approximately 98% of worldwide trade, a number of countries in the region
do not report their trade data in it. For countries without directly reported data, mirror data have been used:
volume and destination of exports were derived from the imports declaration of all other countries, and
similarly, missing imports data for non-reporting countries were derived from exports data from all other
countries. Mirror data were used for the following economies: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Lao
People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, American Samoa, Guam, Marshall
Islands, Nauru, Niue, Northern Mariana Islands and Palau.
Sometimes Comtrade does not have data for all years of the period covered. In such cases, missing country
values have been imputed in order to compute the regional aggregate values. However, no such imputed
values are published at the country level. The following methodology has been applied for imputation:  if
values are available for both an earlier and a later year than the year for which the aggregate is calculated,
the missing value has been imputed using linear interpolation. A missing country value for a year precedingASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
138
the earliest year for which a value is available has been imputed using the value from the earliest year.
Similarly, a missing country value for a year following the latest year for which a value is available has been
imputed by using the value of the latest year. For countries with only one data point for the whole period, this
value has been used for all missing years. No information is used from other countries for imputing the
missing values.
For Tables 2.1 and 2.2 Commercial services exports and imports, no imputation or mirror technique was used
to calculate missing country values. The regional aggregate values therefore are the sums of existing country
values of exports or import.
A blank cell in the table indicates that data are not available or are not separately reported.
A minus sign (-) indicates deficit or decrease, except as indicated.
A full stop (.) is used to indicate decimals.
A slash (/) between years indicates a crop year or financial year, for example, 1990/91.
Use of a hyphen (-) between years, for example, 1990-1991, signifies the full period involved, including the
beginning and end years.
For services trade of the six economies (Australia; Hong Kong, China; Japan, Republic of Korea; Russian
Federation and Singapore) the partner/sectoral percentage are calculated as a proportion of a particular
partner/service sector trade value with the world.
D. Indicator definitions
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 Merchandise exports and imports
The economy’s exports and imports of merchandise to the world expressed as an annual percentage
change and value in 2010 (millions of current United States dollars).
The annual percentage changes reflect the growth of exports and imports from the economy or
subregion to and from the rest of the world.
Table 2.1 Intraregional export growth
Exports from the economy to the Asia-Pacific region expressed as annual percentage change and
value in 2010 (millions of current United States dollars).
The annual percentage changes reflect the growth of intraregional exports.
Table 2.2 Intraregional import growth
Imports to the economy from the Asia-Pacific region expressed as an annual percentage change and
value in 2010 (millions of current United States dollars).
The annual percentage changes reflect the growth of intraregional imports.
Table 2.3 Intraregional trade growth
The economy’s trade (exports plus imports) with the Asia-Pacific region expressed as an annual
percentage change and value in 2010 (millions of current United States dollars).
The annual percentage changes reflect the growth of intraregional trade.PART III – TRADE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
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Table 3.1 Intraregional export share
The proportion of merchandise exports destined to the Asia-Pacific region in the total merchandise
exports (percentage).
The values of the index can range from 0 to 100%.
Table 3.2 Intraregional import share
The proportion of merchandise imports sourced from the Asia-Pacific region in total merchandise
imports (percentage).
The values of the index can range from 0 to 100%.
Table 3.3 Intraregional trade share
The proportion of international trade done with the rest of the Asia-Pacific region in the economy’s
total international trade (percentage).
The values of the index can range from 0 to 100%.
Table 4.1 Relative dependence on exports to developed markets
The ratio of merchandise exports directed to three developed markets (European Union, Japan and
the United States) to the merchandise exports directed to three regional emerging markets (ASEAN,
China and India).
If the indicator value is 1, an economy shares its exports equally between the selected developed
and Asian developing markets. If the value is >1, its exports is more oriented to selected developed
markets. Decreasing value of the indicator over time indicates reduced reliance on developed
markets. The values can range from 0 to +∞.
Table 4.2 Relative dependence on imports from developed markets
The ratio of merchandise imports sourced from three developed markets (European Union, Japan
and the United States) to the national imports sourced from three regional emerging markets
(ASEAN, China and India).
If the indicator value is 1, the economy shares its imports equally between the selected developed
and Asian developing markets. If the value is >1, its imports is more sourced from the selected
developed markets. Decreasing value over time indicates reduced reliance on developed markets.
The values can range from 0 to +∞.
Table 4.3 Relative dependence on trade with developed markets
The ratio of merchandise trade with three developed markets (European Union, Japan and the
United States) to the national trade with three regional emerging markets (ASEAN, China and India).
If the indicator value is 1, the economy shares its trade equally between the selected developed and
Asian developing markets. If the value is >1, its trade with developed markets is larger than trade with
Asian developing markets. Decreasing value of the indicator over time indicates reduced reliance on
developed markets. The values can range from 0 to +∞.ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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Table 5 Normalized trade balance
Total exports less total imports (trade balance) as a fraction of total exports plus total imports (total
trade).
The indicator allows unbiased comparisons across time and across economies of different sizes. The
indicator values can range from -1 to +1; zero value indicates that exports equal imports.
Table 6 Trade balance as a share of GDP
The ratio of trade balance (total exports minus total imports) to GDP, expressed in percentage terms.
If trade is balanced (export value equals import value), the value of this indicator is zero. When export
value is larger than import value, trade balance is positive and theoretically can be more than 100%
of GDP (in countries that are very trade dependent), but in most cases trade balance as a share of
GDP will be below 100%. This applies also in case when trade balance is negative (that is, when
export value is smaller than import value).
Table 7.1 Sectoral composition of exports
The share of exports of individual sector defined at the digit SITC Rev. 3 level in total exports
(percentage, 2007-2009 period average)
The indicator values range from 0 to 100%.
Table 7.2 Sectoral composition of imports
The share of imports of individual sector defined at the digit SITC Rev. 3 level in total imports
(percentage, 2007-2009 period average).
The indicator values range from 0 to 100%.
Table 8 Import penetration
The ratio of total imports to domestic demand (percentage). Domestic demand is defined as GDP
less total exports and plus total imports.
The indicator shows how much of domestic demand of a reporter country is satisfied by imports.
The indicator values range from 0 (no imports) to 100% (all domestic demand is satisfied by imports).
The index can exceed 100 if imported and then re-exported merchandise is not deducted.
Table 9.1 Forecast of export growth (in real terms)
Percentage change of volume of exports refers to the aggregate change in the quantities of total
exports whose characteristics are unchanged. The goods and services and their prices are held
constant, therefore changes are due to changes in quantities only. Source: World Economic Outlook
Database, IMF, April 2011.
Table 9.2 Forecast of import growth (in real terms)
Percentage change of volume of imports refers to the aggregate change in the quantities of total
exports whose characteristics are unchanged. The goods and services and their prices are held
constant, therefore changes are due to changes in quantities only. Sources: World Economic Outlook
Database, IMF, April 2011.PART III – TRADE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
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Table 10.1 Leading exporters and importers from the Asia-Pacific region in 2009 – merchandise
Ranks for the economies are extracted from the global ranking (WTO, International Trade Statistics
2010) based on their share of the world merchandise exports and imports in 2009.
Table 10.2 Leading exporters and importers from the Asia-Pacific region in 2009 – commercial services
Ranks for the economies are extracted from the global ranking (WTO, International Trade Statistics
2010) based on their share of the world commercial services exports and imports in 2009.
Tables 11.1 and 11.2 Commercial services exports and imports
The economy’s exports and imports of commercial services to the world expressed as an annual
percentage change and value in 2010 (millions of current United States dollars).
The annual percentage changes reflect the growth of exports and imports from the economy of
subregion to and from the rest of the world.
Table 12 Services, value added (percentage of GDP)
The industrial origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial
Classification (ISIC), revision 3.
Table 13 Trade in services (percentage of GDP)
Trade in services (as the sum of service exports and imports) divided by the value of GDP.
Table 14.1 Services export as a percentage of total export
The economy’s exports of commercial services to the world expressed as a proportion of total export
(merchandise plus service exports).
Table 14.2 Services import as a percentage of total import
The economy’s imports of commercial services to the world expressed as a proportion of total imports
(merchandise plus service imports).
Tables 15-20 Individual country’s service import and export, 2000 and 2008 or 2009 (percentage)
Service codes description:







262 Computer and information services
266 Royalties and licence fees
268 Other business services
287 Personal, cultural, and recreational services
291 Government services, n.i.e.ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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Table 21 Inward and outward FDI flows
Foreign direct investment inflows comprise capital provided (either directly or through other related
enterprises) by a foreign direct investor to an FDI enterprise in the reporting economy. FDI outflows
are capital received by a foreign direct investor from entities resident in the reporting economy.
Ownership or control of less than 10% of a business is not considered to be foreign direct investment.
FDI includes (1) equity capital which is the foreign direct investorís purchase of shares of an
enterprise in a country other than that of its residence; (2) reinvested earnings comprise the direct
investorís share (in proportion to direct equity participation) of earnings not distributed as dividends
by affiliates or earnings not remitted to the direct investor. Such retained profits by affiliates are
reinvested; and (3) intra-company loans or intra-company debt transactions refer to short- or long-
term borrowing and lending of funds between direct investors (parent enterprises) and affiliate
enterprises.
Table 22 Inward and outward FDI stocks
Inward FDI stock is the value of the share of capital and reserves (including retained profits)
attributable to the parent enterprise, plus the net indebtedness of affiliates to the parent enterprise,
when the parent enterprise is resident in a different economy. Outward FDI stock refers to the value
of capital and reserves in another economy attributable to a parent enterprise resident in the
economy.
Table 23 Trade facilitation indicators
Time for completing trade procedures is calculated as the average of time to export and time to
import (in days) found in the DBD. For exporting goods, procedures range from packing the goods at
the warehouse to their departure from the port of exit. For importing goods, procedures range from
the vessel’s arrival at the port of entry to the cargoís delivery at the warehouse.
Cost of completing trade procedures is similarly calculated as the average of the cost to export and
cost to import of the DBD, but adjusted for inflation using United States GDP Deflator from the World
Bank World Development Indicator database – to allow for comparison over time. These costs refer
to those associated with completing the above mentioned procedures for import or export for
a standardized cargo of goods by ocean transport.
Import-export facilitation bias is calculated as the ratio of time to import to time to export (time basis)
or as the ratio of cost to import to cost to export (cost basis). These ratios provide an indication of
whether import or export procedures are more cumbersome. A ratio above one suggests that import
procedures are more cumbersome than export procedures.
Table 24 Tariff protection in 2009
According to the technical notes of the WTO Trade Profiles 2009, import duties collected as
percentages of total imports (goods and commercial services) are estimated in general on the basis
of data for the three latest years available.
For MFN bound tariffs, the average import duties refer to the simple average of ad valorem and
calculable ad valorem equivalent of final bound HS 6-digit duties. For MFN applied tariffs, they refer
to the simple average of ad valorem and calculable ad valorem equivalent of MFN applied HS 6-digit
duties.
According to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, agricultural goods refer to HS chapters 1 to 24
(excluding fish and fish products) and a number of manufactured agricultural products. This definitionPART III – TRADE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
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does not correspond to the definition of agricultural products that is normally used for a breakdown of
merchandise trade by main commodity group (e.g. agricultural products, fuels and mining, and
manufactures).
This indicator shows how much tariff protection is applied by an economy, on average. The indicator
values range from 0 to prohibitive level of protection (where imports cease to exist).
Table 25 Preferential trade agreements – signed, under implementation and trade coverage
This table provides number of preferential trade agreements the economies have signed and put into
force per year since 1976. The export and import coverage by preferential trade agreements for
a specific country is calculated as a share of export (import) done with the partners in the trade
agreements in the total export (import) of that country.ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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East and North-East Asia -8.3 9.4 20.4 25.9 15.1 17.1 17.3 13.1      -17.6        29.9 3 221 838
China 6.8 22.4 34.6 35.4 28.4 27.2 26.0 17.2 -16.0 31.3 1 577 824
DPR Korea 16.7 22.0 5.8 19.9 4.7 9.5 15.0 22.3 -3.2 50.4 3 000
Hong Kong, China -5.7 5.7 13.3 16.1 10.0 10.5 8.3 6.0 -11.0 21.7 401 022
Japan -15.8 3.3 13.2 19.9 5.2 8.7 10.5 9.4 -25.7 32.6 769 839
Macao, China -9.4 2.4 9.6 9.0 -11.9 3.3 -0.6 -21.4 -51.9 -9.5 870
Mongolia -2.8 0.6 17.5 41.2 22.5 44.9 22.4 34.4 -25.1 52.4 2 899
Republic of Korea -12.7 8.0 19.3 31.0 12.0 14.4 14.1 13.6 -13.9 28.3 466 384
South-East Asia -10.3 5.1 16.5 19.8 15.3 17.3 12.4 14.4 -17.8 29.2 1 052 136
Brunei Darussalam -6.7 1.7 19.4 14.4 23.6 22.2 0.4 34.3 -30.0 27.0 9 150
Cambodia 8.0 28.2 10.1 32.1 10.5 19.4 10.7 15.2 -8.6 16.9 5 030
Indonesia -12.3 3.1 8.4 10.4 22.9 19.0 14.0 18.3 -14.3 32.2 158 200
Lao PDR -3.2 -5.9 11.6 8.3 52.2 59.5 4.6 18.3 -7.9 54.2 1 550
Malaysia -10.4 6.9 11.3 20.8 11.4 14.0 9.7 13.2 -21.1 26.3 198 801
Myanmar 44.7 27.9 -18.5 -4.1 60.2 20.3 38.1 9.5 -3.3 28.0 8 590
Philippines -17.9 7.8 2.9 9.5 4.0 14.9 6.4 -2.8 -21.7 33.8 51 432
Singapore -11.6 2.8 27.7 24.2 15.6 18.4 10.1 13.0 -20.2 30.4 351 867
Thailand -5.9 4.8 17.9 19.8 15.3 16.9 18.6 15.5 -14.3 28.1 195 319
Timor-Leste -8.3 10.2 4.4 -0.9 55.4 -34.7 -41.1 5
Viet Nam 3.8 11.2 20.6 31.4 22.5 22.8 21.9 29.1 -8.9 26.4 72 192
South and South-West Asia 0.5 8.1 25.6 27.4 24.9 22.5 20.1 26.0 -20.4 24.4 482 271
Afghanistan -50.5 47.1 44.0 111.8 25.9 6.3 21.8 8.7 -25.3 -0.9 400
Bangladesh -4.8 1.1 13.7 18.8 11.9 26.9 5.5 23.4 -1.9 27.3 19 195
Bhutan 2.9 6.3 17.9 37.7 41.1 60.5 62.8 -22.7 -4.9 8.9 540
India 2.3 13.6 19.7 30.0 30.0 22.3 23.3 29.7 -15.4 31.1 216 162
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) -10.6 -4.9 38.1 23.5 34.9 36.9 15.2 28.1 -30.6 28.0 100 900
Maldives 1.2 20.0 15.2 19.1 -10.7 39.4 1.2 45.0 -48.9 12.4 190
Nepal -8.3 -22.9 16.5 16.6 11.8 -2.9 3.6 8.1 -12.4 15.5 950
Pakistan 2.3 7.3 20.3 12.1 20.0 5.5 5.4 13.9 -13.8 22.8 21 515
Sri Lanka -11.3 -2.4 9.1 12.3 10.2 8.5 12.4 9.2 -13.1 16.0 8 520
Turkey 12.8 15.1 31.0 33.7 16.3 16.4 25.4 23.1 -22.6 11.5 113 899
 North and Central Asia -2.7 5.5 27.0 35.6 34.1 27.1 19.8 35.0 -35.3 31.2 509 868
Armenia 16.7 47.3 35.7 5.4 34.7 1.2 17.0 -8.3 -32.8 42.4 1 011
Azerbaijan 32.6 -6.3 19.6 39.5 111.6 70.1 63.4 43.8 -31.0 30.4 27 500
Georgia -1.5 8.8 33.2 40.3 33.7 8.2 31.6 21.4 -24.2 39.4 1 580
Kazakhstan -2.0 11.9 33.7 55.4 38.6 37.3 24.8 49.0 -39.3 37.1 59 217
Kyrgyzstan -5.7 2.0 19.8 23.6 -6.5 18.2 42.9 42.6 -10.9 3.3 1 489
Russian Federation -3.5 5.3 26.7 34.8 33.1 24.5 16.8 33.1 -35.7 31.9 400 018
Tajikistan -17.2 13.5 8.0 14.8 -0.6 53.9 4.9 -4.0 -28.3 18.3 1 195
Turkmenistan 7.7 5.6 27.4 6.6 27.8 44.7 24.8 33.7 -49.8 0.0 6 000
Uzbekistan -3.9 -7.2 26.9 34.2 11.0 18.3 42.9 28.3 4.2 10.5 11 857
Pacific island economies -0.9 2.6 10.3 22.4 19.0 14.2 15.4 28.2 -18.0 35.3 252 170
American Samoa -8.2 22.2 18.4 -3.0 -16.1 17.3 2.6 26.7 -17.5 2.1 480
Australia -0.8 2.6 8.2 23.0 22.6 16.3 14.5 32.5 -17.6 37.6 212 423
Cook Islands -25.2 -24.9 68.9 -16.0 -27.6 -33.2 48.7 -21.0 -32.5 80.4 5
Fiji -8.2 -4.1 29.7 3.7 1.2 -1.0 8.7 22.1 -31.8 14.5 720
French Polynesia -11.8 -6.2 -14.8 27.6 9.1 8.4 -16.5 38.9 -38.8 4.8 175
Guam -17.8 -18.2 -13.1 22.2 -1.8 2.1 72.5 14.8 -47.6 -18.2 45
Kiribati 25.8 -23.8 -15.6 -14.8 74.5 46.3 55.0 53.4 33.3 -25.0 15
Marshall Islands 39.9 11.7 6.6 30.1 28.2 -14.8 1.9 -9.1 0.0 0.0 20
Micronesia (F.S.) 22.6 1.4 5.2 -38.1 5.7 -4.9 22.2 27.0 -1.1 0.0 27
Nauru -51.7 -35.7 77.8 -18.8 -76.9 33.3 275.0 633.3 -77.3 100.0
New Caledonia -26.7 11.1 59.6 31.7 5.8 23.7 55.7 -38.2 -20.9 23.7 1 272
New Zealand 3.5 4.8 14.9 23.1 6.8 3.1 20.2 13.5 -18.5 25.8 31 372
Niue -8.1 -68.7 130.4 65.1 13.7 479.9 144.7 -99.3 5.3 0.0 0
Northern Mariana Islands -7.6 -13.9 1.6 -1.4 -16.3 -26.3 -35.4 -65.0 -92.2 11.1 10
Palau 44.0 22.8 -58.7 -30.1 128.1 1.3 -19.1 -9.1 -40.0 0.0 6
Papua New Guinea -13.9 -9.1 34.5 15.6 28.3 27.3 12.4 22.0 -23.1 18.3 5 200
Samoa -3.6 14.0 21.9 -1.9 2.0 -25.3 49.6 -26.1 -36.1 29.4 60
Solomon Islands -31.9 23.4 27.6 31.4 6.4 17.5 35.5 28.0 -22.4 35.5 221
Tonga -25.3 116.4 20.6 -14.7 -33.3 -4.4 -11.1 11.0 -16.9 2.2 8
Tuvalu 60.0 756.3 -30.7 41.1 -53.0 -19.0 80.4 117.4 50.0 0.0 0
Vanuatu -23.1 0.0 35.0 38.1 1.3 29.2 2.2 13.8 1.4 4.3 60
Developing economies -4.9 9.5 22.6 26.9 20.7 20.8 18.1 18.2 -19.0 28.8 4 504 649
Developed economies -13.6 3.2 12.6 20.4 7.5 9.7 11.4 13.2 -23.9 33.4 1 013 634
All economies -7.5 7.8 19.9 25.3 17.5 18.3 16.7 17.2 -19.9 29.6 5 518 283
Table 1.1. Merchandise exports to the world
Annual percentage change Value ($ million)
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East and North-East Asia -4.4 6.1 21.6 25.3 14.8 16.0 14.4 18.1 -18.0 32.3 2 968 595
China 8.2 21.2 39.8 36.0 17.6 19.9 20.8 18.5 -11.2 38.7 1 395 099
DPR Korea 9.5 2.5 8.2 11.2 19.3 6.0 6.1 17.2 -13.5 38.9 4 300
Hong Kong, China -5.6 3.0 12.2 17.0 10.0 11.9 10.2 6.2 -10.4 25.5 442 035
Japan -8.0 -3.4 13.6 18.7 13.5 12.3 7.5 22.5 -27.6 25.5 692 621
Macao, China 7.6 6.6 7.4 26.7 10.3 16.0 15.5 -2.7 -19.2 27.3 6 050
Mongolia 3.7 8.3 16.0 27.5 16.0 25.4 42.5 70.8 -41.1 53.8 3 278
Republic of Korea -12.1 7.8 17.6 25.5 16.4 18.4 15.3 22.0 -25.8 31.6 425 212
South-East Asia -8.8 5.7 12.3 24.8 17.3 14.1 12.7 21.1 -23.0 31.4 950 296
Brunei Darussalam 4.7 34.3 -14.7 7.2 4.9 12.4 25.3 22.5 -4.6 36.9 3 360
Cambodia 8.0 10.7 10.4 24.7 23.0 21.5 14.0 19.7 -9.7 27.6 7 500
Indonesia -13.9 2.1 10.1 30.1 37.6 6.4 15.5 36.8 -29.1 46.4 131 690
Lao PDR -4.6 -12.4 3.4 54.2 23.7 20.1 0.7 31.7 0.6 23.8 1 750
Malaysia -9.9 8.1 4.3 26.4 8.9 14.4 12.1 6.7 -21.1 33.0 164 733
Myanmar 19.8 -18.4 -10.9 5.0 -12.3 33.1 29.2 29.5 0.6 7.7 4 650
Philippines -5.7 17.7 3.6 8.3 7.3 9.3 7.2 4.2 -24.1 27.0 58 250
Singapore -13.8 0.4 17.0 27.4 15.2 19.3 10.2 21.5 -23.1 26.4 310 791
Thailand 0.1 4.3 17.3 24.5 25.2 9.0 8.7 28.0 -25.4 36.5 182 400
Timor-Leste 12.4 -25.3 -7.6 81.2 47.1 9.9 25.4 370
Viet Nam 3.7 21.8 27.9 26.6 15.0 22.5 39.2 28.8 -13.3 21.2 84 801
South and South-West Asia -8.5 15.7 26.6 35.3 29.8 19.1 22.1 30.1 -22.1 26.9 661 602
Afghanistan 44.2 44.6 -14.3 3.6 13.5 4.5 9.2 7.1 10.5 25.9 4 200
Bangladesh 1.5 -4.7 21.4 15.4 15.4 15.4 16.0 28.3 -8.5 27.3 27 794
Bhutan 9.0 2.9 26.7 65.1 -6.0 8.6 25.3 3.3 -2.6 43.6 760
India -2.2 12.2 28.4 37.5 43.2 24.9 28.6 40.0 -19.9 25.5 322 702
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 20.2 23.4 20.3 28.9 25.2 1.8 10.2 27.7 -12.1 24.2 62 670
Maldives 1.0 -0.3 20.2 36.3 16.1 24.4 18.3 26.6 -30.3 14.8 1 110
Nepal -6.4 -3.7 23.6 10.5 17.8 9.1 25.3 15.0 22.1 25.4 5 500
Pakistan -6.2 10.2 16.1 37.7 41.3 17.6 9.3 29.9 -25.2 19.4 37 810
Sri Lanka -16.8 2.2 9.3 19.5 10.8 16.1 10.2 23.5 -26.8 32.9 13 560
Turkey -24.0 24.5 34.5 40.7 19.7 19.5 21.8 18.8 -30.2 31.6 185 497
North and Central Asia 19.4 10.6 25.3 30.6 27.6 30.5 36.3 29.6 -30.9 22.7 313 949
Armenia -0.9 13.0 29.6 5.6 33.4 21.6 49.1 35.4 -25.0 13.9 3 783
Azerbaijan 22.1 16.4 57.7 33.9 23.7 21.1 14.7 25.3 -14.0 4.4 6 800
Georgia 6.2 5.7 43.3 61.7 34.9 47.7 41.8 20.8 -30.7 16.7 5 097
Kazakhstan 27.9 2.1 27.7 52.0 35.8 36.4 38.3 15.7 -25.0 4.8 29 760
Kyrgyzstan -15.7 25.6 22.2 31.2 17.1 55.9 40.4 68.8 -25.3 6.2 3 228
Russian Federation 20.4 13.4 24.8 28.0 28.8 31.0 36.0 30.6 -34.3 29.5 248 397
Tajikistan 1.9 4.8 22.2 35.2 11.6 29.5 42.5 33.3 -21.5 12.9 2 900
Turkmenistan 26.0 -5.8 18.5 32.2 -11.2 -13.1 41.4 54.7 21.4 -17.6 5 600
Uzbekistan 4.3 -13.8 9.8 27.4 8.1 19.5 44.7 46.3 -2.7 -7.1 8 384
Pacific island economies -8.9 13.2 22.9 22.2 13.9 9.6 18.1 19.3 -18.5 20.8 245 509
American Samoa 1.9 -3.2 25.0 -3.2 -13.9 11.3 12.3 4.6 -11.8 -8.3 550
Australia -10.7 13.8 22.6 22.8 14.5 11.2 18.7 21.1 -17.4 21.9 201 643
Cook Islands -7.5 0.9 49.9 7.2 6.4 23.3 7.1 40.8 23.7 45.0 270
Fiji 6.7 1.7 33.7 20.0 11.1 12.3 -0.2 25.7 -36.5 5.1 1 510
French Polynesia 8.9 22.2 22.7 -5.4 14.9 -3.9 12.5 17.4 -20.8 0.5 1 740
Guam 2.4 2.1 33.4 15.8 30.9 23.6 -9.1 -10.0 -5.6 11.8
Kiribati 2.0 22.0 3.6 15.2 24.7 -14.4 10.6 -0.2 -2.8 46.9 100
Marshall Islands 2.3 20.6 11.4 11.4 12.1 -3.2 4.4 5.3 -15.0 41.2 120
Micronesia (F.S.) 6.6 -8.4 13.1 12.5 -1.9 5.0 3.5 9.7 -0.1 0.0 155
Nauru -7.7 16.7 -14.3 -25.0 38.9 28.0 37.5 100.0 17.0 -2.9
New Caledonia 0.8 8.3 52.9 6.2 8.4 19.4 32.7 15.1 -20.4 28.7 3 313
New Zealand -4.3 13.1 23.3 25.0 13.0 0.8 16.9 11.3 -25.6 19.8 30 628
Niue -58.5 114.6 19.3 269.9 27.2 -63.9 87.0 14.3 -35.2 0.0 5
Northern Mariana Islands -8.7 16.6 2.2 0.6 -11.0 -17.3 -38.7 -46.7 -56.3 35.7
Palau -19.3 -3.2 -8.8 21.6 -2.0 9.6 -4.6 9.1 8.3 -7.7 120
Papua New Guinea -7.0 6.2 20.2 22.9 2.9 30.7 32.3 19.1 -10.1 -3.4 3 090
Samoa 28.3 -2.7 13.7 39.5 13.7 15.3 -3.5 8.4 -19.9 34.4 310
Solomon Islands -2.2 -25.6 40.1 29.4 52.4 17.2 32.4 14.6 -17.9 11.1 300
Tonga 3.9 22.3 5.1 12.0 15.2 -3.6 22.6 17.5 -13.6 21.0 175
Tuvalu -30.0 217.7 -29.8 46.1 13.3 -0.8 22.0 68.9 -47.0 14.3 16
Vanuatu 3.4 -0.3 17.1 21.9 16.6 45.7 5.6 36.7 -6.2 8.8 320
Developing economies -4.0 10.2 21.9 28.3 18.6 17.8 18.2 20.8 -19.2 31.5 4 215 060
Developed economies -8.3 -0.3 15.4 19.7 13.7 11.6 9.9 21.8 -25.5 24.5 924 891
All economies -5.2 7.4 20.3 26.2 17.5 16.4 16.5 21.0 -20.5 30.2 5 139 951
Table 1.2. Merchandise imports from the world
Annual percentage change Value ($ million)
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East and North-East Asia -5.6 13.7 25.8 26.7 14.6 15.8 18.9 14.0 -15.1
China 6.5 20.7 30.7 32.8 24.5 23.7 26.4 15.7 -15.4
DPR Korea
Hong Kong, China -1.6 10.8 19.3 20.1 10.7 12.7 12.0 7.2 -9.1
Japan -13.7 10.6 22.9 23.6 5.8 8.0 14.5 15.1 -21.5 37.4 415 445
Macao, China -2.7 18.0 5.7 14.5 1.0 7.0 10.8 -9.6 -20.0 -27.6 426
Mongolia -9.0 4.0 32.2 16.9 31.4 75.7 34.8
Republic of Korea -12.5 10.8 31.4 28.7 14.7 14.6 15.1 16.3 -10.0
South-East Asia -6.8 6.5 15.2 23.1 15.5 19.2 12.8 16.6 -17.9
Brunei Darussalam 61.4 1.0 16.7 23.0 51.7
Cambodia -17.6 78.9 -14.4 59.5 61.5
Indonesia -10.4 2.8 11.2 18.1 24.6 18.3 14.9 20.7 -15.0 37.3 109 413
Lao PDR
Malaysia -10.0 8.6 13.5 22.1 12.8 12.2 13.7 19.4 -18.8
Myanmar
Philippines -12.4 18.5 19.1 15.1 6.5 12.0 11.7 -3.2 -27.2
Singapore -6.8 4.1 13.3 25.9 18.0 20.8 12.2 14.2 -19.9
Thailand -4.9 8.7 24.4 22.8 18.0 17.4 20.4 16.0 -12.0 31.6 122 816
Timor-Leste -65.3
Viet Nam -4.1 3.6 16.5 34.1 27.7 17.3 18.6 32.4 -15.3
South and South-West Asia 5.6 12.6 31.3 23.7 41.0 12.2 -9.6 24.2 -11.3
Afghanistan -26.9
Bangladesh -10.0 -0.5 9.8 43.8 32.1 77.9 1.2
Bhutan 119.6 60.1 62.8 -22.8 -4.6
India 4.2 19.6 27.1 26.3 33.0 16.8 18.4 24.9 -8.9
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 3.5 2.1 42.8 26.1 71.9 -3.6
Maldives 15.6 34.6 21.9 31.6 2.6 7.8 -15.3 15.2
Nepal 12.2 77.2
Pakistan -6.6 1.0 24.2 10.8 36.7 3.4 1.1 29.9 -7.3
Sri Lanka 10.8 11.2 15.1 19.9 14.7 5.0 13.3 9.2 -11.7 36.4 2 247
Turkey 13.7 12.8 31.1 22.8 22.0 28.2 37.4 37.5 -22.9
North and Central Asia -2.4 7.9 32.7 35.7 25.0 27.7 22.9 48.8 -30.5 -8.0 87 207
Armenia 11.8 8.2 20.2 16.7 17.8 7.5 63.7 0.2 -38.2 46.3 307
Azerbaijan -11.4 16.9 47.1 118.5 43.6 10.9 86.2 135.2 -59.3
Georgia 6.7 2.0 33.4 55.2 14.4 -6.1 17.2 22.6
Kazakhstan 0.7 9.3 39.7 43.5 13.3 47.6 42.4 34.6 -36.3
Kyrgyzstan -22.8 10.7 3.4 42.0 9.3 42.8 51.2 14.4 -37.1 3.3 596




Pacific island economies -2.2 4.8 9.6 27.7 21.9 13.3 15.6 35.4 -13.2 36.8 180 308
American Samoa
Australia -2.5 3.8 8.7 28.8 27.0 15.3 14.0 39.4 -12.4 38.2 159 863
Cook Islands -26.5 -17.0 21.4 -3.1 -19.8 -12.0
Fiji -9.4 47.7 -21.8 14.3 55.5 -31.1 45.2 7.5 -18.6






New Caledonia -39.3 -2.2 85.8 57.8 2.1 -6.2 51.0 -24.5




Papua New Guinea 7.7 87.8 -15.2 15.5
Samoa 21.2 15.9 -0.6 3.9 -24.5 54.5 -24.8 -37.0 30.1 58
Solomon Islands 51.1 35.5 12.9 48.6 36.4
Tonga -2.6 46.3 9.0 23.4 -39.8 -3.7 -25.4
Tuvalu -28.1 37.2 -52.3
Vanuatu 10.0 -14.7
Developing economies -3.2 11.4 23.0 26.4 18.8 19.0 16.4 16.9 -15.7
Developed economies -11.2 9.0 20.0 24.5 9.5 9.3 14.7 20.3 -19.1 37.4 595 600
All economies -5.3 10.8 22.3 26.0 16.6 16.8 16.0 17.6 -16.4
Table 2.1. Intraregional export growth
Annual percentage change Value ($ million)
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Table 2.2. Intraregional import growth
Annual percentage change Value ($ million)
2001     2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2010
East and North-East Asia -3.2 9.1 23.8 26.0 15.4 14.7 14.8 14.0 -16.1
China 6.6 26.1 42.6 35.6 20.3 18.5 19.3 13.2 -10.6
DPR Korea
Hong Kong, China -6.1 4.9 13.3 17.3 11.0 12.6 10.6 5.7 -12.1
Japan -4.7 -1.3 17.4 21.1 13.1 10.1 9.2 20.6 -23.3 28.8 371 554
Macao, China 7.0 6.2 10.8 27.2 10.6 13.5 10.1 -8.2 -29.4 14.2 3 304
Mongolia 4.6 24.5 26.8 17.6 31.3 41.9
Republic of Korea -9.8 12.3 18.4 28.2 15.0 16.4 18.7 19.4 -23.6
South-East Asia -10.2 8.9 9.9 26.3 15.4 14.6 13.9 24.2 -21.5
Brunei Darussalam -23.9 25.4 -6.6 12.2 22.7
Cambodia 9.5 13.6 9.0 13.3 120.0
Indonesia -8.9 4.3 8.1 41.4 33.6 6.7 22.1 85.1 -27.0 45.7 97 380
Lao PDR
Malaysia -13.0 12.2 6.2 26.4 9.6 13.9 13.1 6.9 -19.0
Myanmar
Philippines -4.1 16.5 5.8 11.6 4.7 11.3 4.6 6.8 -18.3
Singapore -15.8 2.8 7.0 26.4 13.6 19.2 8.9 18.0 -22.6
Thailand -3.4 11.5 18.8 25.8 25.7 8.4 14.4 18.7 -20.9 39.7 118 661
Timor-Leste -8.1
Viet Nam 1.0 20.1 24.2 30.6 17.6 24.5 39.1 28.9 -11.4
South and South-West Asia 1.3 12.9 37.4 32.5 31.7 34.0 18.8 22.5 -16.8
Afghanistan 30.1
Bangladesh 10.9 0.6 16.7 15.3 4.4 20.0 11.8
Bhutan 94.8 11.5 19.2 8.6 -4.2
India -0.8 15.4 37.7 41.1 39.4 51.5 34.0 35.8 -7.0
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 6.7 10.4 38.5 15.6 17.7 5.7
Maldives -3.6 0.5 22.2 27.5 7.0 26.6 20.9 15.9
Nepal 37.7 100.7
Pakistan -9.5 16.7 23.0 31.5 41.9 16.7 15.7 23.1 -19.8
Sri Lanka 3.3 6.1 17.5 22.0 6.3 22.2 19.2 18.1 -31.6 35.4 9 066
Turkey -17.8 19.3 45.0 51.2 37.9 32.6 29.5 23.5 -32.7
North and Central Asia 1.7 10.9 33.7 47.4 40.3 47.7 49.5 32.9 -40.2 10.4 81 345
Armenia 7.8 17.2 -0.9 3.1 38.2 85.8 55.5 46.2 -19.6 19.2 2 033
Azerbaijan 27.8 26.1 40.7 31.4 32.0 17.5 3.5 28.5 -15.5
Georgia -0.5 6.2 26.4 74.6 48.9 55.8 31.3 19.6
Kazakhstan 17.9 0.4 30.5 51.4 37.1 42.1 39.9 15.1 -32.3
Kyrgyzstan -12.5 18.7 32.2 35.3 15.8 54.2 49.1 63.8 -25.2 7.7 2 523




Pacific island economies -3.8 14.1 25.2 26.3 15.6 13.2 17.0 20.7 -19.1 19.9 129 323
American Samoa
Australia -7.1 14.8 25.7 26.4 17.6 15.5 16.9 24.6 -15.8 21.4 109 377
Cook Islands 57.6 1.6 48.9 -5.5 23.4 26.0
Fiji 69.3 10.6 28.7 20.6 32.1 13.2 -0.6 21.9 -35.0
French Polynesia 7.5 -2.2 40.2 10.2 16.0 -1.6 7.6 33.9 -21.7 8.1 762
Guam 81.3 -28.6 11.1 44.2 94.2 20.7 -11.2 -28.1




New Caledonia -6.5 13.2 19.5 23.1 32.3 11.9 33.5 34.2




Papua New Guinea 26.6 -14.7 12.6 21.2
Samoa -3.6 15.1 40.5 14.4 17.5 -3.8 5.2 -18.9 38.5 269
Solomon Islands 23.0 17.0 42.8 68.6 29.0
Tonga 3.7 15.4 6.6 14.4 14.3 -4.4 21.9
Tuvalu -59.3 248.2 3.4 11.6 -4.0 95.0
Vanuatu 83.3 29.4
Developing economies -4.7 12.1 22.0 28.2 17.9 18.5 17.5 17.3 -17.9
Developed economies -5.0 1.8 19.1 22.3 14.0 10.8 11.1 20.9 -21.8 26.8 499 845
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Table 2.3. Intraregional trade growth
Annual percentage change Value ($ million)
2001     2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2010
East and North-East Asia -4 11 25 26 15 15 17 14 -16
China 7 23 37 34 22 21 23 15 -13
DPR Korea
Hong Kong, China -4 7 16 19 11 13 11 6 -11
Japan -9 4 20 22 9 9 12 18 -22 33 786 999
Macao, China 5 8 10 25 9 12 10 -8 -28 7 3 730
Mongolia -1 9 19 23 23 49 39
Republic of Korea -11 12 25 28 15 15 17 18 -17
South-East Asia -8 8 13 25 15 17 13 20 -20
Brunei Darussalam 32 6 11 21 46
Cambodia 2 27 2 25 102
Indonesia -10 3 10 26 28 14 18 46 -21 41 206 793
Lao PDR
Malaysia -11 10 10 24 11 13 13 14 -19
Myanmar
Philippines -8 17 11 13 5 12 8 2 -22
Singapore -11 4 10 26 16 20 11 16 -21
Thailand -4 10 22 24 22 13 17 17 -17 35 241 477
Timor-Leste -33
Viet Nam -1 13 21 32 21 22 31 30 -13
South and South-West Asia 3 13 35 29 35 25 9 23 -15
Afghanistan 20
Bangladesh 9 1 16 17 7 27 10
Bhutan 105 32 42 -10 -4
India 2 18 32 33 36 35 28 32 -8
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 5 6 41 21 48 0
Maldives -2 4 22 28 6 24 16 16
Nepal 32 96
Pakistan -8 11 23 24 40 13 12 25 -16
Sri Lanka 5 7 17 22 8 19 18 17 -28 36 11 313
Turkey -11 18 42 45 35 32 31 26 -31
North and Central Asia -1 9 33 40 31 36 35 41 -35 0 168 552
Armenia 9 15 4 7 32 64 57 37 -22 22 2 340
Azerbaijan 14 24 42 55 36 15 36 86 -45
Georgia 2 5 29 67 36 37 28 20
Kazakhstan 9 5 35 47 25 45 41 24 -34
Kyrgyzstan -17 16 22 37 14 51 50 49 -28 7 3 119




Pacific island economies -3 9 17 27 18 13 16 28 -16 29 309 631
American Samoa
Australia -5 9 16 28 22 15 15 32 -14 31 269 240
Cook Islands 39 -1 46 -5 20 24
Fiji 38 20 12 19 37 2 7 19 -32
French Polynesia -5 0 26 11 16 -3 6 29 -22 6 857
Guam




New Caledonia -20 8 39 36 19 5 39 13




Papua New Guinea 21 13 0 19
Samoa 5 15 25 11 5 8 -4 -23 37 327
Solomon Islands 32 24 31 62 31
Tonga 3 18 7 15 8 -4 19
Tuvalu -58 238 3 11 -4 94
Vanuatu 70 24
Developing economies -4 12 22 27 18 19 17 17 -17
Developed economies -8 5 20 23 12 10 13 21 -20 32 1 095 445
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East and North-East Asia 40.8 41.9 44.0 45.3 47.1 49.2 49.6 49.4 48.9 49.6 50.0 51.5
China 51.7 50.9 51.3 51.2 50.6 49.1 48.2 46.8 45.5 45.7 45.1 45.5
DPR Korea
Hong Kong, China 49.6 49.7 51.2 53.4 56.1 59.1 61.2 61.6 62.9 65.1 65.8 67.2
Japan 31.6 33.5 36.4 37.3 39.9 43.4 44.8 45.1 44.8 46.5 49.0 51.6 53.6
Macao, China 17.0 18.6 19.1 20.5 23.6 22.8 24.0 27.5 28.5 31.8 36.4 60.0 47.9
Mongolia 77.3 75.0 70.6 67.0 65.3 67.7 57.1 60.3 73.1 80.7
Republic of Korea 41.4 45.0 46.3 46.3 47.5 52.4 51.6 52.9 53.1 53.6 54.8 57.2
South-East Asia 52.3 53.6 56.3 57.4 58.4 60.2 61.3 62.8 63.2 64.2 65.3 65.3
Brunei Darussalam 86.5 91.9 91.3 91.8 92.3 92.9
Cambodia 27.5 21.1 29.4 22.8 27.5 28.6
Indonesia 57.0 58.9 60.7 60.0 60.8 63.3 63.8 66.5 66.9 67.9 68.3 68.2 69.2
Lao PDR
Malaysia 51.6 52.2 56.5 56.7 57.6 58.8 59.4 60.0 59.3 61.6 65.1 66.9
Myanmar
Philippines 35.7 38.7 41.5 43.0 46.6 53.9 56.7 58.0 56.6 59.3 59.1 54.8
Singapore 58.5 60.2 61.4 63.8 64.8 64.8 65.8 67.2 68.7 70.0 70.8 71.0
Thailand 45.9 47.2 50.1 50.5 52.3 55.3 56.7 58.5 58.0 59.4 60.2 61.0 62.7
Timor-Leste 75.5 63.7
Viet Nam 42.4 54.7 59.8 55.4 51.8 50.2 51.5 53.9 51.6 50.3 51.7 48.0
South and South-West Asia 19.9 19.0 20.7 21.9 22.0 23.9 23.3 26.0 25.8 24.8 26.4 26.3
Afghanistan 90.0 87.1
Bangladesh 10.7 10.2 9.4 9.3 8.7 9.7 11.3 16.1 14.5
Bhutan 98.7 99.2 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.7 99.8
India 29.4 30.8 30.2 30.5 32.3 35.0 35.0 35.6 34.6 34.2 34.4 32.2
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 6.2 4.7 15.5 23.1 20.5 25.1 24.7 30.7 29.4
Maldives 52.7 46.4 38.9 44.2 50.4 51.7 45.4 51.1 63.5 67.0 65.5
Nepal 38.2 42.1 48.3 59.0 77.7
Pakistan 25.8 25.7 25.8 23.9 22.6 23.4 23.1 26.4 25.9 24.9 28.5 30.5
Sri Lanka 16.3 17.3 19.0 21.1 22.7 23.1 22.2 22.2 22.7 23.0 26.9
Turkey 14.2 10.8 11.0 11.0 10.9 11.1 10.2 10.8 11.9 13.1 14.6 14.5
North and Central Asia 20.3 19.9 20.5 21.3 21.5 22.7 22.2 20.9 21.3 22.3 23.0 26.1
Armenia 35.5 31.2 30.8 21.5 20.5 22.2 20.3 20.4 29.9 32.1 30.0 30.0
Azerbaijan 54.8 26.4 18.2 12.4 14.9 18.5 29.6 35.1 27.2 52.1 16.5 20.4
Georgia 55.1 54.1 59.0 63.3 59.4 59.8 66.7 57.7 51.0 45.2 45.6
Kazakhstan 41.2 36.9 36.6 37.3 36.1 37.8 32.3 27.4 30.2 35.0 31.6 33.1
Kyrgyzstan 49.2 49.0 53.1 43.3 49.6 40.7 46.9 54.8 66.3 70.2 56.4 48.7 39.9
Russian Federation 17.9 17.8 17.9 19.9 20.1 21.1 20.6 19.7 19.8 19.8 22.2 25.3 22.1
Tajikistan 53.5
Turkmenistan 71.9 43.2 64.7
Uzbekistan
Pacific island economies 49.3 53.6 59.1 58.5 59.7 59.4 61.7 64.8 64.4 65.3 68.2 72.6 75.2
American Samoa
Australia 49.2 53.2 61.4 60.3 61.1 61.5 64.3 66.9 66.3 67.0 70.0 74.5 76.8
Cook Islands 87.2 81.2 82.3 65.7 80.1 79.7 82.6
Fiji 47.5 44.4 58.5 47.4 50.3 62.1 44.1 58.6 52.7 60.1
French Polynesia 51.6 61.2 65.4 59.4 70.2 65.2 62.8 65.1 67.5 72.7 63.6 66.2 60.9
Guam




New Caledonia 41.8 43.9 39.2 36.9 41.9 47.9 44.7 41.4 42.9 32.8




Papua New Guinea 20.4 16.3 23.4 48.3 29.7 28.6
Samoa 72.8 93.5 89.0 90.4 91.7 92.3 95.5 96.8 95.0 95.8
Solomon Islands 55.2 63.5 69.0 73.3 82.7 79.0
Tonga 72.0 91.7 66.3 61.0 78.4 73.6 73.4 66.0
Tuvalu 98.5 98.7 99.7 99.4
Vanuatu 71.7 49.2 50.4
Developing economies 44.7 45.4 46.6 47.2 47.9 49.1 48.7 48.2 47.8 48.5 48.0 49.8
Developed economies 34.4 36.3 39.8 40.8 43.1 46.0 47.6 48.6 48.5 50.1 53.2 56.6 58.7
All economies 41.5 42.5 44.5 45.4 46.6 48.3 48.4 48.3 48.0 48.8 49.0 51.0
Table 3.1. Intraregional export share (percentage)
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East and North-East Asia 51.8 52.5 53.1 53.7 55.3 56.4 56.9 57.3 56.7 56.9 55.1 56.3
China 53.3 52.5 52.3 51.6 53.9 55.2 55.3 56.6 56.0 55.4 53.0 53.3
DPR  Korea
Hong Kong, China 70.9 72.7 73.1 72.7 74.1 74.9 75.2 75.9 76.5 76.8 76.5 75.1
Japan 41.2 42.9 44.5 46.0 47.0 48.7 49.7 49.7 48.8 49.7 48.9 51.7 53.2
Macao, China 77.0 75.0 76.6 76.3 76.0 78.4 78.7 79.0 77.3 73.7 69.5 60.7 58.6
Mongolia 67.6 77.4 80.0 81.5 80.1 79.7 81.0 84.8 84.5
Republic of Korea 42.6 46.4 47.5 48.6 50.7 51.2 52.4 51.9 51.1 52.6 51.6 53.0
South-East Asia 55.9 58.1 59.4 57.9 59.8 60.1 60.5 60.7 60.7 61.2 61.1 62.4
Brunei Darussalam 66.7 72.2 66.4 74.8 73.2 76.5
Cambodia 76.0 79.5 81.6 83.7 81.5 83.8
Indonesia 52.2 52.8 57.6 56.7 58.5 60.7 60.4 65.1 65.8 65.8 70.5 68.7 71.5
Lao PDR
Malaysia 58.7 60.3 60.8 58.7 61.3 62.2 62.3 62.9 61.9 63.4 62.9 64.2
Myanmar
Philippines 57.0 57.7 55.0 55.9 55.4 56.6 58.4 56.9 58.0 56.6 58.0 62.3
Singapore 56.9 58.3 59.9 57.8 59.2 58.0 57.7 56.9 56.9 56.2 54.6 54.9
Thailand 53.9 55.2 57.1 55.2 59.1 60.0 60.9 61.3 61.1 62.6 59.9 63.1 64.8
Timor-Leste 94.0 96.5
Viet Nam 44.5 68.2 71.0 69.4 68.9 67.1 69.4 71.0 72.5 72.2 72.6 74.1
South and South-West Asia 29.8 29.2 27.9 30.1 29.1 31.6 31.5 32.5 35.0 39.5 37.9 39.9
Afghanistan 75.7 79.1
Bangladesh 65.7 66.6 70.0 62.0 67.3 69.4 64.4 62.8 63.0
Bhutan 85.6 91.0 90.6 93.6 93.9 92.6 91.1
India 29.2 28.2 23.0 23.8 24.4 27.1 28.5 28.2 34.1 37.4 35.4 38.9
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 31.4 30.1 34.5 31.2 27.7 30.7 27.4 27.9 16.9
Maldives 68.9 69.3 74.9 72.1 71.8 73.2 68.7 63.4 64.6 66.2 60.7
Nepal 74.3 80.4 71.7 85.4 83.1
Pakistan 39.5 36.8 34.3 33.7 36.2 37.9 36.8 37.5 36.9 39.2 37.2 39.9
Sri Lanka 63.2 64.4 61.2 66.7 67.6 68.0 70.7 72.4 71.5 70.6 73.1
Turkey 20.8 21.4 22.5 24.0 23.3 25.3 27.3 31.6 35.1 37.4 39.0 37.5
North and Central Asia 21.3 24.9 29.2 26.2 26.5 28.2 31.0 33.3 35.5 37.2 37.7 34.8
Armenia 39.1 33.0 35.7 36.4 28.3 26.7 29.5 42.4 47.5 51.7 53.6 53.7
Azerbaijan 52.3 57.4 51.2 53.6 57.9 51.7 51.0 56.2 52.8 50.4 51.7 50.9
Georgia 38.7 46.2 45.5 42.8 43.1 38.2 41.5 46.0 48.7 45.2 46.6
Kazakhstan 55.2 52.2 62.0 57.5 55.0 56.3 56.1 56.7 59.1 59.8 59.5 53.6
Kyrgyzstan 67.2 60.3 69.1 71.8 68.9 73.5 76.0 74.8 74.5 79.1 76.9 78.7 78.2
Russian Federation 15.6 18.3 21.5 19.6 20.2 22.2 25.0 27.5 29.8 32.3 33.3 29.9 34.2
Tajikistan 73.3
Turkmenistan 46.0 48.9 51.2
Uzbekistan
Pacific island economies 44.4 46.2 47.7 49.8 50.3 51.6 53.2 54.2 55.9 56.0 56.5 57.1 58.3
American Samoa
Australia 42.9 45.0 46.8 48.3 48.6 50.1 51.7 53.0 54.8 54.6 55.7 56.5 57.8
Cook Islands 95.7 96.2 95.8 84.7 97.6 96.8
Fiji 48.1 83.5 88.1 82.9 86.8 89.5 90.4 91.1 87.3 89.4
French Polynesia 23.6 27.4 31.3 33.9 27.9 31.6 36.9 37.3 40.4 42.0 41.5 41.0 44.1
Guam




New Caledonia 36.1 38.8 37.8 38.9 32.5 37.6 45.9 45.6 50.1 49.9




Papua New Guinea 84.6 89.5 89.5 84.1 86.1 87.0
Samoa 82.3 81.7 82.5 83.6 83.5 85.6 85.4 83.1 84.0 86.4
Solomon Islands 89.1 80.3 72.6 83.1 91.9 96.7
Tonga 88.5 87.9 86.5 88.2 89.6 89.2 88.1 87.9
Tuvalu 92.3 92.4 76.4 90.9 90.6 92.8 89.3 86.2
Vanuatu 89.7 90.6 92.6
Developing economies 51.7 53.3 53.9 53.3 54.3 54.7 54.7 54.8 54.7 55.3 53.7 54.7
Developed economies 41.8 43.7 45.0 46.6 47.5 49.2 50.4 50.6 50.3 51.1 50.7 53.0 54.4
All economies 48.8 50.4 51.4 51.5 52.6 53.4 53.7 53.9 53.7 54.5 53.1 54.4
Table 3.2. Intraregional import share (percentage)
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East and North-East Asia 48.8 49.4 50.3 51.2 52.7 54.1 54.4 54.4 54.0 54.4 53.7 55.1
China 54.1 53.0 52.5 52.0 52.7 52.5 52.0 51.6 50.5 50.1 48.7 49.2
DPR  Korea
Hong Kong, China 61.1 61.9 62.8 63.7 65.6 67.4 68.6 69.1 70.1 71.3 71.5 71.4
Japan 36.3 38.1 40.5 42.0 43.7 46.3 47.5 47.7 47.2 48.4 49.3 52.2 53.8
Macao, China 52.3 52.0 48.5 51.4 53.2 53.9 56.6 60.9 61.4 61.4 61.3 60.9 57.4
Mongolia 72.6 77.7 76.8 76.3 75.1 69.6 71.4 79.0 82.8
Republic of Korea 42.6 46.4 47.5 48.2 49.8 52.5 52.5 52.9 52.5 53.5 53.5 55.6
South-East Asia 57.9 59.3 60.8 61.0 62.2 60.8 61.4 62.2 62.5 63.1 63.6 64.3
Brunei Darussalam 78.6 87.3 84.0 87.9 88.1 90.0
Cambodia 52.3 50.4 53.7 50.6 50.5 56.4
Indonesia 56.0 57.6 60.1 59.3 60.5 63.0 62.9 66.4 66.8 67.4 69.6 68.7 70.5
Lao PDR
Malaysia 55.5 56.4 59.0 58.2 59.9 60.8 60.9 61.5 60.9 62.6 64.5 66.1
Myanmar
Philippines 46.9 48.0 48.3 49.9 51.5 55.5 57.7 57.6 57.4 58.0 58.6 59.1
Singapore 64.9 66.2 66.4 67.7 68.9 62.1 62.4 62.7 63.4 63.8 63.1 63.6
Thailand 50.6 51.9 54.1 53.5 56.3 58.1 59.2 60.3 59.8 61.2 60.2 62.3 63.9
Timor-Leste 85.2 86.8
Viet Nam 45.1 63.8 67.5 64.3 62.3 60.6 62.1 63.7 63.3 63.1 63.8 62.8
South and South-West Asia 30.4 29.8 28.8 30.1 29.3 32.0 30.7 31.9 33.6 35.4 35.0 36.6
Afghanistan 79.7 91.2
Bangladesh 44.8 44.9 47.7 44.1 45.2 44.8 42.8 43.4 42.5
Bhutan 95.1 100.2 94.7 96.9 97.4 96.7 95.9
India 32.2 31.9 28.5 29.2 30.2 32.5 32.7 32.3 35.2 36.9 35.6 36.9
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 20.8 16.2 27.1 29.7 26.0 29.9 27.8 32.4 30.6
Maldives 67.1 67.1 70.3 69.1 69.4 70.1 64.6 62.0 65.0 66.6 61.4
Nepal 66.6 71.4 65.1 79.2 82.1
Pakistan 34.2 32.9 31.4 30.0 30.7 31.9 31.6 33.7 33.4 34.5 34.7 37.0
Sri Lanka 42.2 43.0 43.1 47.7 49.5 49.2 51.1 52.4 53.4 50.4 54.8
Turkey 19.2 18.0 19.4 19.3 18.9 20.0 21.0 23.9 26.6 28.3 29.6 28.2
North and Central Asia 28.2 26.0 28.7 26.1 26.0 27.1 27.7 27.1 28.3 30.7 29.8 30.7 28.6
Armenia 39.5 33.3 35.1 31.7 25.8 25.4 26.4 35.7 42.9 47.8 49.6 48.8
Azerbaijan 59.4 45.4 32.3 28.6 34.6 36.1 41.1 46.7 39.4 53.0 21.1 30.5
Georgia 43.9 50.9 51.5 50.8 49.8 45.8 49.1 49.7 49.5 45.4 46.6
Kazakhstan 52.1 43.1 46.0 46.2 44.0 45.2 43.2 39.4 41.6 45.1 41.3 41.3
Kyrgyzstan 60.8 55.9 62.1 58.0 60.9 59.3 63.8 67.6 72.2 76.5 71.2 70.3 66.2
Russian Federation 18.4 18.1 19.0 20.0 20.3 21.6 22.0 22.1 23.0 24.4 26.3 27.0 27.6
Tajikistan 63.0
Turkmenistan 56.5 46.6 59.2
Uzbekistan
Pacific island economies 48.5 51.3 54.4 55.4 56.0 56.2 58.2 60.2 61.0 61.4 62.8 65.3 67.5
American Samoa
Australia 47.5 50.3 54.7 55.3 55.5 56.0 58.3 60.4 61.2 61.3 63.2 65.8 68.1
Cook Islands 95.4 97.0 93.4 84.8 97.6 97.3
Fiji 50.2 70.7 78.6 73.3 77.3 82.5 78.6 82.6 77.8 81.9
French Polynesia 29.1 34.9 37.9 37.9 33.0 34.8 40.0 40.5 43.5 45.1 43.4 43.1 45.6
Guam




New Caledonia 38.0 41.1 38.6 38.8 35.8 41.9 45.7 44.2 47.4 44.3




Papua New Guinea 43.6 38.5 51.4 64.2 50.8 50.2
Samoa 84.9 86.6 85.7 86.1 86.7 87.5 88.7 86.3 86.4 88.6
Solomon Islands 77.1 75.2 72.2 93.3 89.2 93.5
Tonga 90.5 92.1 84.0 84.4 88.4 88.2 87.3 86.9
Tuvalu 94.8 95.1 89.6 97.7 98.2 97.6 95.1 89.0
Vanuatu 87.3 83.5 87.8
Developing economies 53.6 54.5 55.1 55.2 56.1 55.8 55.6 55.4 55.1 55.4 54.5 55.6
Developed economies 39.0 41.0 43.4 44.8 46.3 48.4 49.9 50.6 50.5 51.6 52.9 55.9 57.7
All economies 50.0 51.0 52.1 52.6 53.7 54.1 54.3 54.4 54.1 54.6 54.2 55.7
Table 3.3. Intraregional trade share (percentage)
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East and North-East Asia 3.4 3.1 3.2 3.0 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.4
China 7.9 7.1 7.1 6.5 6.7 6.3 6.1 5.7 4.9 4.5 4.1
DPR Korea
Hong Kong, China 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5
Japan 2.6 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.8
Macao, China 7.1 6.6 5.7 4.3 4.8 4.7 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.4 1.4 1.1
Mongolia 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.1
Republic of Korea 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8
South-East Asia 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9
Brunei Darussalam 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.2
Cambodia 9.8 13.0 13.0 14.5 20.1 8.3
Indonesia 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.0
Lao PDR
Malaysia 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8
Myanmar
Philippines 3.9 3.6 3.5 2.9 2.2 2.3 1.9 2.0 1.7 1.9 2.3
Singapore 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5
Thailand 2.4 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9
Timor-Leste 8.2 10.6
Viet Nam 1.7 1.5 1.7 2.1 2.2 1.9 1.7 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9
South and South-West Asia 17.6 22.4 19.0 16.2 15.3 20.3 18.6 13.9 13.1 9.2 7.0
Afghanistan 0.2 0.3
Bangladesh 25.8 32.6 36.9 34.1 23.5 16.2 7.3 10.2
Bhutan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
India 7.1 6.3 4.8 3.9 3.5 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.2 2.1
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 2.7 24.0 17.8 15.5 17.8 18.0 21.6 12.3
Maldives 2.9 6.4 4.9 3.5 2.3 1.7 1.6 1.3 0.8 0.7
Nepal 1.5 1.1 0.7 0.3
Pakistan 8.6 7.6 7.7 8.5 8.4 9.1 7.5 7.6 6.6 5.5 4.3
Sri Lanka 19.7 17.4 11.0 9.5 7.1 5.5 6.3 6.4 7.0 6.8 4.7
Turkey 46.2 50.3 41.0 33.9 28.4 46.3 42.3 34.4 29.6 19.7 16.1
North and Central Asia 13.2 10.5 19.0 11.6 7.3 7.0 8.3 9.9 8.2 8.7 6.3
Armenia 1 346.3 154.1 806.8 55.1 45.3 14.7 44.5 168.0 42.8 68.9 15.1 14.7
Azerbaijan 176.0 93.0 455.6 314.6 88.2 11.8 10.2 49.0 3.4 7.4 5.6
Georgia 44.2 37.4 12.2 21.5 10.9 10.7 26.0 14.5 21.8 22.5
Kazakhstan 2.9 3.1 3.4 2.1 1.5 3.5 4.8 4.9 3.5 4.0 3.6
Kyrgyzstan 6.5 4.3 6.5 1.4 1.7 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.3 4.4 1.9 5.8




Pacific island economies 3.5 3.5 4.1 12.0 2.9 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.4 0.9 0.8
American Samoa
Australia 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.7
Cook Islands 41.6 235.3 131.0 26.6 3.6 1.2 1.8
Fiji 94.5 100.3 24.0 41.0 31.5 1.7 27.5 1.8 3.0 1.8






New Caledonia 64.2 50.3 60.6 41.4 20.9 8.4 7.5 4.9 4.9 11.2




Papua New Guinea 0.9 0.9 5.0 2.8 1.7
Samoa 78.1 10 620.5 448.3 69.9 29.8 37.2 28.9 13.7 4.9 1.5
Solomon Islands 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
Tonga 97.7 9 742.8 597.2 305.3 163.9 667.3 210.9 27.3
Tuvalu
Vanuatu 7.2 1.2 1.1
Developing economies 5.4 5.5 6.2 5.6 4.7 5.1 5.2 4.8 4.2 4.0 3.1
Developed economies 2.6 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.8
All economies 4.5 4.5 5.1 4.7 3.9 4.3 4.4 4.1 3.6 3.4 2.7
Table 4.1. Relative dependence on exports to developed markets
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East and North-East Asia 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
China 5.0 3.1 3.1 2.5 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6
DPR Korea
Hong Kong, China 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Japan 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5
Macao, China 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.0
Mongolia 2.5 1.4 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5
Republic of Korea 2.8 2.4 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.2
South-East Asia 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8
Brunei Darussalam 0.6 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.6
Cambodia 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Indonesia 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Lao PDR
Malaysia 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9
Myanmar
Philippines 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.2 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.1 1.0 0.9
Singapore 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9
Thailand 2.3 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1
Timor-Leste 0.1 0.2
Viet Nam 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
South and South-West Asia 6.8 6.4 5.4 5.1 4.3 3.9 3.2 2.4 2.2 2.1 1.9
Afghanistan 0.7 1.1
Bangladesh 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4
Bhutan 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
India 2.7 2.8 2.5 2.5 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.1 1.3 1.1
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 4.4 3.8 4.3 4.5 3.3 3.7 3.7 1.1
Maldives 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3
Nepal 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
Pakistan 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.0 0.9 1.0
Sri Lanka 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Turkey 14.8 12.6 11.9 10.4 8.6 7.2 5.6 4.7 4.0 3.9 3.7
North and Central Asia 10.0 10.1 9.2 7.1 6.8 6.4 5.4 4.6 3.6 3.4 3.1
Armenia 38.4 52.8 41.5 18.0 35.3 22.9 16.3 4.8 4.5 2.9 2.5 2.1
Azerbaijan 5.8 7.9 9.4 5.0 4.3 4.4 2.3 6.7 5.7 3.7 3.4
Georgia 35.5 30.9 37.5 23.0 16.6 19.0 14.7 9.7 6.4 5.3
Kazakhstan 12.5 7.6 9.4 6.3 4.5 4.9 4.2 3.6 2.8 2.3 2.4
Kyrgyzstan 4.4 3.2 1.8 2.2 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.3 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.8




Pacific island economies 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0
American Samoa
Australia 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0
Cook Islands 1.5 1.2 2.6 1.6 0.9 0.3
Fiji 0.9 0.9 0.7 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
French Polynesia 11.6 8.9 8.5 10.7 8.7 4.7 3.0 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.0
Guam




New Caledonia 7.3 5.4 5.6 4.0 4.7 3.4 2.3 2.2 1.8 1.7




Papua New Guinea 1.3 1.1 1.4 0.8 0.9
Samoa 6.8 4.8 2.5 1.6 1.7 1.4 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.3
Solomon Islands 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2
Tonga 3.5 5.3 3.4 2.6 1.0 1.3 1.4 0.4
Tuvalu 1.7 1.4 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.1 1.9
Vanuatu 1.8 0.7 0.4
Developing economies 3.3 2.7 2.6 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4
Developed economies 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6
All economies 2.8 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3
Table 4.2. Relative dependence on imports from developed markets
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East and North-East Asia  2.9 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.8
China 6.9 6.1 6.1 5.6 5.8 5.3 4.8 4.4 3.8 3.5 3.3
DPR of Korea
Hong Kong, China 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Japan 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.6
Macao, China 4.6 4.1 3.8 3.0 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.7 4.5 5.2 8.0
Mongolia 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.2
Republic of Korea 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8
South-East Asia 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9
Brunei Darussalam 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.7
Cambodia 5.8 7.5 7.3 8.0 11.1 4.8
Indonesia 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.8
Lao PDR
Malaysia 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7
Myanmar
Philippines 3.4 3.1 3.2 3.0 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.7 2.0
Singapore 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Thailand 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9
Timor-Leste 4.8 10.6
Viet Nam 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.4
South and South-West Asia 18.2 23.6 16.5 15.0 13.6 18.7 16.9 12.9 12.3 9.1 6.6
Afghanistan 1.8 3.7
Bangladesh 17.1 22.3 25.0 22.7 16.2 10.9 4.9 6.7
Bhutan 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
India 6.7 5.5 4.2 3.5 3.1 2.5 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.1
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 9.5 19.2 16.3 16.1 16.9 17.4 17.1 7.2
Maldives 4.6 6.9 5.8 3.8 2.4 1.8 2.7 2.3 1.9 2.0
Nepal 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.4
Pakistan 7.2 6.0 6.1 6.9 6.8 7.9 7.1 7.5 6.7 5.7 4.4
Sri Lanka 14.7 12.4 8.0 7.2 5.4 4.0 4.6 4.5 5.2 4.7 3.5
Turkey 57.3 69.9 44.3 38.3 32.4 53.8 48.6 39.1 32.9 22.8 18.8
North and Central Asia 54.1 13.1 29.3 12.1 7.1 5.4 6.7 9.2 7.3 8.1 5.0 5.4
Armenia 2 678.6 300.3 1 408.8 69.9 61.3 20.3 52.6 210.6 63.0 115.4 27.4 21.5
Azerbaijan 154.5 63.5 311.8 213.2 70.7 10.2 8.4 37.6 3.7 4.0 3.5
Georgia 107.7 82.3 34.5 55.5 34.9 32.2 59.6 38.6 54.8 62.7
Kazakhstan 2.7 2.6 3.3 2.2 1.6 2.8 3.6 3.6 2.7 2.7 2.6
Kyrgyzstan 6.3 3.7 5.6 2.4 4.1 2.7 3.2 4.3 3.4 11.5 12.6 12.7




Pacific island economies 6.5 5.3 21.0 60.7 5.1 3.2 3.2 3.0 2.3 2.1 1.5 1.1
American Samoa
Australia 3.0 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.3 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 0.9 0.8
Cook Islands 213.9 123.0 26.9 3.7 1.7
Fiji 64.2 72.3 17.3 34.9 25.0 1.4 24.1 1.4 2.8 1.5






New Caledonia 113.1 60.5 95.8 71.5 35.4 12.4 9.8 6.4 5.3 13.6




Papua New Guinea 0.9 0.9 7.2 2.1 1.3
Samoa 112.8  30 053.8 865.0 237.7 144.1 332.4 250.4 214.6 54.7 24.0
Solomon Islands 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3
Tonga 134.8  18 642.0 736.5 281.8 182.5 989.7 367.7 85.6
Tuvalu
Vanuatu 8.7 2.4 2.2
Developing economies 5.2 4.1 5.6 7.6 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.4 3.0 2.8 2.3
Developed economies 2.3 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.7
All economies 4.4 3.5 4.6 6.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.0
Table 4.3 Relative dependence on trade with developed markets
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East and North-East Asia 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
China 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
DPR Korea -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2
Hong Kong, China 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Japan 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
Macao, China 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.7 -0.7
Mongolia -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
Republic of Korea 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
South-East Asia 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Brunei Darussalam 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5
Cambodia -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Indonesia 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Lao PDR -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
Malaysia 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Myanmar -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3
Philippines 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Singapore 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
Thailand 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Timor-Leste -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -1.0
Viet Nam 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
South and South-West Asia -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2
Afghanistan -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8
Bangladesh -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Bhutan -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2
India -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2
Maldives -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7
Nepal -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7
Pakistan -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3
Sri Lanka -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Turkey -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
North and Central Asia 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Armenia -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6
Azerbaijan -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6
Georgia -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5
Kazakhstan 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3
Kyrgyzstan -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Russian Federation 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Tajikistan 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Turkmenistan -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 -0.1 0.0
Uzbekistan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Pacific island economies -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
American Samoa -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Australia -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cook Islands -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -1.0 -1.0
Fiji -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
French Polynesia -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8
Guam
Kiribati -0.6 -0.8 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.8 -0.8 -0.6 -0.5 -0.7
Marshall Islands -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 -0.6 -0.7
Micronesia (F.S.) -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7
Nauru
New Caledonia -0.4 -0.2 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
New Zealand -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Niue -0.9 -0.9 -0.7 -0.9 -0.9 -1.0 -1.0 -0.5 -0.4 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
Northern Mariana Islands 0.1
Palau -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9
Papua New Guinea 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
Samoa -0.7 -0.2 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7
Solomon Islands 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Tonga -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9
Tuvalu -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
Vanuatu -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7
Developing economies 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Developed economies 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All economies 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 5. Normalized trade balance
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East and North-East Asia 3.3 2.5 1.9 1.2 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.4 2.9 3.8 2.6 2.1
China 4.2 2.7 2.0 1.7 2.1 1.5 1.7 4.4 6.4 7.6 6.8 3.9
DPR Korea -3.5 -5.3 -9.2 -9.3 -8.1 -8.9 -9.0 -10.6 -10.3 -9.5 -11.4 -9.1
Hong Kong, China -7.1 -3.9 -6.7 -6.6 -3.7 -2.9 -4.4 -4.5 -6.9 -10.0 -10.6 -10.8
Japan 2.8 2.5 2.1 1.3 2.0 2.1 2.4 1.7 1.6 2.1 0.4 0.6
Macao, China 3.0 2.7 -1.4 -8.5 -9.6 -8.2 -12.5 -17.7 -18.8 -18.7 -18.0 -17.9
Mongolia -3.7 -5.6 -7.3 -10.0 -13.1 -12.8 -8.3 -5.2 1.8 -5.8 -20.8 -5.4
Republic of Korea 10.9 5.2 2.2 1.9 1.8 2.3 4.1 2.7 1.7 1.4 -1.4 4.9
South-East Asia 9.1 9.3 8.6 7.0 6.3 8.7 6.8 5.9 7.5 6.9 3.4 6.2
Brunei Darussalam 12.5 26.9 46.6 44.3 36.7 47.2 46.2 49.9 52.0 45.5 53.7 45.0
Cambodia -11.7 -13.2 -15.0 -14.9 -9.2 -9.5 -7.4 -13.3 -14.8 -15.6 -16.0 -14.6
Indonesia 14.4 11.7 13.2 12.4 10.6 9.3 6.2 4.0 6.4 5.8 2.5 5.5
Lao PDR -14.9 -15.4 -12.4 -11.4 -8.4 -6.2 -14.6 -12.0 -5.3 -3.4 -5.9 -7.3
Malaysia 20.0 23.7 17.3 15.2 14.1 19.4 17.0 19.1 18.9 15.7 19.2 17.6
Myanmar -27.3 -18.1 -10.4 -6.5 6.7 3.9 1.8 15.8 14.6 19.0 14.8 12.6
Philippines -3.2 5.3 3.6 -3.2 -7.7 -8.0 -7.4 -8.3 -5.7 -5.2 -6.8 -4.6
Singapore 9.9 4.4 3.5 6.7 9.9 25.4 22.8 24.4 23.5 21.1 9.8 13.6
Thailand 10.3 6.6 5.8 2.6 2.7 3.2 1.1 -4.1 0.5 5.6 -0.5 7.1
Timor-Leste -36.3 -41.0 -28.9 -26.2 -38.4 -44.9 -42.6
Viet Nam -7.9 -0.7 -3.7 -3.6 -8.7 -12.9 -12.1 -8.2 -8.5 -19.9 -19.9 -13.8
South and South-West Asia -3.8 -3.1 -3.0 -1.7 -2.7 -3.0 -4.2 -5.2 -5.1 -5.3 -6.8 -5.2
Afghanistan -10.4 -31.1 -29.4 -45.0 -56.5 -40.9 -32.8 -30.5 -26.6 -22.9 -23.0 -22.8
Bangladesh -5.6 -6.3 -5.5 -6.5 -5.2 -6.7 -6.7 -8.0 -7.0 -9.0 -10.7 -7.6
Bhutan -7.1 -16.1 -16.4 -17.8 -15.7 -19.2 -33.0 -15.9 -0.6 12.4 -1.8 -2.7
India -2.2 -2.5 -2.0 -1.5 -1.4 -2.3 -3.2 -5.1 -6.0 -6.6 -9.8 -7.2
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) -1.1 3.5 14.3 8.1 2.8 6.4 5.7 7.9 14.9 14.0 15.2 7.9
Maldives -47.8 -52.7 -44.9 -45.3 -40.5 -46.0 -59.3 -77.8 -76.6 -77.7 -89.0 -62.5
Nepal -15.8 -15.2 -13.4 -12.5 -14.4 -16.9 -16.0 -17.2 -18.4 -20.6 -22.5 -27.9
Pakistan -1.1 -2.5 -2.6 -1.4 -1.8 -1.3 -4.7 -8.5 -10.2 -10.3 -15.1 -8.8
Sri Lanka -6.8 -8.5 -10.5 -7.2 -8.2 -8.2 -10.7 -10.2 -11.9 -11.0 -13.5 -6.7
Turkey -7.0 -5.6 -10.0 -5.1 -6.7 -7.3 -8.8 -9.0 -10.2 -9.7 -9.6 -6.3
North and Central Asia 4.8 15.1 21.1 14.2 12.4 13.0 13.7 15.1 14.2 10.7 12.0 9.1
Armenia -36.0 -30.8 -30.8 -25.1 -20.3 -21.2 -17.6 -16.9 -18.9 -23.0 -28.9 -30.6
Azerbaijan -10.6 -2.3 10.9 15.5 8.0 -0.5 1.1 24.9 36.9 46.1 47.1 33.9
Georgia -19.3 -12.4 -12.6 -13.5 -13.3 -17.0 -23.4 -25.3 -35.4 -39.2 -37.6 -30.1
Kazakhstan 4.6 13.1 20.6 9.9 12.5 14.7 16.9 18.4 18.0 14.3 24.9 13.5
Kyrgyzstan -20.0 -11.7 -3.6 0.6 -6.3 -7.0 -10.0 -17.5 -32.6 -33.6 -47.8 -34.9
Russian Federation 6.2 18.4 23.5 15.7 13.4 13.9 14.5 15.5 14.1 10.1 10.8 9.1
Tajikistan -8.7 2.5 12.8 -3.5 1.4 -5.4 -13.3 -18.2 -12.7 -35.0 -60.0 -31.3
Turkmenistan -13.6 -7.5 16.3 9.0 13.4 18.4 7.9 23.0 43.3 41.0 40.8 -4.6
Uzbekistan 1.6 0.7 0.9 -1.1 0.9 5.2 7.4 7.9 7.2 7.6 4.0 5.2
Pacific island economies -2.3 -3.2 -1.9 -0.3 -2.0 -3.5 -3.5 -2.9 -2.3 -2.7 -1.7 -1.4
American Samoa
Australia -2.2 -3.1 -1.9 -0.1 -1.8 -3.3 -3.4 -2.5 -1.9 -2.4 -1.2 -1.1
Cook Islands -46.0 -47.1 -51.6 -46.4 -41.4 -43.7 -40.2 -41.2 -53.5 -50.4 -72.0 -95.0
Fiji -12.4 -14.8 -14.2 -20.6 -20.5 -22.7 -27.0 -30.1 -35.8 -30.7 -37.6 -26.4
French Polynesia -27.9 -24.6 -30.7 -35.9 -43.3 -44.6 -36.0 -40.6 -37.3 -39.2 -41.0 -34.5
Guam
Kiribati -40.0 -45.0 -54.5 -58.2 -63.8 -53.8 -57.2 -66.1 -53.4 -47.4 -40.6 -36.7
Marshall Islands -57.2 -58.7 -42.3 -39.0 -44.4 -48.4 -48.3 -49.3 -47.7 -46.8 -48.2 -38.1
Micronesia (F.S.) -36.1 -37.4 -38.2 -38.5 -33.6 -38.1 -50.2 -46.5 -49.1 -48.1 -50.5 -47.5
Nauru 38.0 84.3 11.1 -39.4 -67.9 -22.2 -18.1 -83.7 -110.3 -125.5 53.0 -143.8
New Caledonia -15.5 -14.8 -9.4 -14.8 -13.9 -15.4 -10.2 -10.9 -11.0 -7.8 -21.3 -16.7
New Zealand -0.8 -3.1 -1.2 0.8 -1.1 -2.5 -2.8 -4.0 -3.7 -3.0 -2.9 -0.5
Niue
Northern Mariana Islands
Palau -44.4 -85.3 -93.6 -66.8 -63.9 -65.0 -75.9 -63.4 -64.5 -58.2 -58.8 -60.9
Papua New Guinea 14.1 20.0 27.0 23.9 16.5 22.6 20.9 31.7 34.5 26.7 26.9 15.1
Samoa -36.4 -41.4 -17.7 -30.6 -23.1 -19.7 -32.3 -34.8 -46.7 -30.9 -39.5 -35.3
Solomon Islands -2.8 4.2 -6.8 -12.9 -3.3 -6.0 -6.4 -19.7 -20.9 -22.6 -17.6 -14.9
Tonga -32.3 -30.8 -32.3 -39.8 -41.1 -36.7 -37.6 -42.8 -36.4 -43.3 -46.6 -40.4
Tuvalu -75.0 -57.5 -40.7 -27.1 -75.0 -42.0 -52.5 -56.0 -54.8 -58.3 -92.4 -50.2
Vanuatu -21.8 -26.0 -21.7 -26.2 -25.7 -24.0 -24.1 -27.4 -37.4 -33.0 -41.5 -36.7
Developing economies 2.8 3.0 2.9 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.3 3.0 3.9 3.7 3.0 2.5
Developed economies 2.3 1.9 1.8 1.2 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.0 0.9 1.2 0.0 0.3
All economies 2.5 2.4 2.2 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.7 2.8 2.0 1.7
Table 6. Trade balance as a share of GDP (percentage)
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East and North-East Asia 1.54 0.15 1.00 2.45 0.02 6.93 14.64 53.43 17.89 1.93
China 2.51 0.12 0.74 1.88 0.03 5.22 17.26 47.89 24.22 0.14
DPR Korea
Hong Kong, China 0.96 0.36 0.73 0.25 0.02 4.71 10.74 54.99 24.88 2.36
Japan 0.48 0.08 1.36 1.84 0.02 9.52 12.36 61.14 7.36 5.85
Mongolia
Macao, China 0.66 2.26 0.51 7.48 0.00 2.06 9.97 11.84 57.19
Republic of Korea 0.77 0.20 1.14 7.43 0.01 10.17 13.79 56.83 9.21 0.44
South-East Asia 5.51 0.47 3.66 15.65 3.20 7.31 8.84 40.80 10.36 4.20
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia 5.65 0.45 11.40 27.64 10.33 5.22 15.39 13.27 9.98 0.67
Lao PDR
Malaysia 2.61 0.39 2.58 15.80 7.67 5.98 8.78 42.90 8.61 4.67
Myanmar
Philippines 4.73 0.51 2.53 2.66 1.76 2.27 7.49 68.79 8.64 0.61
Singapore 1.07 0.65 0.61 15.84 0.16 10.62 4.48 52.49 6.59 7.48
Thailand 12.52 0.29 5.01 5.33 0.27 7.97 13.03 42.56 10.57 2.45
Timor-Leste
Viet Nam 19.45 0.35 3.91 18.60 0.14 2.21 9.09 12.09 32.81 1.36
South and South-West Asia 7.84 0.48 4.05 22.38 0.34 6.81 24.20 15.20 16.41 2.28
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan 18.90 0.49 3.44 42.63 2.16 3.10 22.71 0.09 6.47 0.01
India 7.87 0.45 6.61 15.95 0.33 10.98 27.24 13.38 14.79 2.41
Iran (Islamic Rep. of)
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan 14.41 0.12 2.57 5.23 0.66 3.23 44.28 3.21 26.22 0.08
Sri Lanka 23.30 0.87 4.29 0.03 0.95 1.09 14.21 5.41 47.21 2.64
Turkey 7.72 0.78 2.23 4.77 0.37 4.37 28.90 29.92 17.08 3.85
North and Central Asia 2.24 0.26 3.88 64.82 0.18 4.04 13.15 3.25 0.65 7.53
Armenia 4.38 13.28 16.74 0.89 0.00 1.41 50.16 4.02 6.80 2.32
Azerbaijan 3.44 0.21 0.72 90.45 0.67 0.87 1.89 1.39 0.21 0.16
Georgia
Kazakhstan 3.87 0.11 6.13 68.08 0.04 3.34 15.74 1.51 0.10 1.08
Kyrgyzstan 11.12 1.49 5.14 10.62 0.01 0.93 8.24 7.39 8.52 46.53




Pacific island economies 15.78 1.67 22.95 24.44 0.36 4.29 9.23 7.31 2.89 11.07
American Samoa
Australia 10.42 1.50 24.92 28.10 0.26 4.19 8.73 7.06 2.67 12.16
Cook Islands
Fiji 38.64 8.72 4.88 24.06 0.70 2.77 5.00 3.90 8.90 2.43

















Developing economies 3.41 0.29 2.26 15.28 0.82 6.18 14.51 38.95 15.82 2.47
Developed economies 3.77 0.42 5.95 6.79 0.07 8.41 11.59 49.67 6.41 6.92
All economies 3.48 0.31 2.96 13.66 0.68 6.60 13.95 41.00 14.04 3.31
Table 7.1. Sectoral composition of exports (in percentage, average 2007-2009)
SITC 0 SITC 1 SITC 2 SITC 3 SITC 4 SITC 5 SITC 6 SITC 7 SITC 8 SITC 9
Food & Beverages Crude Mineral Animal/ Chemicals/ Manu- Machinery/ Misc. Com-
live and mater.ex fuel/ veg oil/ products factured transport manuf- modities
animals  tobacco food/ lubri- fat nes goods equip- arts nes
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East and North-East Asia 3.66 0.45 8.90 18.51 0.47 8.96 10.90 36.13 11.18 0.85
China 1.31 0.17 13.68 12.76 0.83 10.96 10.31 40.93 8.73 0.33
DPR Korea
Hong Kong, China 3.07 0.49 0.88 3.34 0.08 5.51 12.47 53.63 19.42 1.12
Japan 7.64 0.96 7.31 30.17 0.21 7.76 8.88 22.68 12.55 1.84
Mongolia
Macao, China 7.20 5.50 0.50 11.56 0.25 5.38 13.25 24.35 31.96 0.05
Republic of Korea 3.92 0.22 6.51 29.39 0.27 9.06 14.29 28.83 7.15 0.37
South-East Asia 4.47 0.50 2.80 18.86 0.37 8.95 13.31 42.25 5.61 2.87
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia 7.63 0.42 5.64 24.31 0.12 12.66 14.37 31.91 2.92 0.02
Lao PDR
Malaysia 5.40 0.41 3.43 9.31 0.93 8.67 12.56 48.76 5.38 5.16
Myanmar
Philippines 8.86 0.48 2.55 18.31 0.36 8.54 8.06 49.26 3.13 0.45
Singapore 2.05 0.69 0.81 23.75 0.21 5.71 7.42 48.87 6.93 3.55
Thailand 3.89 0.22 3.34 19.15 0.12 10.79 18.73 34.51 6.56 2.69
Timor-Leste
Viet Nam 5.74 0.37 4.52 13.31 0.75 13.56 25.77 29.20 4.36 2.42
South and South-West Asia 2.72 0.15 5.81 24.04 1.59 10.91 14.30 22.51 4.02 13.97
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan 11.05 1.30 6.69 16.95 5.02 5.37 21.73 27.36 4.31 0.22
India 1.61 0.06 5.17 33.73 1.42 10.18 13.21 21.40 3.30 9.92
Iran (Islamic Rep. of)
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan 5.11 0.07 8.27 28.93 4.36 15.43 9.99 24.03 3.00 0.80
Sri Lanka 12.02 0.46 1.74 21.97 1.27 11.06 28.82 17.32 4.30 1.03
Turkey 2.28 0.26 7.42 14.81 0.71 13.19 17.78 27.98 5.90 9.66
North and Central Asia 10.44 1.64 2.68 3.45 0.66 10.82 13.82 42.27 8.79 5.43
Armenia 13.16 3.57 2.07 15.64 1.17 9.63 21.81 22.50 7.34 3.11
Azerbaijan 11.12 3.56 2.41 1.72 0.95 7.98 17.66 47.04 6.22 1.34
Georgia
Kazakhstan 6.02 1.17 1.50 11.82 0.44 8.93 23.45 39.59 6.33 0.75
Kyrgyzstan 11.44 2.63 2.40 13.28 1.02 9.08 14.29 17.55 7.26 21.06




Pacific island economies 4.96 0.88 1.34 14.29 0.33 10.57 11.34 38.58 12.87 4.83
American Samoa
Australia 3.94 0.79 1.19 13.78 0.28 10.60 11.08 39.76 12.98 5.60
Cook Islands
Fiji 15.71 0.72 0.72 30.93 0.97 7.93 13.87 20.00 7.96 1.19

















Developing economies 3.51 0.41 6.75 16.10 0.69 9.64 12.62 38.39 8.27 3.62
Developed economies 6.90 0.94 5.90 26.37 0.24 8.45 9.45 26.54 12.66 2.56
All economies 4.17 0.51 6.59 18.14 0.60 9.40 12.00 36.05 9.13 3.41
Table 7.2. Sectoral composition of imports (in percentage, average 2007-2009)
SITC 0 SITC 1 SITC 2 SITC 3 SITC 4 SITC 5 SITC 6 SITC 7 SITC 8 SITC 9
Food & Beverages Crude Mineral Animal/ Chemicals/ Manu- Machinery/ Misc. Com-
live and mater.ex fuel/ veg oil/ products factured transport manuf- modities
animals  tobacco food/ lubri- fat nes goods equip- arts nes
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East and North-East Asia 13.4 13.1 15.2 15.6 16.6 18.5 20.9 22.6 25.1 26.4 26.8 20.6
China 14.0 15.5 19.3 18.8 20.7 25.4 29.5 30.0 30.4 29.9 27.5 21.0
DPR Korea 9.5 10.9 14.6 15.3 16.1 17.0 18.7 18.9 19.0 19.4 24.1 23.6
Hong Kong, China 104.4 106.6 118.6 113.8 122.5 143.0 157.5 161.5 165.4 162.5 165.1 150.9
Japan 7.5 7.3 8.3 8.6 8.8 9.2 10.1 11.5 13.5 14.5 15.7 11.0
Macao, China 32.6 35.4 42.4 42.1 40.2 37.7 35.5 33.3 31.0 27.2 23.1 19.0
Mongolia 43.4 46.6 52.6 49.6 48.0 49.0 51.9 48.8 47.5 50.9 57.9 48.0
Republic of Korea 29.3 27.3 30.8 28.5 26.9 28.4 32.4 31.8 33.1 34.5 46.1 40.8
South-East Asia 65.7 60.6 69.1 64.6 60.5 62.2 68.1 70.8 68.6 64.3 64.7 52.2
Brunei Darussalam 43.8 39.9 34.5 37.1 42.1 38.3 33.6 31.2 30.4 31.4 38.6 42.3
Cambodia 33.4 40.0 46.0 45.7 49.5 50.1 55.7 55.1 57.1 54.4 49.9 47.5
Indonesia 39.3 24.5 30.4 26.7 21.9 19.8 22.8 27.5 23.5 22.8 25.5 17.6
Lao PDR 39.2 32.8 28.8 27.4 23.6 21.4 26.0 28.7 30.2 24.5 25.1 23.6
Malaysia 97.3 103.6 105.7 93.9 92.2 93.8 101.7 102.7 103.2 93.7 87.7 78.5
Myanmar 35.7 29.9 29.9 35.4 24.3 21.9 21.8 19.2 21.7 25.6 28.0 26.0
Philippines 46.8 45.1 50.6 47.5 49.7 49.5 49.4 46.2 43.5 38.3 33.8 27.3
Singapore 137.0 140.6 150.4 145.2 146.2 195.7 205.2 218.3 222.2 194.3 188.3 160.6
Thailand 42.8 44.0 53.6 55.1 52.4 54.9 59.2 64.4 62.4 60.0 65.4 54.5
Timor-Leste 28.4 30.6 24.2 22.7 29.1 32.6 30.8
Viet Nam 39.2 40.7 48.4 47.9 51.8 56.6 62.8 64.2 68.1 73.6 74.3 66.0
South and South-West Asia 13.2 13.1 14.9 14.5 15.1 16.3 17.8 19.3 20.5 20.1 23.4 19.2
Afghanistan 14.4 28.4 25.7 32.3 37.7 31.2 28.8 27.7 25.0 22.7 22.8 21.1
Bangladesh 16.6 17.5 18.5 18.6 17.3 18.9 20.2 22.3 24.8 24.9 27.1 22.8
Bhutan 34.1 38.3 34.3 34.0 31.8 34.6 44.8 41.4 47.8 50.3 42.9 41.5
India 9.9 10.1 10.8 10.3 11.0 12.0 13.5 16.2 17.8 18.0 22.8 18.6
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 13.5 12.6 15.6 16.5 15.7 18.9 19.9 21.1 19.7 16.7 18.3 15.2
Maldives 44.3 44.7 43.0 43.3 43.5 46.6 51.9 55.9 57.3 55.2 61.8 46.6
Nepal 22.0 22.9 24.2 22.2 21.0 23.2 22.9 23.6 23.4 23.6 24.9 26.8
Pakistan 12.8 13.8 14.9 14.8 14.8 15.2 17.7 21.4 21.4 20.7 25.2 18.2
Sri Lanka 34.1 34.1 38.9 34.7 33.0 32.7 34.9 32.8 32.4 31.5 30.2 22.4
Turkey 15.9 15.4 18.6 20.1 20.8 21.3 22.9 22.2 23.9 24.0 25.2 21.6
North and Central Asia 23.1 24.8 24.0 22.8 22.0 22.4 21.6 21.7 21.6 21.5 21.9 19.4
Armenia 35.1 33.1 35.3 33.0 34.5 37.6 32.1 31.5 28.9 28.9 29.4 29.8
Azerbaijan 21.9 22.1 24.9 29.7 29.0 35.9 41.0 43.7 39.8 33.9 29.3 22.9
Georgia 20.6 18.6 20.6 20.6 20.7 24.4 29.2 31.0 35.1 36.8 35.8 31.2
Kazakhstan 20.4 24.9 34.7 32.3 30.6 32.0 35.7 37.2 35.6 36.5 37.8 30.1
Kyrgyzstan 42.8 43.0 39.0 30.8 34.4 34.9 38.7 38.1 45.7 47.5 53.6 49.2
Russian Federation 22.8 24.7 22.5 20.8 20.4 20.5 19.3 19.4 19.3 19.1 19.6 17.1
Tajikistan 49.5 62.6 89.9 61.5 59.9 53.7 50.6 48.7 60.0 64.5 65.8 39.3
Turkmenistan 30.1 35.6 48.3 49.3 45.1 50.6 51.6 44.1 42.6 47.4 60.9 37.5
Uzbekistan 22.3 18.3 19.8 29.8 24.8 27.7 30.5 28.9 27.7 30.7 37.6 28.9
Pacific island economies 17.3 17.0 18.5 17.8 17.8 16.7 16.9 17.3 18.0 17.6 20.2 17.2
American Samoa
Australia 16.2 15.7 17.1 16.2 16.3 15.4 15.5 16.0 16.6 16.3 18.8 16.1
Cook Islands 34.4 35.0 41.4 37.1 32.8 34.6 31.7 31.2 36.1 35.2 43.0 49.4
Fiji 37.9 39.6 42.2 43.3 39.7 41.5 40.9 41.1 42.8 40.5 46.1 37.1
French Polynesia 28.8 27.2 30.4 32.4 35.2 34.2 30.5 33.0 31.7 31.5 33.2 28.4
Guam
Kiribati 34.8 39.6 38.8 41.4 41.8 37.1 38.0 42.2 38.7 37.4 36.7 38.0
Marshall Islands 39.8 41.6 35.7 36.3 39.0 40.8 42.7 45.2 42.4 41.5 40.6 36.1
Micronesia (F.S.) 34.7 33.4 34.7 36.2 33.9 36.3 38.5 37.0 37.8 38.3 40.7 39.0
Nauru
New Caledonia 22.6 24.0 24.8 24.6 23.8 27.2 25.2 25.6 27.4 28.9 29.3 23.8
New Zealand 22.1 23.6 25.8 25.3 24.3 22.0 22.4 22.3 23.3 22.5 25.7 21.8
Niue
Northern Mariana Islands
Palau 37.3 49.5 53.3 48.0 49.4 43.6 45.7 44.5 44.4 40.9 40.4 39.7
Papua New Guinea 38.4 43.2 45.1 45.9 44.7 47.5 50.8 52.0 62.4 64.3 60.8 47.7
Samoa 31.6 35.4 39.0 43.5 40.7 39.1 41.2 40.7 41.7 37.3 37.8 32.6
Solomon Islands 34.7 30.2 25.5 23.8 23.7 26.6 30.4 37.3 39.3 43.2 41.6 32.9
Tonga 27.6 28.7 28.0 31.4 34.8 33.0 31.9 32.7 29.1 32.1 33.7 30.4
Tuvalu 43.6 37.0 29.0 21.4 43.4 29.9 34.8 36.1 35.5 37.0 48.4 34.2
Vanuatu 28.2 28.1 25.5 26.7 26.3 26.1 27.4 28.8 35.1 31.7 35.8 33.4
Developing economies 28.1 28.3 32.3 30.4 30.2 32.3 34.9 35.2 35.4 34.1 34.8 28.3
Developed economies 8.5 8.3 9.2 9.5 9.8 10.2 11.1 12.4 14.2 15.1 16.4 12.0
All economies 17.1 16.6 19.0 19.1 19.8 21.3 23.4 25.1 26.9 27.2 28.4 22.5
Table 8. Import penetration (percentage)
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East and North-East Asia
China 8.5 -10.3 34.6 15.8 15.0 15.5 15.7 16.1 16.0
Hong Kong, China 2.6 -10.1 16.8 8.3 7.9 8.0 7.8 7.9 7.9
Japan 1.7 -24.2 24.2 4.7 8.2 8.0 7.6 7.0 7.0
Mongolia 17.6 -12.0 11.2 15.9 4.2 58.2 30.3 12.8 25.3
Republic of Korea 6.6 -0.8 14.2 11.2 11.1 10.8 10.6 10.5 10.5
South-East Asia
Brunei Darussalam -6.2 -5.3 4.1 3.1 2.6 2.1 3.7 2.7 3.4
Cambodia 11.6 -2.7 21.9 -3.4 16.5 12.2 9.4 10.1 8.1
Indonesia 0.2 5.3 9.6 6.5 7.4 6.6 6.3 6.6 7.8
Lao PDR 17.4 3.3 16.7 11.2 11.4 5.1 11.1 9.9 -2.4
Malaysia 1.3 -8.0 18.1 -0.1 6.7 7.4 7.0 6.7 6.1
Myanmar 3.8 7.2 7.2 2.2 14.8 48.7 0.3 0.7 0.6
Philippines -8.5 -8.3 23.7 5.4 6.0 5.9 6.0 5.2 4.8
Singapore 4.0 -8.1 10.5 6.3 8.3 8.9 9.2 8.8 7.1
Thailand 4.1 -12.8 16.7 3.1 5.9 5.8 5.9 7.1 7.0
Timor-Leste -23.1 -3.6 36.3 4.8 7.3 -7.5 -2.4 13.4 12.9
Viet Nam 2.9 2.6 5.2 1.4 8.9 13.4 12.7 12.8 11.2
South and South-West Asia
Afghanistan 16.6 35.7 -1.4 4.6 19.8 7.7 10.2 21.5 21.2
Bangladesh 9.2 9.4 13.1 14.8 15.0 14.4 11.8 10.1 9.5
Bhutan -3.0 -27.2 13.0 -4.6 -1.1 1.5 2.3 2.3 13.7
India 10.6 0.7 10.2 14.0 14.7 13.9 13.4 13.2 13.2
Iran ( Islamic Rep. of) -3.3 -2.9 2.7 -0.3 -1.3 2.5 2.1 0.9 1.5
Maldives 5.7 -13.2 5.1 9.1 14.4 12.6 8.9 7.5 7.4
Nepal -7.9 7.0 -17.4 -1.0 0.2 2.6 3.6 4.4 2.0
Pakistan -12.6 -21.6 25.8 2.0 0.5 -0.1 9.1 6.5 6.6
Sri Lanka 4.1 -18.3 17.5 8.6 7.5 7.1 7.0 6.9 5.9
Turkey 6.7 -8.1 5.2 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.3
North and Central Asia
Azerbaijan 5.6 9.5 0.8 3.4 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3
Georgia -1.4 -0.6 6.5 6.3 8.8 7.9 7.2 7.2 5.7
Kazakhstan 35.6 -32.2 31.7 35.2 3.7 2.8 5.4 9.0 11.5
Kyrgyzstan 17.4 1.5 -22.2 11.7 14.7 11.2 9.0 6.7 6.2
Russian Federation -5.6 -8.8 9.5 2.4 3.9 4.3 4.4 4.0 3.9
Tajikistan -9.9 4.8 -0.6 8.7 7.6 6.8 6.5 6.8 6.9
Turkmenistan -8.3 -45.3 22.0 23.8 11.5 8.5 8.0 8.1 8.7
Uzbekistan 19.1 5.9 -8.5 4.0 15.6 4.4 4.5 2.9 3.0
Pacific island economies
Australia 4.6 2.8 5.2 6.5 5.4 4.5 4.9 4.9 4.8
Kiribati -25.0 -17.9 36.1 21.0 9.2 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1
New Zealand -1.7 1.8 3.1 4.3 4.5 5.0 4.7 4.7 4.7
Papua New Guinea 4.5 -19.9 5.1 20.5 4.8 -3.9 4.5 58.9 14.8
Solomon Islands 17.5 -9.2 23.2 17.5 20.0 8.7 8.9 24.3 22.5
Vanuatu 17.4 9.1 10.3 6.8 6.8 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.5
                                                      Export growth
2008 2009 2010E 2011F 2012F 2013F 2014F 2015F 2016F
Table 9.1.  Forecast of export growth (in real terms)
 (Annual percentage change of volume)
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (April 2011).PART III – TRADE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
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East and North-East Asia
China 3.8 3.7 17.7 15.0 15.0 14.9 15.1 15.6 15.9
Hong Kong, China 2.3 -9.0 17.3 8.2 8.0 8.1 7.9 7.9 7.9
Japan 0.4 -15.4 9.8 10.2 9.8 7.8 7.9 8.0 8.0
Mongolia 34.9 -15.7 31.0 28.3 6.1 -5.7 7.5 2.4 14.6
Republic of Korea 4.4 -8.2 17.3 11.6 11.8 11.7 11.8 11.8 11.7
South-East Asia
Brunei Darussalam 11.0 -0.8 4.1 3.1 2.6 2.1 3.7 2.7 3.4
Cambodia -1.2 11.3 3.5 2.0 6.6 2.9 8.5 7.9 8.1
Indonesia 19.7 -15.0 27.5 9.7 8.4 8.3 8.1 8.0 8.0
Lao PDR 18.2 2.1 -3.0 16.9 10.7 -0.5 10.7 -3.3 -3.5
Malaysia 3.6 -7.8 19.7 1.0 7.3 7.6 8.1 7.5 6.3
Myanmar 29.9 5.7 5.8 22.7 4.7 4.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7
Philippines -5.1 -9.6 20.3 3.2 6.5 7.3 6.9 6.3 6.0
Singapore 9.4 -11.0 7.8 7.4 9.3 10.0 10.2 9.9 7.9
Thailand 12.2 -16.5 18.6 3.6 6.9 5.9 5.9 6.5 6.2
Timor-Leste 57.2 37.2 10.9 31.6 11.6 7.0 1.3 -3.2 5.9
Viet Nam 5.4 -1.5 2.5 4.9 7.4 11.3 11.1 11.0 9.4
South and South-West Asia
Afghanistan 4.8 19.3 -5.2 2.6 16.8 4.1 2.9 3.7 7.4
Bangladesh 6.9 7.9 12.1 9.5 11.7 13.9 11.7 10.3 9.1
Bhutan 23.2 -16.4 13.3 6.1 7.6 3.9 6.6 0.2 -2.3
India 10.8 8.3 11.5 11.1 9.1 9.4 9.6 9.9 10.2
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 11.1 -9.1 -0.8 -5.3 5.1 5.3 6.6 7.0 7.3
Maldives 10.7 -14.6 2.5 6.9 5.6 6.3 9.5 8.2 8.1
Nepal -2.9 14.7 13.3 -1.0 1.1 3.3 4.5 4.6 3.8
Pakistan 9.8 -0.8 -11.9 7.8 -5.6 2.3 5.4 5.5 5.6
Sri Lanka 6.7 -7.0 24.0 7.7 10.1 10.7 10.6 10.3 10.4
Turkey -1.4 -12.3 20.5 8.4 7.8 7.8 7.6 7.7 7.6
North and Central Asia
Azerbaijan 13.6 -5.3 3.5 37.6 10.3 10.7 8.6 8.8 8.4
Georgia 8.3 -18.6 0.8 4.0 5.1 4.2 4.8 4.5 6.1
Kazakhstan 7.2 -9.7 -7.7 14.6 13.1 16.8 17.2 16.2 14.7
Kyrgyzstan 23.2 -13.2 -10.8 3.0 14.5 11.2 7.0 6.0 6.0
Russian Federation 14.4 -28.7 24.7 18.7 10.7 9.9 8.9 8.6 8.3
Tajikistan 27.0 -19.1 3.5 6.6 5.3 8.8 8.8 8.7 6.7
Turkmenistan 48.9 55.3 -4.0 13.7 8.5 -1.6 3.4 4.6 -1.3
Uzbekistan 29.1 15.9 -9.5 20.1 10.4 6.3 6.7 7.3 7.7
Pacific island economies
Australia 11.5 -9.1 13.2 8.4 8.5 6.8 5.7 5.6 5.5
Kiribati 7.7 -9.6 2.4 5.5 0.7 0.3 1.9 0.4 1.4
New Zealand 2.7 -14.9 10.0 7.1 6.3 6.3 4.8 5.4 4.9
Papua New Guinea -5.3 -9.9 39.0 12.9 -8.4 -17.1 -10.5 -7.9 -10.1
Solomon Islands -7.4 -18.3 41.9 -1.7 4.5 -0.4 30.5 12.3 12.5
Vanuatu 41.1 -5.8 5.7 7.3 7.3 6.6 6.4 6.4 6.4
                                                         Import growth
2008 2009 2010E 2011F 2012F 2013F 2014F 2015F 2016F
Table 9.2. Forecast of import growth (in real terms)
 (Annual percentage change of volume)
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (April 2011).ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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Table 10.1. Leading exporters and importers from the Asia-Pacific














1 2 China 1 202 12.7 1 4  Japan 552 5.7
2 4  Japan 581 6.2 2 5  Hong Kong, China 352 3.7
3 5  Republic of Korea 364 3.9         retained imports 91 0.9
6 6  Hong Kong, China 329 3.5 3 7  Republic of Korea 323 3.4
        domestic exports 17 0.2 4 8  India 250 2.6
        re-exports 313 3.3 5 9  Singapore 246 2.6
5 8  Russian Federation 303 3.2         retained imports 114 1.2
6 9  Singapore 270 2.9 6 11  Russian Federation 192 2.0
       domestic exports 138 1.5 7 13  Australia 165 1.7
       re-exports 132 1.4 8 15  Turkey 141 1.5
7 15  India 163 1.7 9 17  Thailand 134 1.4
8 16  Malaysia 157 1.7 10 19  Malaysia 124 1.3
9 17  Australia 154 1.6 11 21  Indonesia 92 1.0
10 19  Thailand 152 1.6 12 23  Viet Nam 70 0.7
11 21  Indonesia 119 1.3 13 25  Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 50 0.5
12 22  Turkey 102 1.1 14 27  Philippines 46 0.5
13 23  Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 78 0.8 15 38  Pakistan 32 0.3
14 26  Viet Nam 57 0.6 16 40  Kazakhstan 28 0.3
15 33  Kazakhstan 43 0.5 17 41  New Zealand 26 0.3
16 38  Philippines 38 0.4 18 43  Bangladesh 22 0.2
17 43  New Zealand 25 0.3
18 46  Azerbaijan 21 0.2
19 47  Pakistan 18 0.2
20 48  Bangladesh 15 0.2
Table 10.2. Leading exporters and importers from the Asia-Pacific region














1 3 China 128.6 5.2 1 3 China 158.2 6.7
2 4 Japan 125.9 5.1 2 4 Japan 146.9 6.2
3 5 Singapore 87.8 3.5 3 5 Singapore 81.4 3.5
4 6 India 87.4 3.5 4 6 India 79.8 3.4
5 7 Hong Kong, China 86.3 3.5 5 8 Republic of Korea 75.0 3.2
6 10 Republic of Korea 57.3 2.3 6 9 Russian Federation 59.4 2.5
7 11 Australia 41.2 1.7 7 11 Hong Kong, China 44.4 1.9
8 12 Russian Federation 41.2 1.7 8 13 Australia 41.4 1.8
9 14 Turkey 32.8 1.3 9 14 Thailand 37.8 1.6
10 16 Thailand 29.9 1.2 10 19 Indonesia 27.6 1.2
11 17 Malaysia 28.1 1.1 11 20 Malaysia 27.1 1.1
12 25 Indonesia 13.2 0.5 12 23 Iran, (Islamic Rep. of)a 16.0 0.7
13 31 Philippines 10.1 0.4 13 24 Turkey 15.6 0.7
14 36 New Zealand 7.5 0.3 14 34 Kazakhstan 9.9 0.4
15 37 Iran (Islamic Rep. of)a 6.6 0.3 15 37 Philippines 8.3 0.4
16 38 Viet Nam 5.7 0.2 16 39 New Zealand 7.7 0.3
* excluding intra-European Union (27) trade.
* excluding intra-European Union (27) trade.
a  World Trade Organization estimate.PART III – TRADE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
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East and North-East Asia -1.3 7.3 10.7 26.4 14.9 16.3 21.4 17.5 -12.2 21.7 525 816
China 9.1 19.7 17.8 33.8 19.1 23.7 33.1 20.4 -12.2 32.3 170 200
DPR Korea
Hong Kong, China 1.7 8.5 4.4 18.5 15.5 14.2 16.5 8.7 -6.2 25.1 108 000
Japan -6.7 2.0 8.7 24.9 13.8 12.8 10.4 15.3 -14.0 9.2 137 555
Macao, China 14.9 26.3 17.8 40.2 6.8 21.0 36.6 26.3 5.7 51.3 28 004
Mongolia 47.6 63.6 13.4 62.4 24.3 18.0 19.1 -13.6 -17.0 18.2 487
Republic of Korea -4.9 0.9 14.4 27.8 12.0 14.5 29.0 25.3 -19.0 12.6 81 570
South-East Asia 0.3 9.8 6.4 31.8 12.2 16.0 27.6 12.2 -6.6 17.7 216 304
Brunei Darussalam 143.8 -11.5 2.3 24.7 13.2 20.8 9.2 6.6 5.5
Cambodia 22.4 15.3 -9.3 45.6 35.0 16.9 21.5 6.8 -1.3 5.3 1 676
Indonesia 5.9 21.6 -21.1 128.5 6.9 -11.8 8.8 22.0 -10.1 25.0 16 548
Lao PDR 5.2 8.3 -27.3 44.3 15.6 9.9 26.0 40.8 2.4
Malaysia 3.8 2.9 -8.8 26.3 14.5 10.8 36.2 3.1 -5.1 13.1 32 478
Myanmar -15.6 4.1 -43.5 1.8 2.4 8.0
Philippines -9.0 11.6 -1.1 19.3 11.9 42.4 51.6 -0.5 5.5 20.8 12 377
Singapore 0.3 7.8 22.9 27.7 15.0 19.0 28.4 16.7 -5.8 19.8 111 736
Thailand -6.2 18.3 2.6 20.6 5.7 23.1 22.3 9.7 -10.2 14.5 33 985
Timor-Leste 83.4 -29.5 5.9
Viet Nam 4.0 4.9 11.0 18.2 9.4 19.6 26.8 8.4 -18.5 32.4 7 503
South and South-West Asia -5.7 7.3 23.4 39.2 26.9 19.6 21.0 19.6 -10.4 7.3 146 943
Afghanistan
Bangladesh -14.1 25.6 30.2 5.7 12.8 27.1 13.8 31.2 3.9 24.0 1 159
Bhutan 21.4 -6.9 -9.4 35.2 54.0 -1.1 23.4 -2.3 7.8
India 4.8 13.8 23.6 60.5 37.6 33.1 24.7 19.9 -13.1 21.4 109 514
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 57.9 65.7 16.8 -0.2 12.6 12.9 22.5 15.8 -5.0
Maldives 1.6 2.5 19.2 17.7 -37.2 73.4 16.2 7.8 -4.9 16.6 763
Nepal -26.2 -36.5 57.3 17.6 -23.7 -7.3 34.9 45.6 10.9
Pakistan 1.4 14.9 -1.3 16.5 18.8 9.9 -0.9 13.8 0.7 8.2 2 757
Sri Lanka 45.8 -6.5 11.4 8.4 0.8 5.6 9.4 12.9 -5.4
Turkey -21.7 -7.3 28.1 26.6 16.7 -4.5 13.2 20.3 -5.1 0.4 32 750
North and Central Asia 17.5 19.5 18.6 26.0 20.4 24.9 26.2 28.4 -16.2 6.6 52 803
Armenia 37.7 -1.8 13.2 62.7 24.2 18.0 20.2 11.3 -8.7 15.4 669
Azerbaijan 9.1 25.4 22.0 15.8 37.7 34.7 39.3 24.1 14.8 16.3 1 941
Georgia 45.1 23.7 13.0 21.4 27.4 23.7 21.9 18.5 5.9 21.4 1 487
Kazakhstan 20.7 24.7 12.1 18.9 10.0 29.2 25.8 22.5 -4.2 0.1 3 815
Kyrgyzstan
Russian Federation 17.3 19.9 19.6 27.2 20.9 24.8 26.2 29.7 -18.7 6.4 43 702
Tajikistan -0.6 -3.3 9.6 22.5 27.2 7.3 5.6 14.7 6.1
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan 3.5 2.7 12.9 6.8 15.2 17.2 24.4 24.3 -13.4 14.6 1 187
Pacific island economies -6.7 14.2 22.8 19.4 8.4 3.6 20.6 9.4 -9.9 11.2 57 048
American Samoa
Australia -8.9 8.3 21.2 19.9 9.1 6.8 22.6 11.9 -8.1 16.6 47 715
Cook Islands
Fiji -2.8 22.2 22.7 13.7 23.8 -6.2 6.4 15.6 -28.3
French Polynesia 23.4 9.9 7.7 -8.0 17.5 5.7 -15.9
Guam




New Caledonia 27.1 15.9 -31.9 15.7 24.8 14.3 -16.6




Papua New Guinea 17.5 -42.7 35.7 -14.8 52.4 5.8 2.9 1.4 -49.0 104.0 331
Samoa 20.3 17.6 -1.6 2.2 11.6
Solomon Islands 3.7 -66.7 52.1 11.9 38.6 40.0 9.2 -3.7 27.3 32.6 91
Tonga 24.5 3.1 20.3 -5.0 39.8 -23.8 1.6 49.3 -13.1 17.6 35
Tuvalu
Vanuatu -5.2 -19.5 19.5 9.0 14.4 3.9 26.4 25.8 5.0
Developing economies 1.1 10.7 12.6 30.4 17.0 18.2 25.8 17.7 -10.4 18.5 804 767
Developed economies -6.8 4.3 12.5 23.4 12.2 10.4 13.2 13.6 -12.7 11.2 194 147
All economies -1.2 8.9 12.6 28.6 15.8 16.3 22.8 16.8 -10.9 17.0 998 914
Table 11.1. Commercial services exports to the world
Annual percentage change Value ($ million)
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East and North-East Asia -1.7 5.7 7.1 23.3 9.5 14.1 18.8 15.8 -8.3 14.9 496 973
China 8.9 18.1 19.0 30.5 16.2 20.6 28.8 22.2 0.1 21.6 192 200
DPR Korea
Hong Kong, China 0.9 4.2 0.6 19.2 9.2 9.1 15.0 10.5 -5.4 15.4 51 225
Japan -6.1 -0.9 2.1 20.0 2.0 9.4 11.0 12.6 -12.2 5.6 155 235
Macao, China 8.0 19.4 9.6 17.8 15.4 20.7 41.6 30.2 -9.5 46.0 4 583
Mongolia 25.5 31.6 -4.5 99.8 -5.8 9.9 -11.4 31.2 -8.9 38.1 753
Republic of Korea -1.3 11.7 10.3 23.9 18.1 17.6 21.1 13.7 -16.7 16.9 92 978
South-East Asia 2.1 5.3 10.7 20.2 10.6 13.4 16.5 15.5 -9.8 19.3 226 250
Brunei Darussalam 21.5 -18.3 16.3 4.0 2.0 10.1 7.8 5.9 2.9
Cambodia 6.1 8.2 15.5 18.1 25.8 20.4 14.6 7.3 0.5 17.1 1 100
Indonesia 1.4 7.5 2.4 20.1 5.9 -3.0 13.7 16.3 -1.3 18.1 32 624
Lao PDR 95.3 -11.3 -0.5 7.3 18.9 7.7 22.3 111.3 43.5
Malaysia -0.4 -1.8 6.6 9.5 14.7 7.7 21.6 5.6 -9.3 17.5 32 040
Myanmar 11.3 -14.1 36.1 10.1 9.4 12.6
Philippines 2.4 1.7 -1.2 8.4 0.5 7.1 19.0 12.9 1.5 25.0 10 597
Singapore 6.8 4.7 19.6 24.0 10.8 17.9 14.6 17.2 -9.3 21.4 96 067
Thailand -5.6 14.5 8.6 27.3 17.3 22.2 16.2 20.6 -18.4 21.0 45 429
Timor-Leste 40.1 50.0 13.2
Viet Nam 4.0 9.3 9.5 17.0 -6.7 15.0 40.4 10.4 -14.2 24.2 8 392
South and South-West Asia -1.9 10.3 20.4 42.6 25.0 17.8 22.1 21.2 -9.2 15.7 145 716
Afghanistan
Bangladesh -6.6 -7.4 21.0 15.1 9.6 5.0 26.6 30.8 -8.4 21.4 3 887
Bhutan -8.1 40.7 80.5 -4.8 24.7 -54.8 -6.8 67.6 -22.5
India 4.7 5.0 18.8 43.0 32.7 24.4 20.9 24.7 -8.5 45.6 116 906
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 13.4 119.5 19.5 51.3 7.0 9.6 29.4 16.8 0.8
Maldives 0.5 1.3 8.1 30.6 35.5 7.7 17.0 29.8 -18.6 7.0 299
Nepal 6.3 12.5 11.5 45.8 12.8 15.2 46.7 17.3 -8.3
Pakistan 5.1 -5.5 48.1 64.4 41.3 12.3 4.1 10.2 -36.4 8.7 6 414
Sri Lanka 9.0 -10.5 6.0 13.7 9.6 15.0 8.9 15.9 -16.4
Turkey -26.1 -1.9 21.0 37.1 12.4 4.1 35.4 14.1 -6.2 17.1 18 210
North and Central Asia 24.2 19.6 16.4 24.6 19.6 15.3 29.8 23.1 -18.0 15.2 86 234
Armenia 8.5 12.9 21.6 58.9 23.4 16.2 28.6 23.2 -11.8 12.0 940
Azerbaijan 36.8 97.3 58.0 33.3 -2.9 6.0 19.4 15.1 -13.8 14.5 3 774
Georgia 6.8 40.0 9.7 23.9 32.8 17.7 27.0 32.5 -21.3 8.8 990
Kazakhstan 42.5 34.4 5.9 36.3 45.8 16.9 33.1 -4.9 -9.5 3.6 10 237
Kyrgyzstan
Russian Federation 22.1 15.3 15.9 21.6 17.3 15.6 30.0 29.7 -19.5 18.0 69 879
Tajikistan 22.1 48.1 16.1 71.1 22.1 56.8 50.3 -23.3 -36.2
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan 29.0 -11.0 5.2 40.1 0.5 -5.6 -2.8 9.4 -2.7 -0.4 414
Pacific island economies -7.5 11.2 19.5 25.9 11.0 4.2 22.0 17.3 -14.7 17.0 62 014
American Samoa
Australia -8.3 5.9 19.2 27.5 9.2 5.7 24.0 21.5 -14.5 22.5 49 842
Cook Islands
Fiji -11.7 -4.4 40.7 20.7 8.6 2.3 0.2 15.0 -24.7
French Polynesia 12.8 11.3 10.6 -25.8 12.9 24.3 -7.1
Guam




New Caledonia 28.9 11.2 40.5 34.4 16.9 5.3 -20.7




Papua New Guinea -14.3 26.1 15.3 11.9 17.2 25.5 22.8 -6.6 5.4 57.5 3 016
Samoa 33.8 2.2 11.2 0.4 2.6
Solomon Islands 13.9 -39.2 27.6 -31.4 33.2 17.3 43.0 19.1 -16.0 61.6 153
Tonga 28.8 16.4 13.9 2.6 6.0 -10.2 7.0 34.0 -10.6 -3.3 38
Tuvalu
Vanuatu 6.6 -28.8 17.3 9.4 12.6 -3.4 6.5 43.5 -0.5
Developing economies 3.7 10.6 13.1 26.2 15.9 16.0 21.9 18.2 -9.2 18.0 803 145
Developed economies -6.4 0.5 5.3 21.6 3.9 8.0 13.7 14.0 -13.0 9.5 214 041
All economies 0.2 7.3 10.7 24.8 12.5 13.9 19.8 17.2 -10.1 16.1 1 017 187
Table 11.2. Commercial services imports from the world
Annual percentage change Value ($ million)
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East and North-East Asia
China 39.0 39.0 41.5 41.2 40.4 40.5 40.9 40.9 41.8 43.4
Hong Kong, China 86.5 86.5 88.3 89.2 89.9 90.6 91.2 91.2
Japan 65.8 65.8 67.9 68.0 67.9 68.0 68.5 68.5 70.6
Macao, China 90.3 90.3 92.7 91.4 91.5 88.7 85.1 85.1
Mongolia 47.0 47.0 53.8 51.4 44.8 40.9 35.9 35.9 39.2 43.8
Republic of Korea 57.3 57.3 59.8 59.6 58.1 59.0 59.7 59.7 60.8 60.9
South-East Asia
Brunei Darussalam 35.3 35.3 38.2 34.6 31.0 27.5 26.1 26.1
Cambodia 39.1 39.1 41.5 40.1 41.7 41.2 40.8 40.8 41.3 42.0
Indonesia 38.5 38.5 40.1 41.1 41.0 39.2 38.3 38.3 36.5 35.2
Lao PDR 24.6 24.6 25.0 25.3 25.7 39.4 37.1 37.1 37.1
Malaysia 43.1 43.1 45.9 44.1 42.2 41.9 41.5 41.5 41.7 46.2
Myanmar 33.1 33.1 32.5 35.1 35.4
Philippines 52.0 52.0 53.1 53.4 53.2 53.8 54.2 54.2 53.4 55.0
Singapore 64.3 64.3 67.2 68.0 66.7 68.9 69.2 69.2 74.0
Thailand 49.0 49.0 48.1 46.0 46.3 45.8 44.9 44.9 44.2 45.1
Timor-Leste 55.7 55.7
Viet Nam 38.7 38.7 38.5 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.1 38.1 37.9 38.8
South and South-West Asia
Afghanistan 35.1 35.3 35.0 35.2 39.2 39.2 45.2 45.4
Bangladesh 49.2 49.2 50.9 52.0 52.4 52.6 52.5 52.5 52.5 52.6
Bhutan 36.3 36.3 35.1 35.0 36.1 38.2 38.6 38.6 35.2 37.4
India 50.5 50.5 52.7 52.8 53.1 53.0 52.9 52.9 54.4 54.6
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 49.5 49.5 46.6 47.1 46.0 45.1 46.0 46.0 0.0 0.0
Maldives 76.2 76.2 74.0 74.7 74.8 71.9 74.9 74.9 75.7 77.5
Nepal 37.0 37.0 43.3 44.3 45.0 46.0 48.2 48.2 49.6 50.2
Pakistan 50.7 50.7 52.8 52.7 50.8 51.4 52.8 52.8 52.9 54.2
Sri Lanka 52.8 52.8 57.7 58.3 58.8 58.0 58.0 58.0 57.2 57.7
Turkey 57.2 57.2 59.6 60.0 60.6 60.7 61.8 61.8 63.7 64.9
North and Central Asia
Armenia 39.0 39.0 39.0 37.8 37.4 33.8 34.9 34.9 37.2 44.8
Azerbaijan 37.5 37.5 34.6 34.0 33.4 26.5 23.8 23.8 23.8 31.8
Georgia 55.7 55.7 55.0 53.8 55.7 56.5 62.3 62.3 68.7 69.0
Kazakhstan 50.8 50.8 52.8 53.9 54.8 53.1 52.0 52.0 51.0 53.3
Kyrgyzstan 31.9 31.9 39.0 40.6 42.6 45.7 47.2 47.2 51.5
Russian Federation 55.6 55.6 60.9 61.2 58.1 57.0 58.2 58.2 59.7 62.5
Tajikistan 33.7 33.7 35.9 35.4 46.6 44.7 47.8 47.8 48.4 53.9
Turkmenistan 31.2 31.2 35.6 38.4 40.4 43.6 46.3 46.3 34.0 34.2
Uzbekistan 42.5 42.5 43.7 43.4 43.3 48.9 46.5 46.5 47.9 47.3
Pacific island economies
Australia 69.6 69.6 69.8 70.4 70.4 70.0 68.9 68.9 68.4
Fiji 60.6 60.6 61.8 63.2 62.2 66.8 66.6 66.6 67.6 68.8
Kiribati 65.7 65.7 65.2 64.1 63.8 67.5 66.4 66.4 63.7 61.8
New Zealand 66.1 66.1 68.2 68.8 68.8 69.3 69.4 69.4
Papua New Guinea 22.8 22.8 23.3 23.1 23.3 19.9 19.0 19.0 18.4 19.6
Samoa 57.2 57.2 57.0 57.0 56.0 56.2 57.7 57.7 57.7 61.4
Solomon Islands 52.6 52.6 56.8 49.3 52.9 57.4 57.6 57.6 52.7 55.0
Tonga 55.9 55.9 57.2 56.4 56.7 58.8 62.3 62.3 62.0 61.9
Vanuatu 62.4 62.4 64.2 66.6 66.3 67.3 68.5 68.5 68.3
Table 12. Services, value added (percentage of GDP)
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East and North-East Asia
China 2.9 2.9 4.4 5.3 5.9 6.1 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.3
Hong Kong, China 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.3 36.4
Japan 4.1 4.1 3.7 3.4 3.4 3.6 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.0
Macao, China 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mongolia 9.7 9.7 9.4 14.1 17.4 12.4 14.3 14.3 23.1 24.5
Republic of Korea 7.5 7.5 7.4 7.7 8.4 9.4 9.5 9.5 14.5 12.1
South-East Asia
Brunei Darussalam 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cambodia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.3 10.7 10.7 11.5 16.2
Indonesia 7.5 7.5 8.3 8.7 9.2 9.4 9.6 9.6 17.4 12.1
Lao PDR 5.8 5.8 11.8 12.1 15.5 12.4 12.3 12.3 18.8 12.5
Malaysia 21.2 21.2 20.8 23.8 28.7 29.9 32.4 32.4 34.1 33.7
Myanmar 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Philippines 11.3 11.3 13.3 14.3 17.8 22.0 27.0 27.0 27.0 11.2
Singapore 58.2 58.2 51.8 51.4 52.3 57.6 55.6 55.6 53.6 62.5
Thailand 14.9 14.9 17.6 18.8 18.7 20.0 20.1 20.1 22.5 23.0
Timor-Leste 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Viet Nam 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.4 18.4 21.2 19.3
South and South-West Asia
Afghanistan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bangladesh 3.6 3.6 4.0 4.4 4.8 5.9 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.8
Bhutan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
India 3.4 3.4 4.8 4.2 4.4 4.8 4.7 4.7 6.3 7.1
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 3.8 3.8 0.0 11.1 5.5 3.2 3.6 3.6 4.4 3.5
Maldives 64.7 64.7 71.5 67.6 73.1 77.6 83.7 83.7 79.6 76.5
Nepal 10.2 10.2 14.7 16.0 21.5 22.5 22.1 22.1 15.7 17.2
Pakistan 8.8 8.8 8.7 8.2 8.3 7.9 8.6 8.6 5.9 5.6
Sri Lanka 13.4 13.4 14.9 14.6 15.4 15.5 14.2 14.2 14.4 15.2
Turkey 7.4 7.4 8.2 8.1 11.2 11.6 10.8 10.8 12.3 10.2
North and Central Asia
Armenia 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.8 4.1 5.5 12.9 12.9 17.9 18.1
Azerbaijan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.6 18.6 18.6 23.2 16.2
Georgia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.7 15.7
Kazakhstan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.4 7.6 7.6 9.3 12.1
Kyrgyzstan 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 6.2 14.1 15.3 15.3 14.5 17.6
Russian Federation 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 7.8 8.2 8.2 10.6 11.4
Tajikistan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Turkmenistan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.6 20.6 0.0 0.0
Uzbekistan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Pacific island economies
Australia 7.6 7.6 7.6 8.1 9.2 9.1 9.4 9.4 8.8 9.7
Fiji 50.4 50.4 49.4 49.1 49.3 48.9 48.2 48.2 51.6 47.1
Kiribati 93.0 93.0 66.4 69.4 61.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
New Zealand 13.1 13.1 15.2 13.9 14.1 14.6 13.8 13.8 14.9 15.5
Papua New Guinea 18.9 18.9 23.2 22.3 15.3 20.8 23.5 23.5 29.3 28.1
Samoa 53.9 53.9 67.9 62.4 36.1 45.4 44.7 44.7 38.2 37.2
Solomon Islands 34.4 34.4 30.1 30.0 33.5 22.9 24.5 24.5 23.3 29.8
Tonga 43.8 43.8 28.4 26.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Vanuatu 53.0 53.0 49.3 52.6 50.9 50.0 52.7 52.7 63.1 67.5
Table 13. Trade in services (percentage of GDP)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009PART III – TRADE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
167
East and North-East Asia 13.6 14.5 14.2 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.2 13.6 14.1 14.8 14.0
China 10.8 11.0 10.8 9.6 9.5 8.8 8.6 9.1 9.3 9.7 9.7
DPR  Korea
Hong Kong, China 16.6 17.7 18.1 16.9 17.2 17.9 18.4 19.5 19.9 20.8 21.2
Japan 12.7 13.8 13.7 13.2 13.7 14.6 15.1 15.1 15.8 17.8 15.2
Macao, China 56.4 62.1 66.9 68.5 73.6 77.2 79.9 84.5 89.8 95.1 97.0
Mongolia 12.1 17.3 25.4 24.8 27.5 27.8 23.8 23.3 16.4 17.8 14.4
Republic of Korea 15.1 16.3 15.4 14.8 14.5 14.5 14.5 16.1 17.5 16.6 14.9
South-East Asia 13.7 15.0 15.6 14.4 15.7 15.3 15.1 16.8 16.6 18.4 17.1
Brunei Darussalam 4.8 11.7 10.3 9.0 9.7 9.0 8.9 9.6 7.8 11.3
Cambodia 23.3 25.7 23.7 20.4 22.0 25.6 25.2 27.0 25.5 27.0 25.0
Indonesia 7.2 8.5 9.9 7.4 14.2 12.6 9.7 9.3 9.5 10.0 9.5
Lao PDR 28.8 30.6 33.6 24.8 30.5 25.0 18.7 21.7 24.8 26.8
Malaysia 12.3 14.0 13.6 11.4 11.8 12.1 11.8 14.3 13.2 15.4 14.0
Myanmar 21.8 14.0 11.7 8.4 8.9 5.9 5.3
Philippines 7.8 8.6 8.9 8.6 9.2 9.9 12.0 16.2 16.5 21.1 19.4
Singapore 17.1 19.0 19.7 19.1 19.5 19.5 19.6 22.1 22.6 25.7 24.1
Thailand 16.6 16.6 18.3 16.3 16.4 15.3 16.0 16.4 15.7 16.3 14.8
Timor-Leste 80.1 88.2 77.2 84.6
Viet Nam 15.7 15.8 15.0 14.0 12.7 11.5 11.3 11.7 10.0 9.0 9.4
South and South-West Asia 24.9 23.7 23.5 23.2 24.8 25.1 24.7 24.8 23.9 26.1 23.4
Afghanistan
Bangladesh 4.2 3.8 4.7 5.4 4.8 4.9 4.9 5.2 5.5 5.8 5.7
Bhutan 16.2 18.6 16.6 13.3 13.1 14.1 9.2 7.1 8.9 9.9
India 27.4 27.9 28.0 28.6 33.1 34.4 36.3 36.6 34.8 35.4 33.6
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 4.7 8.1 13.3 11.5 9.5 8.0 6.7 7.1 6.5 8.7
Maldives 76.1 76.1 73.2 73.8 73.6 66.2 70.9 73.7 67.6 79.5 80.1
Nepal 33.8 29.1 25.3 31.4 31.6 23.9 23.1 28.1 34.5 40.0
Pakistan 12.5 12.4 13.1 11.0 11.4 11.3 11.7 11.1 11.1 12.7 11.4
Sri Lanka 14.4 21.7 21.0 21.3 20.7 19.3 18.9 18.5 19.0 20.3
Turkey 41.0 32.5 27.9 27.5 26.4 26.5 22.8 21.0 20.7 24.2 22.3
North and Central Asia 8.6 10.2 11.4 10.7 10.0 9.1 8.9 9.4 8.9 11.3 9.4
Armenia 30.7 34.3 25.8 22.5 31.0 29.3 32.5 33.1 37.5 45.0 39.8
Azerbaijan 11.8 10.0 12.9 13.1 11.1 7.5 6.1 5.2 4.5 7.3 6.6
Georgia 39.0 48.5 51.7 47.6 44.0 42.8 46.1 44.2 43.6 51.9 48.5
Kazakhstan 9.3 11.2 12.4 10.6 8.3 6.7 6.3 6.4 5.3 8.1 6.1
Kyrgyzstan
Russian Federation 8.3 9.9 11.1 10.6 10.0 9.2 9.2 9.9 9.7 11.9 9.8
Tajikistan 7.4 8.7 7.5 7.6 8.1 10.2 7.3 7.3 8.7 12.3
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan 13.7 14.6 15.9 14.4 11.8 12.2 12.1 10.7 10.4 8.8 9.1
Pacific island economies 23.0 21.9 23.8 25.8 25.4 23.6 21.9 22.7 20.0 21.6 18.4
American Samoa
Australia 23.3 21.8 22.8 24.8 24.3 22.3 20.8 22.0 19.2 21.0 18.3
Cook Islands
Fiji 40.9 42.3 48.3 46.9 49.2 54.3 52.9 52.4 51.0 52.2
French Polynesia 78.2 83.8 81.7 81.5 78.9 84.0 80.0 84.6
Guam




New Caledonia 34.8 29.8 27.2 19.4 18.4 15.3 25.1 26.0




Papua New Guinea 10.4 13.6 9.1 9.1 6.9 8.1 6.8 6.3 5.3 3.6 6.0
Samoa 52.4 56.5 67.1 57.3 65.0 76.4
Solomon Islands 39.4 49.7 21.1 24.2 21.3 26.1 29.6 25.3 20.3 29.5 29.1
Tonga 61.3 72.5 55.7 55.7 58.3 74.6 70.0 72.8 78.2 79.0 81.2
Tuvalu
Vanuatu 82.0 84.9 81.9 80.0 76.0 78.1 74.2 78.0 79.7 80.2
Developing economies 14.7 15.5 15.6 14.5 14.9 14.5 14.2 15.0 14.9 16.3 15.2
Developed economies 14.3 15.3 15.4 15.4 15.7 16.3 16.4 16.6 16.7 18.7 16.1
All economies 14.6 15.4 15.6 14.7 15.1 14.9 14.7 15.3 15.3 16.7 15.3
Table 14.1. Services export as a percentage of total export
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East and North-East Asia 16.9 17.3 17.2 15.5 15.3 14.7 14.5 15.0 14.7 16.2 14.3
China 13.7 13.8 13.5 11.7 11.3 11.2 11.3 11.9 12.2 13.6 12.1
DPR  Korea
Hong Kong, China 10.3 10.9 11.0 10.0 10.2 10.1 9.9 10.3 10.7 11.2 10.4
Japan 21.7 22.1 22.5 20.7 20.9 19.2 18.8 19.3 18.0 21.0 18.3
Macao, China 23.6 23.7 25.8 26.2 24.8 25.7 26.4 30.6 37.1 39.8 43.1
Mongolia 20.4 23.7 27.4 23.7 32.7 28.3 25.7 17.7 14.2 20.4 18.7
Republic of Korea 17.1 18.8 19.4 18.4 18.2 18.4 18.3 19.0 18.0 19.8 17.9
South-East Asia 18.6 20.4 20.3 20.1 19.5 18.6 18.5 19.0 18.3 20.8 19.2
Brunei Darussalam 41.0 44.6 32.9 40.0 39.3 38.7 38.2 34.7 31.5 33.1
Cambodia 14.2 14.0 13.7 14.2 13.6 13.9 13.7 13.8 12.6 13.8 12.8
Indonesia 26.1 29.4 30.4 28.9 27.3 22.4 20.9 20.6 18.1 23.5 19.9
Lao PDR 2.4 4.7 4.8 4.6 3.3 3.1 2.8 3.4 5.4 7.5
Malaysia 16.8 18.3 16.9 17.2 15.3 15.9 15.2 16.2 16.1 18.0 16.3
Myanmar 11.4 10.7 11.2 16.2 16.8 20.1 17.6
Philippines 12.3 13.2 11.6 11.1 11.1 10.5 10.3 11.3 12.1 15.6 15.4
Singapore 18.2 21.6 22.4 22.7 22.3 21.6 21.4 22.0 21.4 24.4 23.6
Thailand 19.8 18.9 20.4 19.2 19.5 18.5 20.3 21.4 20.4 21.9 19.9
Timor-Leste 69.7 64.0 64.5 65.2
Viet Nam 17.2 17.3 15.8 13.8 12.9 10.7 10.1 10.2 8.9 8.8 9.0
South and South-West Asia 18.6 19.6 18.9 18.1 18.9 18.4 18.2 18.2 17.2 19.4 18.0
Afghanistan
Bangladesh 14.6 13.6 13.3 13.3 13.2 12.6 11.6 12.6 12.8 12.8 12.3
Bhutan 20.9 18.2 23.3 30.2 20.0 24.9 12.1 9.3 14.2 11.7 0.0
India 26.8 28.2 26.9 25.4 26.1 24.7 24.6 23.5 21.5 23.8 26.6
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 13.5 12.8 20.7 20.6 23.3 20.6 21.9 24.7 23.1 25.6
Maldives 21.7 21.6 21.9 20.1 19.5 22.0 19.6 19.5 19.9 22.4 21.2
Nepal 10.9 12.2 14.0 12.8 16.2 15.7 16.4 18.7 19.0 14.9
Pakistan 16.3 17.9 15.7 19.2 22.1 22.1 21.3 20.5 18.0 15.7 14.5
Sri Lanka 18.2 22.5 20.3 19.8 19.0 18.8 18.7 18.5 17.6 19.6
Turkey 12.3 12.0 9.7 8.8 8.6 8.1 7.1 7.9 7.6 9.9 8.9
North and Central Asia 24.9 25.6 27.1 25.7 24.8 23.6 21.4 20.6 19.8 22.6 21.5
Armenia 16.7 18.0 18.0 17.1 23.7 22.3 21.5 19.1 17.7 20.2 19.9
Azerbaijan 28.8 31.2 43.5 43.6 43.5 37.6 34.6 35.5 33.6 33.6 35.7
Georgia 23.4 23.5 28.9 23.7 19.2 19.0 15.7 14.3 15.5 17.2 16.3
Kazakhstan 26.7 28.8 34.7 30.6 28.4 29.8 26.7 25.9 22.4 25.8 25.6
Kyrgyzstan
Russian Federation 26.7 26.9 27.3 25.8 24.9 23.2 21.0 20.3 20.1 23.6 22.0
Tajikistan 7.8 9.2 12.5 12.0 14.7 15.8 18.6 19.4 12.2 10.1
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan 8.5 10.3 10.6 10.2 11.1 10.4 8.4 5.8 4.4 4.4 4.7
Pacific island economies 20.9 21.2 20.9 20.4 20.9 20.5 19.7 20.2 19.9 20.7 20.2
American Samoa
Australia 20.6 21.0 19.9 19.4 20.0 19.3 18.5 19.2 19.2 19.7 19.8
Cook Islands
Fiji 28.0 24.4 23.2 24.1 24.3 23.8 22.2 22.2 20.7 23.7
French Polynesia 29.1 27.4 30.7 29.9 24.8 24.9 25.9 29.1
Guam




New Caledonia 29.3 25.9 26.8 32.1 34.8 32.0 30.1 30.0




Papua New Guinea 40.2 38.2 42.3 41.3 39.0 42.2 41.2 39.4 33.8 37.4 49.4
Samoa 16.3 18.7 16.9 19.0 17.8 21.7
Solomon Islands 43.2 47.0 42.0 39.8 25.9 23.4 23.4 24.8 25.6 26.0 33.8
Tonga 20.9 24.6 23.7 25.2 23.6 22.1 20.9 18.8 20.9 21.4 17.9
Tuvalu
Vanuatu 41.8 42.5 34.6 34.6 32.2 31.5 23.4 23.5 24.4 25.5
Developing economies 12.4 13.4 13.8 13.1 13.1 12.9 12.9 13.4 13.1 14.7 13.5
Developed economies 88.4 86.0 85.6 83.9 82.5 80.1 77.8 74.7 72.7 73.2 73.8
All economies 18.0 18.8 18.8 17.5 17.4 16.8 16.5 16.8 16.4 18.2 16.5
Table 14.2. Services import as a percentage of total import
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010PART III – TRADE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
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Table 21. Inward and outward FDI flows
FDI net inflows FDI outflows
$ million percentage per annum $ million percentage per annum
2009 90-94 95-99 00-04 05-09 2009 90-94 95-99 00-04 05-09
East and North-East Asia 163 974 47.0 18.1 -1.7 8.7 185 646 -5.5 -2.5 -2.7 20.0
China 95 000 76.4 1.8 10.5 7.0 48 000 24.6 -2.9 56.5 40.7
DPR Korea 2 -67.7 521.1 175.5 -55.5 0 64.3 -21.5 -18.3
Hong Kong, China 48 449 24.3 41.0 -13.9 9.6 52 269 72.0 -6.2 -6.3 17.7
Japan 11 939 -16.3 318.7 -1.6 44.0 74 699 -22.7 0.1 -0.5 13.0
Macao, China 2 303 64.1 44.0 16.7 196 34.3
Mongolia 437 2 782.1 32.7 14.7 23.9 -90
Republic of Korea 5 844 1.2 67.0 0.0 -4.6 10 572 23.7 4.3 -1.2 25.2
South-East Asia 36 806 12.4 0.5 11.4 -2.5 21 284 47.6 -3.7 19.8 4.1
Brunei Darussalam 311 -4.2 6.4 -11.7 1.9 30 4 983.4 -27.1 19.3 -10.7
Cambodia 533 11.4 -3.0 8.7 -1 -3.5
Indonesia 4 877 19.0 -12.5 2 949 -51.7 118.3 -1.0
Lao PDR 157 77.2 -12.6 -15.9 54.2 0 57.0 -31.8 -100.0
Malaysia 1 381 15.1 -9.5 5.1 -23.6 8 038 106.1 -13.0 0.4 28.2
Myanmar 323 -12.0 -1.1 4.8 8.2 0
Philippines 1 948 30.4 -3.8 -25.6 1.2 359 92.5 7.9 46.7 17.4
Singapore 16 809 11.3 9.5 6.3 2.1 5 979 22.5 4.2 16.2 -14.6
Thailand 5 949 -14.6 31.0 14.5 -7.3 3 818 33.8 -20.8 63.9
Timor-Leste 18 -100.0 318.1 0
Viet Nam 4 500 81.3 -4.5 5.7 22.2 112 14.5
South and South-West Asia 49 016 30.0 2.2 23.2 19.1 16 825 41.5 21.5 38.4
Afghanistan 185 568.7 475.8 -9.1 0
Bangladesh 716 36.2 35.3 -5.6 -4.1 15 -20.5 -56.7 29.9 46.5
Bhutan 36 -95.0 1 14.1 1 017.1 41.8 0
India 34 613 42.4 0.2 12.6 46.0 14 897 92.3 -9.5 43.4 49.5
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 3 016 15.5 96.1 -1.0 356 102.9 171.6 32.7 -5.8
Maldives 10 11.8 14.2 3.1 0.3 0
Nepal 39 -100.0 -3.7 99.4 0
Pakistan 2 387 29.8 2.0 37.9 2.0 -14 -15.9 1 103.8 50.2
Sri Lanka 404 40.0 32.6 7.7 10.4 20 78.2 43.9 31.6 -14.8
Turkey 7 611 -2.9 -3.0 29.8 -6.6 1 551 54.6 -2.7 9.9
North and Central Asia 55 619 351.1 12.2 52.5 32.7 49 551 38.4 44.3 37.8
Armenia 838 23.9 48.2 24.2 36.8 53 67.8
Azerbaijan 473 23.0 128.7 -27.1 326 531.0 -28.1
Georgia 764 92.4 39.2 14.0 -1 32.1 -68.3
Kazakhstan 12 649 10.5 33.9 58.9 3 119 92.6
Kyrgyzstan 60 -17.5 8.8 -3 76.8
Russian Federation 38 722 12.5 54.4 31.7 46 057 38.2 44.3 37.8
Tajikistan 8 3 209.8 -9.5 84.4 -38.8 0
Turkmenistan 1 355 5 565.1 -14.4 28.2 34.2 0
Uzbekistan 750 24.0 40.7 0
Pacific island economies 24 782 -8.9 -31.0 27.4 18 105 6.3 -29.0 20.8
American Samoa
Australia 22 572 -14.8 -34.9 28.4 18 426 30.7 -42.0 26.2
Cook Islands 1 -40.7 -62.7 29.0 0 113.8 -100.0
Fiji 238 -4.0 8.5 203.2 10.9 5 8.9 -17.3
French Polynesia 34 -48.6 20.8 33.9 44.7 18 -100.0 3.3
Guam
Kiribati 2 9.5 3 531.9 1.7 30.4 0
Marshall Islands 8 -57.5 5.2 0 85.6 -100.0
Micronesia (F.S.) 8 272.3 0
Nauru 0 -100.0 25.7 123.6 -26.9 0
New Caledonia 955 -81.1 58.3 41 58.7 7.8
New Zealand 348 11.6 -24.2 15.9 -30.9 -406 -4.0 -11.9 -28.1
Niue 0 -100.0 0 -5.9
Northern Mariana Islands
Palau 2 -100.0 -17.1 23.2 0 -100.0 -100.0
Papua New Guinea 396 -18.1 -16.0 -28.5 85.4 4 -44.9 -52.9 -9.7
Samoa 1 -17.9 -12.7 1 -8.0
Solomon Islands 173 -33.0 43.1 74.7 14 -30.2 199.5
Tonga 15 93.1 -1.8 -1.1 -3.5 2 -100.0 -23.8
Tuvalu 2 0
Vanuatu 27 22.8 -18.9 -0.5 19.5 0 0.0 0.0 1 560.6 -33.6
Developing economies 295 339 32.6 8.8 5.3 10.5 198 692 53.9 -2.7 3.5 25.4
Developed economies 34 858 -9.6 -0.2 20.2 92 719 -20.1 -4.0 3.2 63.0
All economies 330 197 22.3 7.4 7.9 16.7 291 411 -0.5 -3.2 3.4 32.9ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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Table 22. Inward and outward FDI stocks
FDI inward stock FDI outward stock
$ million percentage per annum $ million percentage per annum
2009 90-94 95-99 00-04 05-09 2009 90-94 95-99 00-04 05-09
East and North-East Asia 1 713 362 7.9 15.6 4.7 14.2 1 921 449 12.9 15.8 4.2 19.1
China 473 083 37.6 16.5 6.1 14.8 229 600 37.2 10.9 12.7 41.5
DPR Korea 1 437 5.8 9.8 7.2 0.1 0
Hong Kong, China 912 166 2.4 15.5 -0.1 14.9 834 089 49.0 42.1 0.9 15.3
Japan 200 141 18.2 8.3 17.8 18.7 740 930 8.1 1.1 7.4 17.7
Macao, China 13 381 -0.1 0.0 8.6 27.7 1 211 25.6
Mongolia 2 383 275.6 35.7 30.5 35.3 0
Republic of Korea 110 770 12.2 32.3 23.2 1.4 115 620 34.2 22.9 4.6 31.5
South-East Asia 689 980 18.1 13.7 6.2 14.3 342 367 40.2 13.0 13.5 20.0
Brunei Darussalam 10 672 16.0 50.7 24.0 3.1 732 7 198.5 6.9 7.5 3.3
Cambodia 5 169 50.5 41.6 7.2 20.3 307 6 008.3 6.2 7.3 3.5
Indonesia 72 841 16.7 9.4 -10.8 15.3 30 183 170.1 3.6 11.9 21.3
Lao PDR 1 564 76.7 25.5 3.6 23.7 20 2 192.4 23.0 -1.1
Malaysia 74 643 22.1 14.3 -5.0 13.8 75 618 36.8 28.2 -5.3 36.3
Myanmar 5 869 33.5 31.9 5.5 4.8 0
Philippines 23 559 17.7 11.9 -8.5 12.0 6 095 31.4 10.1 -2.6 31.7
Singapore 343 599 15.8 11.8 11.3 15.3 213 110 35.4 12.3 18.0 15.1
Thailand 99 000 17.5 15.2 15.5 13.1 16 303 36.7 7.3 14.1 33.9
Timor-Leste 238 253.9 0.0 23.2 9.6 0
Viet Nam 52 825 34.3 26.3 9.0 14.1 0
South and South-West Asia 295 399 9.2 11.9 20.4 19.0 96 833 6.2 25.8 24.9 48.4
Afghanistan 1 550 0.2 9.7 106.5 27.7 0
Bangladesh 5 139 1.6 33.2 9.3 10.2 91 0.5 8.6 7.9 -0.8
Bhutan 167 6.7 13.4 29.7 66.9 0
India 163 959 20.5 28.6 23.5 39.6 77 207 32.0 36.3 45.3 67.8
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 23 984 2.8 1.3 49.3 10.6 2 209 -12.6 29.5
Maldives 231 21.1 14.7 9.6 6.4
Nepal 166 4.5 51.3 14.7 6.9
Pakistan 17 789 19.5 7.4 2.4 14.9 2 201 2.2 11.7 9.5 26.1
Sri Lanka 4 687 16.0 14.3 8.0 17.6 334 37.7 24.4 11.0 18.6
Turkey 77 729 5.9 5.0 19.1 2.2 14 790 3.2 18.4 17.9 15.5
North and Central Asia 356 693 405.8 36.0 34.8 11.8 262 008 1 2583.8 30.1 52.2 15.1
Armenia 3 628 47.2 64.1 17.3 27.8 77 37.5 65.3
Azerbaijan 9 044 81.8 34.4 -10.1 6 114 654.6 13.5
Georgia 7 547 3 917.6 107.5 24.9 33.5 122 4.8 54.8
Kazakhstan 72 333 28.8 22.1 29.6 6 786 159.0
Kyrgyzstan 1 075 31.2 13.3 20.0 15 25.8 -43.5
Russian Federation 252 456 34.4 39.6 8.8 248 894 30.0 51.9 14.1
Tajikistan 870 4 061.8 29.5 16.6 29.9 0
Turkmenistan 6 103 6 431.6 18.5 20.1 26.4 0
Uzbekistan 3 638 5 904.6 55.7 12.2 29.4 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -100.0
Pacific island economies 406 933 9.4 4.3 23.4 8.0 359 584 11.4 12.2 23.4 12.9
American Samoa
Australia 328 090 6.7 3.8 24.4 7.9 343 632 11.9 14.0 24.3 13.3
Cook Islands 41 0.1 44.3 0.0 3.7 0
Fiji 2 163 16.7 -9.1 24.6 22.4 31 6.4 -5.0 12.1 -17.3
French Polynesia 340 10.0 7.2 8.9 13.8 117 27.1
Guam




New Caledonia 4 184 7.4 3.4 53.7 83.9
New Zealand 66 634 29.1 6.3 20.0 6.7 15 076 7.5 -2.3 13.2 6.8
Niue 7 355.6 0.0
Northern Mariana Islands
Palau 126 4.9 1.7
Papua New Guinea 3 071 -0.3 3.5 2.5 8.1 280 73.4 5.4 -0.4 1.2
Samoa 81 29.1 17.6 1.8 10.8
Solomon Islands 873 4.2 1.6 -0.6 22.2 389 0.2 10.7
Tonga 99 70.8 3.6 12.4 25.3
Tuvalu 34 9.9 7.8
Vanuatu 1 046 11.3 6.5 6.7 16.0 59 4 668.1 3.0
Developing economies 2 867 502 10.3 15.7 7.3 14.1 1 882 603 42.5 30.3 7.7 20.2
Developed economies 594 865 10.6 5.1 22.3 10.8 1 099 639 8.6 3.7 12.5 16.0
All economies 3 462 368 10.3 13.5 10.0 13.5 2 982 241 14.2 15.2 9.7 18.5PART III – TRADE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
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Table 23. Trade facilitation indicators
Time for completing trade Cost of completing trade procedures Import-export
procedures (days) (2000 constant United States dollars) facilitation bias 2010
2005 2010 % Change 2005 2010 % Change Time basis Cost basis
East and North-East Asia 23 19 -20.9 907 815 -10.1 1 1
China 21 23 7.1 309 412 33.5 1.1 1.1
DPR  Korea
Hong Kong, China 15 6 -63.3 370 483 30.7 0.8 1.0
Japan 11 11 886 817 -7.8 1.1 1.0
Mongolia 59 47 -20.5 2 178 1 738 -20.2 1.0 1.1
Macao, China
Republic of Korea 12 8 -37.5 792 623 -21.3 0.9 1.0
South-East Asia 29 21 -25.2 701 633 -9.7 1.0 1.1
Brunei Darussalam 23 528 0.8 1.1
Cambodia 49 24 -51.0 675 633 -6.3 1.2 1.2
Indonesia 28 24 -14.5 531 538 1.3 1.4 0.9
Lao PDR 72 49 -31.9 1 353 1 539 13.7 1.0 1.1
Malaysia 16 16 0.0 356 355 -0.1 0.8 1.0
Myanmar
Philippines 18 15 -17.1 696 554 -20.4 0.9 1.1
Singapore 4 5 12.5 341 353 3.7 0.8 1.0
Thailand 23 14 -41.3 822 560 -31.9 0.9 1.3
Timor-Leste 26 26 0.0 864 799 -7.5 1.0 1.0
Viet Nam 24 22 -8.5 674 474 -29.8 1.0 1.2
South and South-West Asia 38 30 -20.5 1 047 1 222 16.6 1.0 1.2
Afghanistan 82 76 -7.4 2 002 3 048 52.3 1.0 1.0
Bangladesh 46 28 -39.1 953 937 -1.6 1.2 1.4
Bhutan 38 38 0.0 1 406 1 585 12.8 1.0 2.0
India 40 19 -53.2 917 821 -10.5 1.2 1.0
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 33 29 -12.3 953 1 115 17.0 1.3 1.6
Maldives 21 22 4.9 1 044 1 214 16.2 1.0 1.0
Nepal 39 38 -2.6 1 447 1 600 10.6 0.9 1.1
Pakistan 35 20 -44.3 571 509 -10.8 0.9 1.1
Sri Lanka 26 20 -21.6 639 576 -9.8 0.9 1.0
Turkey 23 15 -35.6 543 810 49.2 1.1 1.1
Norht and Central Asia 61 52 -14.9 2 017 2 198 9.0 1.1 1.2
Armenia 36 16 -56.3 1 514 1 464 -3.3 1.4 1.2
Azerbaijan 56 45 -20.5 2 463 2 549 3.5 1.1 1.2
Georgia 53 12 -78.3 1 192 1 044 -12.5 1.3 1.0
Kazakhstan 83 74 -10.3 2 398 2 391 -0.3 0.8 1.0
Kyrgyzstan 70 68 -2.9 2 154 2 482 15.2 1.1 1.1
Russian Federation 36 36 0.0 1 523 1 460 -4.1 1.0 1.0
Tajikistan 83 3 117 1.0 1.4
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan 92 82 -11.4 2 872 3 078 7.2 1.3 1.5
Pacific island economies 23 23 -3.7 863 775 -10.2 1.1 1.0
American Samoa 12 9 -29.2 757 860 13.6 0.9 1.1
Australia
Cook Islands
Fij 24 23 -6.3 497 507 1.9 1.0 1.0
French Polynesia
Guam
Kiribati 21 21 0.0 1 349 844 -37.4 1.0 1.0
Marshall Islands 27 27 0.0 666 746 12.0 1.6 1.0
Micronesia (F.S.) 30 1 022 1.0 1.0
Nauru
New Caledonia
New Zealand 10 10 0.0 664 663 -0.1 0.9 1.0
Niue
Northern Mariana  Islands
Palau 32 31 -3.1 988 826 -16.4 1.1 1.0
Papua New Guinea 28 28 0.0 534 547 2.5 1.1 1.1
Samoa 29 29 0.0 774 658 -14.9 1.1 1.0
Solomon Islands 23 23 0.0 998 892 -10.7 0.9 1.2
Tonga 22 22 -2.3 507 543 7.0 1.3 1.1
Tuvalu
Vanuatu 28 28 0.0 1 758 1 196 -32.0 1.2 0.9
Developing economies 36 30 -15.8 1 093 1 123 2.8 1.0 1.0
Developed economies 11 10 -10.9 769 780 1.4 1.0 1.0
All economies 34 29 -16.0 1 107 1 129 1.9 1.0 1.1ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
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Table 24. Tariff protection in 2009
Tariff rate percentage Tariff rate percentage
Simple average MFN applied Simple average Final bound








East and North-East Asia
Chinah 9.6 15.6 8.7 10.0 15.7 9.2 1.8 0.7 48.4
DPR Korea
Hong Kong, Chinah 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0
Japane 4.9 21.0 2.5 5.1 22.2 2.5 1.5 50.7 84.0
Mongolia*b 5.0 5.1 5.0 17.5 18.9 17.3 2.4 0.0 1.4
Macao, Chinai 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0
Republic of Koreai 12.1 48.6 6.6 16.6 56.1 10.2 1.7 4.8 38.8
South-East Asia
Brunei Darussalam‡a 2.5 0.1 2.9 25.4 31.6 24.5 91.7 67.6
Cambodia†ag 14.2 18.1 13.6 19.1 28.1 17.7 2.9 0.3 6.0
Indonesiad 6.8 8.4 6.6 37.1 47.1 35.5 2.1 57.5 61.2
Lao PDRa 9.7 19.5 8.2 - - -
Malaysiac 8.4 13.5 7.6 24.0 73.0 14.9 1.0 75.1 64.6
Myanmara 5.6 8.7 5.1 83.4 103.7 21.5
Philippinesf 6.3 9.8 5.8 25.7 35.0 23.4 5.2 0.0 22.2
Singaporei 0.0 0.2 0.0 10.4 27.3 6.4 0.0 98.6 100.0
Thailandi 9.9 22.6 8.0 28.2 40.6 25.5 1.5 15.5 50.8
Timor-Leste
Viet Nam 10.9 18.9 9.7 11.4 18.5 10.4 36.4 44.6
South and South-West Asia
Afghanistana 5.6 5.8 5.5 - - - 0.3
Bangladesh*ah 14.7 17.6 14.3 169.2 192.0 34.4 11.8 27.8 16.6
Bhutanj 0.5
Indiai 12.9 31.8 10.1 48.5 113.1 34.4 8.1 40.7 14.3
Iran (Islamic Rep. of)‡ai 26.0 28.9 25.6 - - - 7.1 0.0 0.0
Maldivesi 20.4 18.3 20.7 36.9 48.0 35.1 12.7 15.6 0.1
Nepalj 12.4 14.3 12.1 26.0 41.4 23.7 6.5
Pakistane 13.9 17.1 13.4 59.9 95.6 54.6 7.1 24.6 40.5
Sri Lankai 11.2 24.8 9.2 30.2 50.1 19.6 4.0 0.3 42.1
Turkeyai 9.7 42.9 4.8 28.6 60.8 17.0 1.0 22.2 39.0
Norht and Central Asia
Armeniaai 2.8 6.8 2.2 8.5 14.7 7.6 2.1 27.9 77.4
Azerbaijan 8.9 13.5 8.2 - - - 33.6 9.8
Georgiai 1.3 7.7 0.3 7.4 13.1 6.5 0.8 45.9 98.0
Kazakhstani 5.9 12.2 4.9 - - - 2.1 13.4 47.7
Kyrgyzstan*i 4.6 7.7 4.2 7.5 12.7 6.7 2.9 31.4 49.4
Russian Federationd 10.5 13.2 10.1 - - - 5.2 7.1 24.5
Tajikistana 7.9 11.1 7.5 - - - 1.8
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan 15.9 19.2 15.4 - - -
Pacific island economies
American Samoa
Australiai 3.5 1.3 3.8 10.0 3.4 11.0 2.2 48.1 52.2
Cook Islands












Papua New Guineaa 5.0 14.2 3.6 32.1 45.8 30.0 85.6 94.1
Samoa
Solomon Islandsa 9.9 14.6 9.2 78.6 73.5 79.4
Tonga 11.7 11.7 11.7 17.6 19.2 17.3
Tuvalu










MFN duty free imports
percentage 2008
a Import duties collected, data during 2000-2001. h Import duties collected, data during 2005-2007.
b Import duties collected, data during 2000-2002. i  Import duties collected, data during 2006-2008.
c Import duties collected, data during 2001-2003. j  Import duties collected, data during 2007-2009.
d Import duties collected, data during 2002-2004. *  MFN duty free imports (%) 2007.
e Import duties collected, data during 2003-2005. ‡ MFN duty free imports (%) 2006.
f Import duties collected, data during 2004-2005. † MFN duty free imports (%) 2004.
g Import duties collected, data during 2004-2006. a Tariff rate in 2008.PART III – TRADE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
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Table 25. Preferential trade agreements – signed, under implementation and trade coverage
Trade coverage
Preferential trade Preferential trade under RTAs in
agreements signed  agreements put into force percentage,
 average 2007-2009
1976- 1996- 2001- 2006- 2011 Total 1976- 1996- 2001- 2006- 2011 Total Export Import 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010
East and North-East Asia 25.01 30.56
China 1 5 5 11 1 4 6 11 31.01 25.64
DPR Korea
Hong Kong, China 1 1 2 1 1 2 28.85 46.15
Japan 3 9 1 13 2 9 11 15.34 16.59
Macao, China 1 1 1 1 13.90 34.77
Mongolia
Republic of Korea 1 3 3 1 8 1 1 4 6 35.94 29.66
South-East Asia 61.84 70.12
Brunei Darussalam 1 1 5 7 1 1 6 8 92.57 63.51
Cambodia 1 1 4 6 1 1 4 6 8.81 69.75
Indonesia 1 1 6 8 1 1 5 7 61.32 76.29
Lao PDR 3 2 4 9 3 2 4 9 82.41 93.92
Malaysia 1 4 7 12 1 1 6 8 54.62 59.58
Myanmar 1 1 4 6 1 1 4 6 88.29 92.93
Philippines 1 1 5 7 1 1 5 7 46.69 54.05
Singapore 1 1 9 9 20 1 8 9 18 67.29 66.11
Thailand 2 4 4 10 2 4 4 10 49.66 53.46
Timor-Leste
Viet Nam 1 2 5 8 1 2 5 8 66.77 71.60
South and South-West Asia 40.32 39.96
Afghanistan 3 3 2 1 3 82.33 49.40
Bangladesh 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 7.53 37.15
Bhutan 1 1 2 2 2 93.09 76.34
India 1 1 4 4 1 11 1 3 7 11 39.40 42.93
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 2 1 3 1 1 2 8.29 8.11
Maldives 1 1 1 1 13.92 17.75
Nepal 1 1 2 2 2 64.09 61.45
Pakistan 5 4 9 2 6 8 20.26 23.24
Sri Lanka 1 1 2 4 1 2 1 4 8.22 33.19
Turkey 2 2 8 7 19 1 3 5 6 2 17 66.08 50.02
 North and Central Asia 45.39 46.50
Armenia 7 1 8 4 3 1 8 78.90 63.05
Azerbaijan 2 1 2 5 1 2 1 1 5 20.46 46.18
Georgia 3 3 1 1 8 1 5 2 8 51.39 46.82
Kazakhstan 3 4 1 1 9 2 4 2 1 9 22.50 47.03
Kyrgyzstan 6 2 1 9 4 4 1 9 55.71 59.99
Russian Federation 5 1 1 7 5 1 1 7 15.00 13.81
Tajikistan 1 1 2 4 1 1 2 4 40.03 46.54
Turkmenistan 3 1 1 5 2 2 1 5 59.31 46.73
Uzbekistan 3 2 1 6 2 3 1 6 65.20 48.39
Pacific island economies 19.36 37.88
American Samoa
Australia 3 3 2 8 3 3 2 8 21.44 37.15
Cook Islands 1 1 2 1 1 2 10.03 73.59
Fiji 2 1 3 2 1 3 32.76 37.59
French Polynesia
Guam
Kiribati 1 1 2 1 1 2 6.15 56.83
Marshall Islands 1 1 1 1 0.07 0.11
Micronesia (F.S.) 1 1 2 1 1 2 0.08 6.23
Nauru 1 1 2 1 1 2 11.50 26.52
New Caledonia
New Zealand 2 1 2 4 9 2 2 3 1 8 44.13 48.05
Niue 1 1 2 1 1 2 9.63 37.54
Northern Mariana Islands
Palau
Papua New Guinea 3 1 1 5 3 1 4 44.54 49.80
Samoa 1 1 2 1 1 2 64.25 44.36
Solomon Islands 2 1 3 2 1 3 2.71 34.16
Tonga 1 1 2 1 1 2 17.18 64.96
Tuvalu 1 1 2 1 1 2 24.15 16.91
Vanuatu 2 1 3 2 1 3 1.77 34.39
Developing economies 38.36 46.49
Developed economies 26.97 33.93
All economies 37.66 45.72ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
180PART III – TRADE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
181
REFERENCES
Abe, Masato (2010). Achieving a sustainable
automotive sector in Asia and the Pacific:
challenges and opportunities for the reduction of
vehicles CO2 emissions. ESCAP working paper
presented at the Regional Symposium on Low
Carbon Economy. Bali, Indonesia, 13-14 October.
Agence France-Presse (2010). Philippines overtakes
India as call centre capital. 6 December.
Aggarwal, Vinod K., and Simon Evenett (2010).
Financial crisis, new industrial policy, and the bite
of multilateral trade rules. Asian Economic Policy
Review, No. 5, pp. 221-244.
Akyüz, Yilmaz (2010). Export dependence and the
future of growth in China and East Asia. South
Bulletin Issue, No. 48, 30 June.
Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade
(2011a). Fighting Irrelevance: the Role of Regional
Trade Agreements in International Production
Networks.  Bangkok: ESCAP.
 (2011b, forthcoming).  Studies on Utilization
of Preferences and Rules of Origin in Asian
Preferential Trade Agreements.  Bangkok: ESCAP.
Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Agreements
Database (2010). Regional trade agreements in
Asia and the Pacific – What is in the number?
APTIAD Briefing Note No. 1, November. Available
from http://www.unescap.org/tid/aptiad/documents/
APTIAD-Briefing-Note-1.pdf
 (2011). How much trade is covered by the RTAs
and why does it matter? APTIAD Briefing Note
No. 2, June. Available from http://www.unescap.
org/tid/aptiad/documents/APTIAD-Briefing-Note-
2.pdf
Asian Association of Management Organizations
(2007). SMEs in Asian Region – Harnessing the
Growth Potential.  New Delhi.
Asian Development Bank (2000).  Private Sector
Development Strategy.  Manila.  March.
 (2001).  Report and Recommendation of the
President to the Board of Directors on Proposed
Loans to the Federated States of Micronesia for
the Private Sector Development Program.  Manila.
 (2006).  Central Asia: Increasing Gains from
Trade Through Regional Cooperation in Trade
Policy, Transport, and Customs Transit.  Manila.
 (2011).  Asian Development Outlook 2011:
South-South Economic Links.  Manila.
Asian Development Bank/Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2009).
Designing and Implementing Trade Facilitation in
Asia and the Pacific.  Manila: Asian Development
Bank. November. Available from www.unescap.org/
tid/publication/adbescapbook.asp
Asian Productivity Organization (2007).
Entrepreneurship Development for Competitive
Small and Medium Enterprises.  Tokyo.
Athukorala, Prema-chandra (2005). Product
fragmentation and trade patterns in East Asia.
Asian Economic Papers, vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 1-27.
 (2008). China’s integration into global production
networks and its implications for export-led growth
strategy in other countries in the region.  Working
Paper No. 2008/04. Canberra: Australian National
University.
 (2009). The rise of China and East Asian export
performance: is the crowding out fear warranted?
World Economy, vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 234-266.
 (2010). Production networks and trade patterns in
East Asia: regionalization or globalization. ADB
Working Paper No. 56, August.  Manila: Asian
Development Bank.
Athukorala, Prema-chandra, and Nobu Yamashita
(2008). Patterns and determinants of production
fragmentation in world manufacturing trade.
In Globalisation, Regionalism and Economic
Interdependence, F. di Mauro, S. Dees and
W. McKibbin, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. pp. 45-72.
Bank Negara Malaysia (2005). Small and Medium
Enterprise (SME) Annual Report.  Kuala Lumpur.
Beijing University of International Business and
Economics (2011). The Boao Forum for Asia
Progress of Asian Economic Integration Annual
Report 2011.  Beijing: Beijing University of
International Business and Economics Publishing
Co., Ltd.ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
182
Bonapace, Tiziana, and Mia Mikic (2007).  Regionalism
quo vadis? Charting the territory for new
integration routes. In Multilateralism, Regionalism
and Bilateralism in Trade and Investment, Philippe
de Lombaerde, ed. Dordrecht: Springer. Chapter 5,
 pp. 75-98.
Bouët, Antoine, and David Laborde Debucquet (2009).
The potential cost of a failed Doha Round. IFPRI
Discussion Paper 00886, July. Washington, D.C.:
International Food Policy Research Institute.
Bown, Chad (2010). The WTO dispute settlement
system would survive without Doha. VoxEU.org.
19 June. Available from www.voxeu.org/index.
php?q=node/5207
Carrére C., and J. de Melo (2004). Are different rules of
origin equally costly? Estimates from NAFTA.
Discussion Paper Series No. 4437. London:
Centre for Economic Policy Research.
China, Ministry of Commerce (2009). 2008 Statistical
Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct
Investment. Beijing.
Dolan, Catherine, John Humphrey and Carla Harris-
Pascal (2000). Horticulture commodity chains: the
impact of the UK market on the African fresh
vegetable industry.  IDS Working Paper No. 96.
Brighton, United Kingdom: Institute of Deve-
lopment Studies.
Duval, Yann (2011). Trade facilitation in regional trade
agreements: recent trends in Asia and the Pacific.
Trade and Investment Division Staff Working
Paper No. 02/11, March. Bangkok: ESCAP.
Available from www.unescap.org/tid/publication/
swp211.pdf
Duval, Yann, and Chorthip Utoktham (2010a).
Intraregional trade costs in Asia: a primer. Trade
and Investment Division Staff Working Paper
01/10. Bangkok: ESCAP. Available from www.
unescap.org/tid/publication/swp110.pdf
 (2010b). Beyond trade facilitation: impact of the
domestic business environment on export
competitiveness in Asia and the Pacific.  In Rising
Non-tariff Protectionism and Crisis Recovery.
Bangkok: ESCAP.  ST/ESCAP/2587.  Chapter VI.
Available from www.unescap.org/tid/publication/
tipub2587.asp.
 (2011). Trade facilitation in Asia and the Pacific:
which policies and measures affect trade costs the
most? Trade and Investment Division Staff
Working Paper No. 01/11, February.  Bangkok:
ESCAP. Available from www.unescap.org/tid/
publication/swp111.pdf
European Commission (2009). European SMEs under
Pressure: Annual Report on EU Small and
Medium-sized Enterprises 2009. Zoetermeer, the
Netherlands: EIM Business & Policy Research.
Economist Intelligence Unit (2011a).  EIU Country Data.
Available from http://www.eiu.com/
 (2011b).  Country Forecast: China, April 2011.
eiu.com.  Available from http://portal.eiu.com/
report_dl.asp?issue_ id=1718086556&mode=pdf
 (2011c). Country Forecast: India, April 2011.
eiu.com.  Available from http://portal.eiu.com/
report_dl.asp?issue_id=257928810&mode=pdf
Elliott, Larry (2011). WTO head Pascal Lamy warns of
looming protectionism without world trade
agreement. Guardian, 27 January. Available from
www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/jan/27/wto-
pascal-lamy-looming-threat-protectionism
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the
Pacific (2004). UNESCAP Trade Facilitation
Framework. Bangkok. ST/ESCAP/2327. Available
from www.unescap.org/tid/publication/t&ipub
2327.asp
 (2007a). Enhancing the Competitiveness of
SMEs: Subnational Innovation Systems and
Technological Capacity-Building Policies.
Bangkok. ST/ESCAP/2435.  Available from
www.unescap.org/tid/publication/indpub2435.asp
 (2007b).  Economic and Social Survey of Asia and
the Pacific 2007.  Sales No. E.07.II.F.4.
 (2009a). Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment
Report 2009. Sales No. E.09.II.F.19.
 (2009b). Globalization of Production and the
Competitiveness of Small and Medium-sized
Enterprises in Asia and the Pacific: Trends and
Prospects. Sales No. E.09.II.F.23.
 (2010). Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Report
2010. Bangkok. Available from www.unescap.org/
tid/ti_report2010/home.aspPART III – TRADE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
183
 (2011a). Economic and Social Survey of Asia and
the Pacific 2011. Sales No. E.11.II.F.2.
 (2011b, forthcoming).  Policy Guidebook for SME
Development in Asia and the Pacific. Bangkok.
 (2011c, forthcoming). Trade, Investment, and
Climate Change.  Bangkok.
Evenett, Simon (2010). The harm done to the
commercial interests of the LDCs: what role of the
G20?  In Tensions Contained...For Now: The 8th
GTA Report, S.J. Evenett, ed. London: Centre for
Economic Policy Research.  pp. 33-52.
Evenett, Simon, and Martin Wermelinger (2010).
Snapshot of contemporary protectionism: how
important are the murkier forms of trade
discrimination. In Rising Non-tariff Protectionism
and Crisis Recovery, M. Mikic and M.
Wermelinger, eds. Bangkok: ESCAP. Available
from www.unescap.org/tid/publication/tipub2587.
asp
Evenett, Simon, and others (2010). The resort to
protectionism during the great recession: which
factors mattered? St. Gallen, Switzerland:
University of St. Gallen. Mimeo. Available from
www.aeaweb.org/aea/2011conference/program/
retrieve.php?pdfid=575
fDi Intelligence (2011). FDI Global Outlook Report 2011:
Manufacturing Makes a Comeback. London:
Financial Times Ltd. Available from www.
fdiintelligence.com.
Foster, Neil, and Robert Stehrer (2010). Preferential
trade agreements and the structure of international
trade. Working Paper Series No. 61. Vienna:
Vienna Institute for International Economic
Studies.
Gereffi, Gary, John Humphrey and Timothy Sturgeon
(2005). The governance of global value chains.
Review of International Political Economy, vol. 12,
No. 1, pp. 78-104.
Gereffi, Gary, and Olga Memedovic (2003). The Global
Apparel Value Chain: What Prospects for
Upgrading by Developing Countries. Vienna:
United Nations Industrialization Development
Organization.
Global Production Networks (2003). Global Production
Networks in Europe and East Asia: The
Automotive Components Industry. GPN Working
Paper No. 7, May.  Manchester, United  Kingdom:
University of Manchester.
Gootiiz, Batshur, and Aaditya Mattoo (2009). Services in
Doha: what’s on the table? Policy Research
Working Paper No. 4903. Washington, D.C.:
World Bank.
Gopalan, Sasidaran, and Ramkishen S. Rajan (2010).
India’s FDI flows: trying to make sense of the
numbers. ARTNeT Alerts on Emerging Policy
Challenges, Issue No. 5, January. Bangkok:
ESCAP. Available from www.unescap.org/tid/
artnet/pub/alert5.pdf
Grafe, Clemens, Martin Raiser and Toshiaki Sakatsume
(2005). Beyond borders: reconsidering regional
trade in Central Asia. EBRD Working Paper No. 95.
London: European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development.
Grigoriou, Christopher (2007). Landlockedness,
infrastructure and trade: new estimates for Central
Asian countries. Policy Research Working Paper
No. 4335.  Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Haddad, Mona, and Ben Shepherd (2011). Managing
Openness – Trade and Outward Oriented Growth
after the Crisis. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott and Woan
Foong Wong (2010).  Figuring out the Doha
Round. Policy Analyses in International Economics
No. 91, June. Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute
for International Economics.
Hummels, David, and Peter J. Klenow (2005). The
variety and quality of a nation’s trade. American
Economic Review, vol. 95, No. 3, pp. 704-723.
Humphrey, John (2005). Shaping Value Chains
for Development: Global Value Chains in
Agribusiness.  Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft
für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH.
IBM Global Business Services (2010). Global Locations
Trend Annual Report.  New York. October.
Iimi, Atsushi (2005). Urbanization and development of
infrastructure in the East Asian region. JBICI
Review, No. 10, pp. 88-109. Available from:
www.jbic.go.jp/en/research/report/jbic-review/pdf/
report10_3.pdf (accessed in April 2011).ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
184
IMD (2011). World Competitiveness Yearbook.
Lausanne: IMD International. Available from
www.imd.org/research/publications/wcy/World-
Competitiveness-Yearbook-Results/
International Energy Agency (2010). Energy Technology
Perspectives 2010: Scenarios and Strategies to
2050. Paris.
International Labour Organization (2009). Micro, Small
and Medium-sized Enterprises and the Global
Economic Crisis: Impacts and Policy Responses.
Geneva.
International Monetary Fund (2011a). World Economic
Outlook 2011. Washington, D.C. April.
 (2011b).  Regional Economic Outlook: Asia and
Pacific – Leading the Global Recovery: Managing
the Next Phase of Growth. Washington, D.C.
April.
International Trade Centre (ITC) UNCTAD/WTO (2005).
Lao People’s Democratic Republic: the Case for
a National Export Strategy Key Issues and
Possible Response. Project LAO/61/89 Support to
Trade Promotion and Export Development in Lao
People’s Democratic Republic.  May.
Japan External Trade Organization (2007).  FY 2006
Survey of Japanese Firms’ International
Operations Report.  Tokyo.
Japan International Cooperation Agency (2006).
Effective Support Approaches for Small and
Medium Enterprises by Development Stages: Final
Report.  Tokyo.  March.
Jha, Veena (2009). Climate change, trade and
production of renewable energy supply goods: the
need to level the playing field. Geneva: Inter-
national Centre for Trade and Sustainable
Development.
Kawai, Masahiro, and Ganeshan Wignaraja (2011).
Asia’s Free Trade Agreements – How is Business
Responding? A joint publication of the Asian
Development Bank and the Asian Development
Bank Institute with Edward Elgar Publishing.
Cheltenhem, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar.
Kimura, Fukunari (2006). International production and
distribution networks in East Asia: facts,
mechanics, and policy implications. Asian
Economic Policy Review, vol. 1, No. 1.
Kugler, Maurice (2006). Spillovers from foreign direct
investment: within or between industries.  Journal
of Development Economics, vol. 80, pp. 444-477.
LOWTAX (2011). Mauritius: Double Tax Treaties.
Tortola, British Virgin Islands. Available from
www.lowtax.net/lowtax/html/jmu2tax.html#2tax
Malaysia, National SME Development Council (2010).




Malaysiandigest (2011). Mustapa: Malaysia’s FDI
Totaled US$9bil in 2010.  8 March.  Available from
www.malaysiandigest.com/news/18498-mustapa-
malaysias-fdi-totaled-us9bil-in-2010.html
Manchin, Miriam, and Annette O. Pelkmans-Balaoing
(2007). Rules of origin and the web of East Asian
free trade agreements. Policy Research Working
Paper No. 4273, July. Washington, D.C.: World
Bank.
McGuire, Greg (2002).  Trade in services – market
access opportunities and the benefits of
liberalization for developing economies.  UNCTAD
Policy Issues in International Trade and
Commodities Study Series No. 19.  New York and
Geneva: United Nations. Available from
www.unctad.org/en/docs/itcdtab20_en.pdf
Mikic, Mia (2009). Crisis-era state measures and Asia-
Pacific economies.  In The Unrelenting Pressure of
Protectionism: the 3rd GTA Report – a Focus on
the Asia-Pacific Region, S.J. Evenett, ed. London:
Centre for Economic Policy Research. pp. 33-47.
Miroudot, Sébastien, Jehan Sauvage and Marie
Sudreau (2010). Multilateralising regionalism: how
preferential are services commitments in regional
trade agreements? OECD Trade Policy Working
Papers, No. 106. Paris. Available from http://
dx.doi.org/10.1787/5km362n24t8n-en
Molinuevo, Martin (2010). Protectionism in services
during the global crisis – a (trade) war in shallow
trenches. In Rising Non-tariff Protectionism and
Crisis Recovery, M. Mikic and M. Wermelinger,
eds. Bangkok: ESCAP. Chapter VIII, pp. 156-172.
ST/ESCAP/2587. Available from www.unescap.
org/tid/publication/tipub2587.aspPART III – TRADE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
185
Nadvi, Khalid, and John Thoburn (2003). Challenges to
Vietnamese firms in the world garment and textile
value chain, and the implications for alleviating
poverty.  EADI Workshop on Clusters and Global
Value Chains in the North and the Third World,
Novara, Italy, October. Available from www.eco.
unipmn.it/eventi/eadi/papers/nadvithoburn.pdf
Ng, Francis, and Alexander Yeats (2001). Production
sharing in East Asia: who does what for whom,
and why? In Global Production and Trade in East
Asia, L.K. Cheng and H. Kierzkowski, eds.
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 63-109.
 (2003). Major trade trends in East Asia: what are
their implications for regional cooperation and
growth? Policy Research Working Paper No. 3084.
Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (2005). OECD SME and Entre-
preneurship Outlook – 2005.  Paris.
  (2011). Central Asia: more diversified and




Park, Yung Chul, and Kwanho Shin (2009). Economic
integration and changes in the business cycle in
East Asia: is the region decoupling from the rest of
the world? Asian Economic Papers, vol. 8, No. 1,
pp. 107-140.




Rodriguez-Clare, Andres (1996). Multinationals,
linkages, and economic development.  American
Economic Review, vol. 86, No. 4, pp. 852-873.
 (2007). Clusters and comparative advantage:
implications for industrial policy. Journal of
Development Economics, vol. 82, pp. 43-57.
Shepherd, Ben (2010). Facilitating services trade in
the Asia-Pacific. ARTNeT Policy Brief No. 28,
November. Bangkok: ESCAP.  Available from
www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/pub/polbrief28.pdf
Shepherd, Ben, and Erik Van Der Marel (2010). Trade
in services in the APEC region: patterns,
determinants, and policy implications. Report
prepared for the APEC Policy Support Unit.
Singapore.
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (2010).
Available from www.sdc.admin.ch/
Stephenson, Sherry (2011). The convergence of
regional trade agreements.  Paper written for the
Global Trade Agenda Council of the World
Economic Forum.
Stern, Nicholas (2011). The prize, perils and price




Sturgeon, Timothy J., and Richard K. Lester (2001). The
new global supply-base: new challenges for local
suppliers in East Asia. Paper prepared for the
World Bank’s Project on East Asia’s Economic
Future.  Washington, D.C.
Taiwan Province of China, Small and Medium
Enterprise Administration, Ministry of Economic
Affairs (2010).  White Paper of Small and Medium
Enterprises in Taiwan.  Taipei.  Available from http://
book.moeasmea.gov.tw/book/doc_detail.jsp?
pub_SerialNo=2010A01017&click=2010A01017
Tambunan, Tulus T.H. (2009a). Facilitating small and
medium enterprises in international trade (export):
the case of Indonesia.  Paper presented at the
Asia-Pacific Trade Economists’ Conference:
Trade-led Growth in Times of Crisis, Bangkok,
November. Available from www.unescap.org/tid/
artnet/mtg/Tulus%20Tambunan.pdf
 (2009b). Impact of Global Economic Crisis on
Exports of SMEs in Developing Countries. Jakarta:
Center for Industry, SME and Business
Competition Studies, Trisakti University. Available
from http://static.globaltrade.net/files/pdf/20100
526020801.pdf
United Kingdom, Department for International
Development (2008).  Private Sector Development
Strategy – Prosperity for all: Making Markets
Work. London. Available from http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.
gov.uk/Documents/publications/Private-Sector-
development-strategy.pdfASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
186
United Nations, Statistics Division, Department of
Economic and Social Affairs (2010). Manual on
Statistics of International Trade in Services 2010
(MSITS2010).  Available from http://unstats.un.org/
unsd/tradeserv/TFSITS/msits2010/M86%20rev1-
white%20cover.pdf
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(2009). Review of Maritime Transport 2009.  Sales
No. E.09.II.D.11. Available from www.unctad.org/
en/docs/rmt2009_en.pdf
 (2010a). World Investment Report 2010:
Investing in a Low-carbon Economy.  Sales
No. E.10.II.D.2.
 (2010b). Cross-border M&A deals worth over $1
billion completed in 2009. Division on Investment
and Enterprise. July. Mimeo.
 (2011a). Global Investment Trends Monitor:
Global and Regional FDI Trends in 2010, No. 5,
17 January. Available from www.unctad.org/en/
docs/webdiaeia20111_en.pdf
 (2011b).  Global Investment Trends Monitor:
Global and Regional Trends of FDI Outflows in
2010, No. 6, 27 April.  Available from www.unctad.
org/en/docs/webdiaeia20114_en.pdf
 (2011c).   Services, development and trade: the
regulatory and institutional dimension – Expanding
trade opportunities for developing countries. Trade
and Development Commission, April. TD/B/C/.1/
MEM.3/8. Geneva. Available from www.unctad.
org/en/docs/c1mem3d8_en.pdf
United Nations Industrial Development Organization
(2010).  UNIDO’s Industrial Policy & Private Sector
Development Branch. Available from www.unido.
org/index.php?id=1000115. Vienna.
United Nations Network of Experts on Paperless Trade
for Asia and the Pacific (2010). Towards a single
window trading environment: case of Korea’s
national paperless trade platform – uTradeHub.
UNNExT Brief No. 3, May. Bangkok:  ESCAP.
Available from www.unescap.org/unnext/pub/
brief3.pdf
United States Agency for International Development
(2004). Analysis of the Role and Place of Small
and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Russia.
Washington, D.C.
United States International Trade Commission (2010).
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: U.S. and EU
Export Activities, and Barriers and Opportunities
Experienced by U.S. Firms. Washington, D.C.
Available from www.usitc.gov/publications/332/
pub4169.pdf
Veloso, Francisco, and Rajiv Kumar (2002). The
Automotive Supply Chain: Global Trends and
Asian Perspectives. ERD Working Paper No. 3,
January. Manila: Asian Development Bank.
Wermelinger, Martin (2011).  Features of post-crisis
protectionism in Asia and the Pacific. ARTNeT
Working Paper Series No. 97, May. Bangkok:
ESCAP. Available from www.unescap.org/tid/
artnet/pub/wp9711.pdf
Wermelinger, Martin, and Ian Barnes (2010). “Climate
change mitigation policies in the Asia-Pacific: A
concern for trade policymakers?”, ARTNeT Policy
Brief No. 27, September. Bangkok: ESCAP.
Available from www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/pub/
polbrief27.pdf
World Bank (2002).  Private Sector Development
Strategy – Directions for the World Bank Group.
Washington, D.C.
 (2004). Tajikistan trade diagnostic study. Available
from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTLF/
Resources/Tajikistan_Final_Report.pdf
 (2008). International Trade and Climate Change:
Economic, Legal and Institutional Perspectives.
Washington, D.C.
  (2010a).  Doing Business 2011: Making




 (2010b). Logistics Performance Index 2010: the
Asia-Pacific Region. LPI Regional Brochure
Series. Washington, D.C. Available from http://
go.worldbank.org/0X5BB50CW0
 (2011). Doing Business – measuring business
regulations. Washington, D.C. Available from
www.doingbusiness.org/
World Trade Organization (2007). World Trade Report
2007 – Six Decades of Multilateral Trade




 (2010a). International Trade Statistics 2010.
Geneva. Available from www.wto.org/english/
res_e/statis_e/its2010_e/its10_toc_e.htm
 (2010b). World Trade Report 2010: Trade in
Natural Resources. Geneva. Available from
www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/
wtr10_e.htm
 (2011a). Trade growth to ease in 2011 but despite
2010 record surge, crisis hangover persists.  WTO
2011 Press Releases, Press/628,
7 April. Geneva. Available from www.wto.org/
english/news_e/pres11_e/pr628_e.htm
 (2011b).  A review statistics on trade flows in
services – overview of trade flows in commercial
services 2000-2010. Council for Trade in Services,
S/C/W329Add.1, 7 January.  Geneva.
 (2011c). Protectionist pressures on the rise, latest
G20 monitoring report says. WTO 2011 News
Item, 24 May. Geneva. Available from
www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/
igo_24may11_e.htm
Yusuf, Shahid, Kaoru Nabeshima and Dwight Perkins
(2007).  China and India reshape global industrial
geography.  In Dancing with Giants: China, India,
and Global Economy, L. Alan Winters and Shahid
Yusuf, eds. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Chapter 2.
Zhang, Yunling, and Minghui Shen (2011). The status of
East Asian Free Trade Agreements.  ADBI Working
Paper 282. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank




Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Agreements
Database (APTIAD). Available from www.unescap.
org/tid/aptiad
CEIC Database. Available from http://ceicdata.
securities.com/cdmWeb/
Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook 2011.
Available from https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2011.html
CEPII Database.  Available from www.cepii.fr/
anglaisgraph/news/accueilengl.htm
Containerization International online. Available from
www.ci-online.co.uk/
Economist Intelligence Unit. eiu.com. Available from
www.eiu.com/.  Accessed in October 2010.
ESCAP Trade Cost Database. Available from www.
unescap.org/tid/artnet/trade_cost.asp
GTZ. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische
Zusammenarbeit. Available from http://www.
gtz.de/en/index.htm (acccessed in 2010).
Global Trade Alert.  Global Trade Alert database.
Available from www.globaltradealert.org/site-
statistics.
European Commission. Eurostat. Available from http://
epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/
eurostat/home/
Viet Nam, General Statistics Office of Viet Nam.
Available from www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.
aspx?tabid=491
International Monetary Fund. Data and Statistics.
Available from www.imf.org/external/data.htm
. Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). Available
from www.imf.org/external/data.htm
. World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database April
2011, Available from www.imf.org/external/
data.htm.
International Trade Centre UNCTAD/WTO. Market
Analysis Tools: Investment Map. Available from
www.intracen.org/marketanalysis/Default.aspx,
Accessed on 26 November 2010.
Republic of Korea, Statistics Korea. Available from
www.kostat.go.kr/eng/
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development. OECD.StatExtracts. Available from
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx
Thailand, Office of Small and Medium Enterprises
Promotion. Available from http://eng.sme.go.th/
Pages/home.aspx
United Nations, Statistics Division, Department of
Economic and Social Affairs. UN Comtrade
database. Available from www.comtrade.un.org.
Accessed in October 2010.ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2011
188
. UN Service Trade database.  Available from
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/ServiceTrade/default.
aspx
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
UNCTADstat. Available from www.unctad.org/
TEMPLATES/Page.asp?intItemID=1584&lang=1.
Accessed in October 2010.
World Bank. World Development Indicators. Available
from http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators. Accessed on 25 October
2010.
. Doing Business 2011 database. Available
from www.doingbusiness.org/. Accessed on
12 November 2010.
. Doing Business 2011 database: Economy
Rankings. Available from http://www.doingbusi
ness.org/rankings.  Accessed on 20 April 2011.
. World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS)
Database. Available from http://wits.worldbank.org/
wits/.  Accessed on 19 May 2011.
World Tourism Organization.  UNWTO World Tourism
Barometer. Advance release January 2011.
Available from www.unwto.org/facts/eng/baro
meter.htm
World Trade Organization. WTO Statistics database.
Available from http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDB
Home.aspx?Language= . Accessed on 7 April
2011.




. International Trade Statistics online. Available
from http://stat.wto.org/StatisticalProgram/
WSDBStatProgramHome.aspx?Language=E.
Accessed on 7 April 2011.
. Tariff Profiles 2010. Available from http://
stat.wto.org/TariffProfile/WSDBTariffPFHome.
aspx?Language=E
. Regional Trade Agreements Information System
(RTA-IS). Available from http://rtais.wto.org/UI/
PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx